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ABSTRACT 
Prediction of financial distress has been a topic of much interest to companies and all 
interested stakeholders (Wanke et al. 2015). Investors, debt holders, creditors, employees, 
governments, auditors and the society in general, are all affected in one way or the other 
when firms become financially distressed and they eventually fail. Financial distress 
detection has been an important issue in the academic literature but since the 2007 
financial crises, it has become a more relevant issue because of the increasing number of 
firms becoming financially distressed and bankrupt. From a report in the Guardian 
newspaper on 17th January 2018, almost half a million UK businesses begun 2018 in 
significant financial distress and according to the UK Insolvency Service, 17,439 firms 
in England and Wales went bust in 2018. The expectation is that with Brexit uncertainty, 
inflation and interest rate may rise which can lead to weaker consumer spending 
impacting on business financial performance.  
Early studies (Beaver 1966, 1968; Altman 1968; Ohlson 1980; Taffler 1984) on financial 
distress used accounting and cash flow empirical-based variables to develop financial 
distress prediction models. Recent studies (Lee and Yeh 2004; Lajili and Zeghal 2010; 
Brédart 2014) indicate that the predictive power of these models is improved significantly 
by including corporate governance mechanisms. However, the role of corporate 
governance mechanisms in influencing financial distress may be moderated by firms’ 
contextual factors. Hence, in determining the influence of corporate governance 
mechanisms on financial distress, firms’ environment, resource, and technology need to 
be considered. The study, therefore, determines the moderating influence of firms’ 
environment (complexity, dynamism, and munificence), resource (tangible and 
intangible), and technology on the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and financial distress.  
Also, Daily et al. (2003) have contested that taking a multi-theoretic approach to corporate 
governance is necessary to observe and understand how each corporate governance 
mechanism is viewed from each different theoretical perspective. This study uses the 
agency theory, the resource dependence theory, the stakeholder theory, and the 
stewardship theory to develop the research hypotheses to test the influence of corporate 
governance mechanisms on the likelihood of firms’ financial distress because each of 
these theories may argue and prescribe different functions for each corporate governance 
mechanism. 
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The study has four main objectives. The first objective is to assess if the composition and 
structure of corporate boards are associated with the financial distress of UK firms. The 
second objective is to evaluate whether the different forms of firms’ ownership have any 
influence on the financial distress of UK firms. The third objective is to determine the 
extent to which the disclosure and transparency components of corporate governance are 
related to the financial distress of UK firms. The final objective is to determine whether 
the environment, resources, and technology moderate the corporate governance and 
financial distress relationship of UK firms. 
The data for the study is obtained from the annual reports of 100 financially distressed 
and 100 financially non-distressed firms listed on the London Stock Exchange for the 
period 2009 to 2016. The results of the study indicate that from the components of board 
composition and structure; board activity, board member qualification, audit committee 
independence, remuneration committee size, and the presence of a firm’s chairperson on 
the audit committee are all significantly and negatively related to firms’ financial distress. 
However, the board size, the proportion of independent directors, board member financial 
expertise, and audit committee size are significantly but positively related to firms’ 
financial distress. In terms of the ownership structure variables, the directors’ ownership, 
institutional ownership, as well as the concentrated ownership are all significant and have 
negative relationships with firms’ financial distress. For disclosure and transparency 
variables, directors’ remuneration, the presence of senior independent director, and 
disclosure of notice of annual general meeting in the annual reports are significantly and 
negatively related to firms’ financial distress, but the disclosure of proxy voting 
arrangements in the annual reports has no significant relationship with firms’ financial 
distress. On the control variables, firm size and firm age are all significant and have 
negative relationships with financial distress. In addition, the industry is ascertained to 
show significant effects. Regarding the moderating role of environment (complexity, 
dynamism, and munificence), resources (tangible and intangible), and technology, the 
results have provided evidence of some moderating influence of these factors on the 
relationship between the corporate governance mechanism and financial distress. 
Moreover, the results have shown that models with the interactions of the moderating 
factors have lower arithmetic values for Akaike’s Information Criteria (AIC) indicating 
that these models are of best fit than the baseline model without the interactive terms. The 
results further show that technology has a more moderating influence on corporate 
governance and financial distress relationship, and this is followed by environmental 
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dynamism, environmental complexity, tangible resources, intangible resources, and 
environmental munificence.  
Also, the results indicate that although the board composition and structure model, the 
ownership structure model, and the disclosure and transparency model have the best fit 
over the model with only the firm characteristics, the corporate governance model which 
combines all the corporate governance mechanisms has the best fit to determine firms’ 
financial distress due to its lower AIC value. This means that corporate governance 
mechanisms are effective in determining firms’ financial distress when all of them are put 
together. Based on the results, the study suggests the need for policy makers to ensure 
that firms comply with the mechanisms of corporate governance, pay attention to their 
environment and consider their resources and technological capabilities in the institution 
and implementation of their corporate governance structures to prevent their firms 
becoming financially distressed.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
OBJECTIVES AND OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
Financial distress detection is a major issue in the finance and accounting literature 
because of its impacts on many stakeholders (Brédart 2014). Investors, debt holders, 
creditors, employees, governments, auditors, and society, in general, are all affected in 
many ways when firms become financially distressed and ultimately fail. For instance, 
the collapse of the UK retail company, British Home Stores in April 2016 affected all 
stakeholders including the 11,000 individuals employed by the company and cost the 
taxpayer £35 million. Financial distress detection has become more relevant because of 
the 2007 financial crisis in which many firms became financially distressed and filed for 
bankruptcy (Li and Zhong 2013). In the UK, some firms continue to find themselves in 
financial distress. According to the Guardian newspaper’s report on 17th January 2018, 
493,296 UK businesses were experiencing significant financial distress in the final 
quarter of 2017. This figure was 36% higher than at the same time in 2016 and 10% higher 
than in the third quarter of 2017 according to the report. At the end of 2018, 17,439 
companies entered insolvency, a rise of 0.7% on 2017 (Insolvency Service and Company 
House 2018). What is worrying is that with Brexit uncertainty, businesses especially the 
high-street retailers are expected to find it difficult because the Bank of England expects 
the level of business investment to be around 25 per cent lower by 2019 relative to its pre-
referendum forecasts, which is damaging to the country’s future productivity growth 
(Independent newspaper, 26th December 2017). It is therefore not surprising that some 
leading UK retailers including Tesco, Asda, Marks and Spencer, and Sainsbury's 
supermarkets are implementing cost-cutting measure to ensure survival.  
According to Baldwin and Scott (1983), the financial distress of a firm occurs when the 
firm’s business deteriorates to the point where it cannot meet its financial obligations. 
Traditionally, financial distress prediction models developed since the sixties (Beaver 
1966, 1968; Altman 1968;   Deakin 1972; Altman et al. 1977; Ohlson 1980) primarily 
focused on accounting and cash flow empirical-based variables. Generally, according to 
Parker et al. (2002), the components of financial distress or bankruptcy models revolve 
around six dimensions of the firm and these are; financial risk, operating risk, size, 
liquidity, profitability, and market perception. Although financial and accounting ratios 
have their own limitations, including the assertion that accounting information is subject 
to window dressing through earnings management which affects the reliability of the 
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accounting ratios  (Lee and Yeh 2004), ratios obtained from financial statements are 
regarded as one of the most important information sources about a firm’s affairs (Smith 
et al. 2011). Hence, studies on predictions of corporate financial distress continue to use 
financial and accounting ratios. However, researchers (Fich and Slezak 2008; Chang 
2009; Platt and Platt 2012) have argued that models based on financial and accounting 
data alone do not provide enough predictive power for financial distress. Recently, 
researchers (Lajili and Zéghal 2010; Brédart 2014) investigated the link between financial 
distress and corporate governance and results of these studies indicate that corporate 
governance variables significantly improve the predictive power of the widely used 
model to predict financial distress. For instance, Donker et al. (2009) find that firms with 
higher levels of managerial shareholdings are less likely to experience financial distress 
and that the model with ownership variables represented a significant improvement over 
empirically derived prediction models that used financial ratios after sampling 177 firms 
in the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. However, the relationship between corporate 
governance and financial distress is likely to be moderated by the firms’ environment, 
resources, and technological capability. It is important for corporate governance research 
to uncover firm contextual factors and to understand how the effectiveness of corporate 
governance practices is moderated by the firm’s environment, resources, and 
technological capability. Hence, it is important to understand how these contextual factors 
moderate corporate governance and financial distress relationship.  
Moreover, agency theory has dominated research on corporate governance (Daily et al. 
2003), but critiques say, it is “under-contextualised” and therefore lacks the ability to 
accurately compare and explain the diversity of corporate governance arrangements 
across different institutional and national context (Aguilera et al. 2008). However, since 
corporate governance is a complex and diverse concept where various elements interact 
and could lead to various performance outcomes, a multi-theoretic approach is needed to 
address all aspects of governance, financial, and accounting decisions on firm value and 
performance (Lajili and Zéghal 2010). 
The Financial Reporting Council (FRC), the Stock Exchange and the accountancy 
profession in response to increasing concern about standards of financial reporting and 
accountability, particularly in the light of the BCCI and Maxwell cases, the Cadbury 
report, which marked the beginning of UK’s corporate governance code, was produced 
(Cadbury 1992). Since then reformers have recommended board diversity (Tyson 2003), 
a greater proportion of non-executive directors on boards (Higgs 2003), audit committees 
      
3 
 
(Smith 2003) and other mechanisms as necessary to enhance board effectiveness (Appiah 
2013) to ensure continuing firms’ survival. In addition, the FRC has been launching 
yearly public consultations on the UK corporate governance code, the most recent being 
the FRC’s plans for a comprehensive review of the UK corporate governance code 
2017/2018. However, despite the various amendments and consultation to the corporate 
governance code aimed at ensuring that it is in line with ongoing business environments, 
some firms continue to face financial distress while others end up in failure, the cause of 
which might be attributed to corporate governance. The UK corporate governance code 
is based on the principle of ‘comply’ or ‘explain’ which leaves some firms only to explain 
in their annual reports why some aspects of the code have not been complied with. Firms’ 
board of directors is a significant corporate governance mechanism, hence, their role is 
very important because their ability to act effectively is a determinant of firms’ financial 
health (Manzaneque et al. 2016a). The nomination, audit, and remuneration committees 
are equally significant corporate governance mechanisms that respectively improve board 
composition, accountability and the executive remuneration process.  
Taking into consideration the different theories that include the agency, resource 
dependence, stakeholder, and stewardship, which complement one other in finding out 
the necessary corporate governance mechanisms that might affect firms’ financial distress 
(Appiah 2013), this study determines whether corporate governance mechanisms have 
some relationships with firms’ financial distress considering the various amendments to 
the code and whether the relationship is moderated by the firms’ environment, resources, 
and/or technological capability. 
1.2 MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY 
This study is motivated by the following. First, the recent corporate scandals including 
the accounting scandal by Tesco supermarket, the payment protection insurance and the 
LIBOR fixing which affected the banking industry; and the scandal surrounding the Co-
operative Group of Companies; have reignited concerns regarding the effectiveness of 
corporate governance practices of UK firms. For instance, Tesco supermarket was 
accused of aggressively managing its accounts in the year leading to 2014 and that three 
former senior board members of the company were charged with fraud in relation to the 
£250 million accounting scandal between February and September 2014 by the Serious 
Fraud Office. Corporate governance structures, therefore, may potentially influence the 
accuracy of the financial and accounting disclosures used to measure the true condition 
of the firm (Fich and Slezak 2008). Although empirical results support the hypotheses 
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that weak corporate governance tends to reduce the corporate value, whether it will lead 
to a higher probability of financial distress remains an open question (Lee and Yeh 2004).  
Second, in the UK, many firms continue to face financial distress, and some have ceased 
to operate due to their inability to generate enough funds to turnaround their operations. 
As noted earlier on page one of this study, 493,296 UK businesses were experiencing 
significant financial distress in the final quarter of 2017 meaning, almost half a million 
UK businesses started 2018 in significant financial distress (The Guardian newspaper’s 
report on 2018). At the end of 2018, 17439 companies entered insolvency, a rise of 0.7% 
on 2017. The rate at which businesses are getting into financial distress situations has 
raised questions about how those businesses are governed. Woolworth, MFI, and the 
British Home Stores, which failed in 2008 and 2014 led to their stakeholders demanding 
answers from their board of directors about how those businesses were run, and how 
certain financial transactions were carried out.  
Third, the UK corporate governance code is based on the principle of ‘comply’ or 
‘explain’. Since its establishment, there have been several amendments to the corporate 
governance code requiring firms to comply or explain. For instance, the Greenbury (1995) 
report requires remuneration committees to consist of non-executive directors who should 
be responsible for determining the level of executive directors' compensation packages, 
and that there should be full disclosure of each executive's pay package. The Higgs (2003) 
report also requires a firm’s non-executive directors to possess the knowledge, 
experience, skills and time to perform their functions and that with the exception of the 
chairperson, at least, half of the board should be made up of non-executive directors, as 
well as the recommendation to nominate a senior independent director to ensure good 
relations among directors and efficient communication between shareholders and 
directors. On diversity, the Higgs (2003) report argues that diversity could enhance board 
effectiveness. In addition, the Combined Code (2003) requires the board of companies to 
be of enough and manageable size. The Corporate Governance Code (2014) also requires 
the board to establish audit committees of at least three independent non-executive 
directors. With these and other requirements from the UK corporate governance code 
which firms are required to comply or otherwise explain to ensure standard financial 
reporting and accountability, the question that needs answering is, whether firms comply 
with the corporate governance mechanisms, and if so, whether the corporate governance 
mechanisms have any influence on firms’ financial distress. It is therefore important for 
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the study to determine whether the corporate governance mechanism prescribed by the 
code and the various amendments have any influence on firms’ financial distress. 
Fourth, the environment in which firms operate in, their resource capacity, as well as their 
technological capability are significant contextual factors that influence firms’ activity 
and could have moderating influences on the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and firms’ financial distress. However, the extant literature (Fich and Slezak 
2008; Chang 2009; Lajili and Zéghal 2010; Platt and Platt 2012; Brédart 2014) have not 
established whether the firms’ environment, resource, and technological capability could 
moderate the corporate governance mechanisms and financial distress relationship of 
firms. 
Fifth, the relationship between corporate governance and financial distress has been 
analysed by several studies the results of which are not homogeneous (Ciampi 2015). For 
instance, in terms of CEO duality, Simpson and Gleason (1999) find a lower probability 
of financial distress when one person is both the CEO and chairperson of the board, but 
Sharma (2001) finds that CEO duality is not associated with financially distressed status 
while CEO duality on the occurrence of financial distress did not lead to significant results 
in a study by Brédart (2014). Also, according to Nahar Abdullah (2006), his findings of 
board independence not associated with financial distress status contradicts the evidence 
of Elloumi and Gueyié (2001) but consistent with the findings by Chaganti et al. (1985). 
Due to these inconclusive outcomes of how corporate governance mechanisms influence 
corporate financial distress, it is essential that this study continues this investigation with 
a new dataset to find out if different and new conclusions can be drawn. 
Lastly, sample sizes and sample periods of some studies including those by Wu et al. 
(2008), Chen and Du (2009), and Lajili and Zéghal (2010) are not large and long enough 
to draw generalised research conclusions. These studies, therefore, recommend a larger 
sample size and longer sample periods in future studies. For instance, Lajili and Zéghal 
(2010) indicate that the insignificance of the independence hypothesis in their study could 
be due in part to the short-term horizon adopted and therefore recommend that future 
research should consider both a longer time horizon and a larger number of firms to detect 
and systematically test whether and how board independence, turnover, and ownership 
structure impact financial distress.  
It is from the above discussions that this study intends to close the gap by using a sample 
of UK firms to test the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
      
6 
 
financial distress and to test if the relationship between corporate governance and 
financial distress is moderated by the firms’ environment, resources, and technology.  
1.3 AIM AND OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
The main aim of the study is to investigate the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and firms’ financial distress and determine whether the environment, 
resource, and technology have any moderating influence on the corporate governance and 
financial distress relationship of UK firms. The main aim will be achieved by aggregating 
the following individual objectives: 
1. To assess if the composition and structure of corporate boards are associated with 
the financial distress of UK firms. 
 
2. To evaluate whether the different forms of firms’ ownership (directors, 
institutional and concentrated ownerships) have any influence on the financial 
distress of UK firms. 
3. To establish the extent to which the disclosure and transparency components of 
corporate governance relate to the financial distress of UK firms. 
4. To determine whether firms’ environment, resources, and technological capability 
moderate the relationship between board composition and structure variables, 
ownership structure variables, and disclosure and transparency variables; and the 
financial distress of UK firms.  
1.4 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH METHODOLOGY OF THIS STUDY 
From the population of firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) for the period 
2009-2016, the study obtains data from the annual reports for a sample of 200 firms. The 
rationales behind the selection of this population are that first; it provided the sample of 
distressed and non-distressed firms required for the study. Second, in addition to the 
requirement to prepare and publish their accounts, listed companies are required to report 
on how they have applied the principles of corporate governance in their annual reports. 
The period 2009-2016 is selected to ensure that the study results reflect the current 
corporate governance principles that firms are supposed to comply or explain. From the 
population, the study excludes firms that are specially regulated and these include banks 
and other financial institutions since they are subject to different regulatory standards, 
compliance, and institutional requirements (Manzaneque et al. 2016a). Banks and the 
other financial institutions also have a number of significant differences in terms of 
industrial characteristics as well as accounting reporting standards, such as income-
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measuring accounting rules (Hsu and Wu 2014) and therefore their financial reporting, 
ratios, and cash flows are substantially different from the non-financial firms. These make 
analysis and comparison of their data with the other non-financial firms very difficult and 
impractical.  
The variables in the study are grouped under dependent, independent, moderating and 
control variables. The dependent variable of the study is financial distress, which is a 
binary (0,1). Hence, the study adopts a dummy variable for financial distress with ‘1’ 
representing financially distressed firms and ‘0’ representing financially non-distressed 
firms. The extant literature ( Elloumi and Gueyié 2001;  Lee and Yeh 2004; Donker et al. 
2009; Brédart 2014) describe financial distress as a dichotomous variable. The 
independent variables for the study are grouped under three main headings and these are: 
board composition and structure (board size, proportion of independent directors, board 
gender diversity, board activity, board member qualification, board member financial 
expertise, audit committee independence, audit committee size, a firm’s chairperson on 
audit committee, remuneration committee size, and a firm’s chairperson on remuneration 
committee); ownership structure (directors ownership, institutional ownership, and 
concentrated ownership); and disclosure and transparency (directors’ remuneration, 
senior independent director, disclosure of notice of annual general meeting in the annual 
reports, and disclosure of proxy voting arrangements in the annual reports). The 
moderating variables are a technological capability, resources (tangible and intangible) 
and environment (munificence, complexity, and dynamism). Finally, the control variables 
for the study are firm size, firm age, and industry. 
1.5 SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS OF THIS STUDY 
The regression results of this study fulfil the four main objectives set out in the study. The 
first objective was to assess if the composition and structure of corporate boards are 
associated with the financial distress of UK firms. This study identified eleven 
components of board composition and structure and the results associated with them are 
as follows:  
1. The regression results of this study reveal board size to be significantly and 
positively related to financial distress, meaning the size of the board of directors 
has a direct influence on firms’ financial distress. This result for board size is 
contrary to the hypothesis set for it.  
2. For the proportion of independent directors, the regression results indicate that it 
has a significant and a positive relationship with financial distress, meaning the 
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more independent directors a firm has, the more likely the firm is to be financially 
distressed and vice versa. Again, this result does not support the hypothesis set for 
the proportion of independent directors.   
3. With regards to board gender diversity, the results from the study reveal that it is 
insignificantly related to financial distress.  
4. For board activity, the regression results of this study show that board activity is 
significantly and negatively associated with financial distress and confirms the 
hypothesis of this study. This result of board activity is consistent with the study 
by Vafeas (1999) who finds that firms respond to a poor performance by 
increasing their level of board activity which in turn is linked with improved 
operating performance in subsequent years. 
5. Evidence from this study also demonstrates that board member educational 
qualification is significantly and negatively related to financial distress and this 
means that a firm is in a good position to avoid financial distress when board 
members have the right educational qualification.  
6. On board member financial expertise, the evidence of the study shows that it has 
a significant and positive relationship with financial distress and this direct 
relationship does not support the hypothesis set for this study.  
7. For audit committee independence the regression results show that it has a 
significant and negative relationship with financial distress indicating that the 
higher the levels of independence, the less likelihood firms become financially 
distressed.  
8. For audit committee size, the evidence of this study shows that it has a significant 
and positive relationship with financial distress and the direct relationship does 
not support the hypothesis set for audit committee size.  
9. With regards to the presence of a firm’s chairperson on the audit committee, the 
regression results from this study demonstrate that it is significantly and 
negatively related to financial distress. This means that firms with their 
chairpersons being members on the audit committees are less likely to be 
financially distressed since firms’ chairpersons with their knowledge of the firm 
are valuable resources that enhance the monitoring, as well as ensure the quality 
and transparency of the financial reporting process of the audit committee.  
10. On remuneration committee size, the regression results from this study reveal that 
it is significantly and negatively related to financial distress supporting the 
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findings of Chan et al. (2015) but inconsistent with the results of Appiah and 
Chizema (2015).  
11. Lastly, evidence of this study relating to the presence of a firm’s chairperson on 
the remuneration committee has no significant relationship with financial distress.   
Regarding the second objective, this study evaluated whether the different forms of firms’ 
ownerships (directors, institutional and concentrated ownerships) have any influence on 
the financial distress of UK firms and the regression results reveal the following. 
1. The regression results from this study indicate that directors’ ownership has a 
significant and negative relationship with financial distress. 
2. Wth regards to institutional investors, the results of this study demonstrate that 
institutional ownership is significantly and negatively related to financial distress. 
Due to their large shareholding, the institutional shareholders, as influential 
stakeholders have extra inscentive and the resources to monitor management to 
improve firm performance to avoid financial distress likelihood.  
3. Finally, reagrding ownership structure variables, the findings of this study indicate 
that concentrated ownership is significantly and negatively related to financial 
distress and this result is consistent with that of Xiaolan et al. (2006), Donker et 
al. (2009), Ciampi (2015) and Hu and Zheng (2015) but inconsistent with that of 
Lajili and Zéghal (2010) and Manzaneque et al. (2016).  
For the third objective of this study which evaluated the extent to which the disclosure 
and transparency components of corporate governance are related to the financial distress 
of UK firms, the following results are obtained from the regression analysis.  
1. On directors’ remuneration, the regression results of this study found that it is 
significantly and negatively related to financial distress.  
2. With regards to the presence of senior independent director, the results from this 
study indicates that it has a significant and a negative relationship with financial 
distress and this means that a firm is not financially distressed if  it has a senior 
independent director since the senior independent director plays an important role 
in monitoring the effectiveness of the chairperson, liaising with the non-executive 
directors and communicating with the major shareholders (Higgs 2003) issues and 
concerns that impact firms’ operation, which improve their performance, and 
reduces the likelihood of financial distress.  
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3. On the disclosure of proxy voting arrangements in the annual reports, the findings 
from this study indicate that it has an insignificant association with financial 
distress.  
4.  Finally, regarding the third objective, this study found evidence that the 
disclosure of notice of the annual general meeting in the annual reports has a 
significant and negative relationship with financial distress.  
With regards to objective one to objective three above, this study developed five models 
which are; the board composition and structure model; the ownership structure model; 
the disclosure and transparency model; the corporate governance model which 
incorporated board composition and structure variables, ownership structure variables, 
and disclosure and transparency variables; and the baseline model which was composed 
of firm characteristics. Using the Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC), this study finds 
evidence that the corporate governance model is the model of best fit and thus, predict 
financial distress better. This is followed by the disclosure and transparency model, the 
board structure and composition model and the ownership structure model. As expected, 
the baseline model is the model that has the least fit. The results of this study mean that a 
model predicts firms’ financial distress better when all the corporate governance 
mechanisms are combined.  
The last objective of this study was to determine whether the environment, resources, and 
technological capability moderate the corporate governance and financial distress 
relationship of UK firms. This study adopted the three dimensions of environment 
identified by Dess and Beard (1984) and these are; environmental complexity, 
environmental dynamism, and environmental munificence. Also, following Norman et al. 
(2013), the study categorises resources into tangible and intangible. Although the study 
found evidence of the interaction of each of the six moderating factors with each 
component of board composition and structure, ownership structure, and disclosure and 
transparency, only the overall findings are reported in this section. The regression results 
from the study indicate that from the six moderating models, the technology model shows 
evidence of best fit and this is followed by environmental dynamism model, 
environmental complexity model, tangible resource model, intangible resource model and 
then environmental munificence model. This means that firms’ technological capability 
has a greater moderating influence on corporate governance-financial distress 
relationship. This is followed by environmental dynamism, environmental complexity, 
tangible resource, intangible resource, and then finally environmental munificence having 
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the least moderating influence on that relationship. The study also found evidence that 
when all the moderating models are compared with the baseline model, the results show 
that each of the moderating models performs better than the baseline model. Hence, the 
results support the argument that firm’s contextual factors in the form of environment, 
resource, and technological capability play significant roles in the firms’ efforts to use 
their corporate governance mechanisms to avoid financial distress.  
1.6 CONTRIBUTION OF THIS STUDY 
This study makes a number of contributions to the existing literature. The most important 
contribution is the provision of evidence, for the first time, that the influence of corporate 
governance mechanisms on financial distress is significantly moderated by the 
interactions of environment (complexity, dynamism, and munificence), resource 
(tangible and intangible) and technological capability. Eventhough existing studies (Fich 
and Slezak 2008; Chang 2009; Donker et al. 2009; Lajili and Zéghal 2010; Platt and Platt 
2012; Brédart 2014) have significantly contributed both theoretically and empirically to 
the relationship between various elements of corporate governance and financial distress, 
none of these studies investigated whether the relationship could be moderated by firms’ 
environment, resource, and technology.  
Another important contribution of this research is that it shows that the impact of certain 
corporate governance mechanisms on ﬁrms’ financial distress changes under different 
conditions. This is explained by the fact that the significance or the insignificance of some 
corporate governance elements change when they interact with environmental 
complexity, environmental dynamism, environmental munificence, tangible resource, 
intangible resource, and technological capability. This study found evidence that although 
the presence of senior independent director is significant, it lost its significance when 
interacted with technology. Likewise, this study found that institutional ownership 
became insignificant when it interacted with environmental complexity and 
environmental dynamism. These suggest that the impact of corporate governance 
mechanisms on ﬁrms’ financial distress needs to be understood in the context of firms’ 
environment (complexity, dynamism, munificence), resource (tangible and intangible), 
and technological capability. This will enable firms in compliance with the requirements 
of the corporate governance code, design, implement, and monitor their corporate 
governance structures that fit their environment, resource, and technology. 
Moreover, this study makes a significant contribution to existing studies by showing that 
firms’ financial distress can be as a result of the presence of senior independent director 
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and the disclosure of notice of the annual general meeting in the annual reports which 
have not been investigated by researchers such as Donker et al. (2009), Lajili and Zéghal 
(2010), Brédart (2014), Manzaneque et al. (2016a,b). Results from this current study 
reveal that the presence of the senior independent director and disclosure of notice of the 
annual general meeting in the annual reports are all significantly and negatively related 
to financial distress. These results, therefore, contribute to the existing literature on 
corporate governance and firms’ financial distress. 
Furthermore, this study contributes to the existing literature by demonstrating that 
corporate governance mechanisms are relatively more effective in predicting financial 
distress of firms listed in the AIM than firms listed in the Main Market. This is because 
evidence of this study reveals that the corporate governance model of firms in the AIM 
has a lower AIC arithmetic value than the corporate governance model of firms in the 
Main Market. 
In addition, this study provides evidence of the relevance of using a multi-theoretical 
approach to address different roles of corporate governance mechanisms including those 
relating to board size, the proportion of independent directors, board activity, board 
member qualification, board member financial expertise, directors’ ownership, 
institutional ownership, and concentrated ownership in the UK, where there is a limited 
evidence. Corporate governance is a complex and multi-faceted concept where various 
elements interact and could lead to different performance outcomes and therefore the 
multi-theoretic approach better explains the theoretical argument of the corporate 
governance mechanisms.  
Finally, this study also contributes to the limited research evidence on the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and financial distress in the UK, where 
current knowledge and understanding is limited. Previous studies (Elloumi and Gueyie 
2001; Lee and Yeh 2004; Fich and Slezak 2007; Chang 2009; Donker et al. 2009; Lajili 
and Zeghal 2010; Bredart 2014) on corporate governance and financial distress occurred 
outside the UK and the few that occurred in the UK, Appiah (2013), Poletti-Hughes and 
Ozkan (2014), and Hsu and Wu (2014) focused on failed companies but these are 
characteristically different from financially distressed companies. Hence, the study’s use 
of financially distressed companies instead of failed companies makes a significant 
contribution to the existing literature on corporate governance mechanisms and firms’ 
financial distress literature. 
      
13 
 
1.7 OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH 
The thesis consists of nine chapters and it is structured as follows. Chapter Two presents 
the trend and development of corporate governance in the UK. The first part of the chapter 
concentrates on the developments of corporate governance in the UK. Corporate 
governance has undergone some developments and continues to be reviewed to respond 
to growing corporate scandals and financial distress. Leadership, effectiveness, 
accountability, remuneration, and relationship with shareholders, which are the principles 
of the corporate governance code are discussed in the chapter. The chapter also discusses 
corporate governance for Alternative Investment Market (AIM) companies and concludes 
with the legal definition of financial distress in the UK. 
Chapter Three provides a literature review of the study. It reviews the empirical literature 
on the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and financial distress. The 
logic is to determine whether there is any consistency in the findings of the effect of 
corporate governance mechanisms on firms’ financial distress. It begins with the 
discussion of financial distress and how financially distressed firms are identified. It is 
followed by the discussion of how corporate governance mechanisms affect financial 
distress under three sections, which are board composition and structure, ownership 
structure, and disclosure and transparency. The chapter also has a section on the 
moderating variables. This is followed by a summary of the results of previous empirical 
studies and finally, concludes with the chapter summary. 
Chapter Four presents the main theoretical foundations of the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and financial distress. The theoretical framework 
enables prior identification of the appropriate research questions and the independent 
variables to direct the study (Tingbani 2015). The chapter discusses the agency, resource 
dependence, stewardship, and stakeholder theories to explain the association between 
corporate governance mechanisms and financial distress, and this leads to a section in the 
chapter that discusses the conceptual framework of the study. The chapter concludes with 
its summary.  
Chapter Five of the study pulls together work covered in chapters two, three, and four. 
The chapter translates both the theoretical and empirical studies discussed on the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and financial distress into 
testable hypotheses. The hypotheses are grouped into three sections. In the first section, 
the hypotheses relating to the direct relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and financial distress as determined by previous studies are discussed under 
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three sub-sections: board composition and structure, ownership structure, and disclosure 
and transparency. The second section discusses the hypotheses developed for the control 
variables based on prior studies deemed to have influence on the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and firms’ financial distress. In the final section, the 
hypotheses covering the moderating influence of the three dimensions of environment: 
complexity, dynamism, and munificence; the two types of resources: tangible and 
intangible; and technological capability on the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and financial distress are discussed. Finally, the chapter concludes with its 
summary.  
Chapter Six describes the research data and methodology. This chapter explains the 
research method used to answer the research hypotheses. It explains the research 
philosophies, research paradigms, research approaches as well as qualitative and 
quantitative research methods. It also discusses sampling procedure, types and sources of 
data used, financial distress identification as well as explanations of the variables of the 
study including the control variables and the moderating factors.  
Chapter Seven presents the empirical results of the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and financial distress. It reports the descriptive statistics, 
multicollinearity tests, and the results of the multivariate logistic regression analysis in 
the relevant sections.       
Chapter Eight presents the empirical findings of the moderating role of environment, 
resources, and technological capability on the relationship between corporate governance 
and financial distress. The chapter has two sections. The first section discusses the 
empirical results of the interaction of environmental complexity, environmental 
dynamism, environmental munificence, tangible resource, intangible resource, and 
technology with the components of board composition and structure, ownership structure, 
and disclosure and transparency on the relationship between corporate governance and 
financial distress. This is to determine the extent to which firms’ environment, resources, 
and technological capability moderate the relationship between corporate governance and 
financial distress. In the second section, further analysis of the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and financial distress is estimated to enhance the 
robustness of the results.               
Chapter Nine reports the final summary and conclusion of the study. It gives a summary 
of the research objective, methodology, and techniques adopted for the study. In addition, 
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the chapter summarises the policy implication, contributions, as well as the main 
limitations and recommendations for future research.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
TREND AND DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE UK 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The recent financial crisis and corporate scandals have renewed concerns in corporate 
governance among stakeholders. Weak corporate governance may lead to a deteriorating 
firm performance which may affect the firm’s survival. Hence, weaknesses in all aspects 
of corporate governance must be addressed for firms to avoid financial distress and their 
ultimate failure. Corporate governance must, therefore, aim at improving risk 
management and improve board quality, to enhance financial performance and prevent 
financial distress and its effects on all stakeholders. The chapter discusses corporate 
governance development in the UK since the Cadbury (1992) report. The chapter 
highlights the significant corporate governance mechanisms that comprise board 
composition and structure (board size, proportion of independent directors, board gender 
diversity, board activity, board member qualification, board member financial expertise, 
audit committee independence, audit committee size, a firm’s chairperson on the audit 
committee, remuneration committee size, and a firm’s chairperson on the remuneration 
committee). It also highlights ownership structure (directors’ ownership, institutional 
ownership, and concentrated ownership), and disclosure and transparency (directors’ 
remuneration, senior independent director, disclosure of proxy voting arrangement in the 
annual reports, and disclosure of notice of the annual general meeting in the annual 
reports). The identification of these corporate governance mechanisms resulting from the 
corporate governance development and its amendments would assist in establishing 
whether firms’ financial distress may be linked to these corporate governance 
mechanisms. The chapter is structured as follows: Sections 2.2 and 2.3 discuss the 
definition and the developments of corporate governance in the UK respectively. Section 
2.4 examines the ‘comply’ or ‘explain’ approach while the principles of corporate 
governance are described under section 2.5. Corporate governance for firms in the AIM 
is discussed in section 2.6 and the summary of the chapter is presented in section 2.7.   
2.2 DEFINITION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Paragraph 2.5 of the Cadbury report (1992) defines corporate governance in the UK “as 
the system by which companies are directed and controlled. Boards of directors are 
responsible for the governance of their companies. The shareholders’ role in governance 
is to appoint the directors and the auditors and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate 
governance structure is in place. The responsibilities of the board include setting the 
company’s strategic aims, providing the leadership to put them into effect, supervising 
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the management of the business and reporting to shareholders on their stewardship. The 
board’s actions are subject to laws, regulations and the shareholders in general meeting”. 
Although other researchers including Shleifer and Vishny (1997a) have defined corporate 
governance as financial and legal institutions that can be altered through the political 
process, this study adopts the traditional definition of corporate governance as given in 
the Cadbury report (1992).  
2.3 DEVELOPMENT OF UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Concerns regarding the perceived low level of confidence both in financial reporting and 
in the ability of auditors to provide the safeguards which the users of company reports 
seek and expect are heightened by some unexpected failures of major companies in the 
late 1980s. The Financial Reporting Council (FRC), the London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
and the Accountancy Profession set up the Cadbury Committee in May 1992 to address 
the financial aspects of corporate governance (Cadbury 1992). The Cadbury (1992) came 
out with the Code of Best Practice which was directed to the boards of directors of all 
listed companies registered in the UK, but it also encouraged many companies to meet 
the Code’s requirement. The Code was based on three main principles which included 
openness, integrity, and accountability. The Cadbury (1992) recommended that listed 
companies state in their reports and accounts whether they comply with the Code, identify 
and give reasons for any areas of non-compliance. The Cadbury (1992) report provided a 
yardstick against which standards of corporate governance in other economies were 
measured. The report, however, recommended that the FRC appointed a new committee 
by the end of June 1995 to examine how far compliance with the Code had progressed.  
In 1995, the Greenbury committee in response to public and shareholder concerns about 
pay and other remuneration of company directors in the UK was set up to identify good 
practice in determining directors remuneration and prepare a Code of such practice for 
use by UK companies (Greenbury 1995). The Greenbury (1995) report recommended that 
boards of directors set up remuneration committee of non-executive directors to 
determine on their behalf, and on behalf of the shareholder, within agreed terms of 
reference, the company’s policy on executive remuneration and specific remuneration 
packages for each of the executive directors, including pension rights and any 
compensation payments. The remuneration committee was to operate under five guidance 
which included accountability, responsibility, full disclosure, alignment of director and 
shareholder interests, and improved company performance. According to section 2.2 of 
the Code of Best Practice (Greenbury 1995), though the detailed provisions have been 
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prepared with large companies mainly in mind, however, the principles applied equally 
to smaller companies. The report, therefore, recommended the LSE to introduce an 
obligation to include in their annual remuneration committee reports to shareholders on 
their annual reports a general statement about their compliance with section ‘A’ of the 
Code (remuneration committee) which should explain and justify any areas of non-
compliance.  
Later, the Hampel committee was established to review the Cadbury (1992) Code and its 
implementation, to pursue any relevant matters arising from the Greenbury report, and to 
look afresh at the roles of directors, shareholders and auditors in corporate governance  
(Hampel 1998). The Hampel (1998) report endorsed the majority of the findings of both 
the Cadbury (1992) and Greenbury (1995) reports. While the Hampel committee found 
that most large listed companies implemented both codes fully, smaller companies though 
implemented most provisions, found it harder to comply with the Code. However, the 
report concluded that it would be a mistake to distinguish between the governance 
standards expected of larger and smaller companies. It, therefore, considered that high 
standards of governance are important for smaller listed companies as for larger ones 
(Hampel 1998). The Hampel (1998) report drew a distinction between principles of 
corporate governance and guidelines like the Cadbury (1992) and Greenbury (1995) 
reports. It recommended that companies must include in their annual reports and accounts 
a narrative statement of how they applied the relevant principles including directors, 
directors’ remuneration, shareholders, and accountability and audit, to their 
circumstances. The report recognised however that corporate governance will continue to 
develop and that the FRC should keep under review the possible need in the future for 
further studies of corporate governance (Hampel 1998). 
Although the Cadbury committee in 1992 established a framework for corporate 
governance which has become the basis for the arrangements whereby UK companies 
govern themselves (Page and Spira 2004), it did not resolve the risk management and 
internal control issues. The Turnbull (1999) committee, therefore, focused on the need 
for directors to review risk management and internal control systems and report on them 
since a firm’s system of internal control has a significant role in the management of risks 
for the achievement of its objectives. Significantly, Turnbull (1999) recommended a 
framework for establishing systems of internal control. 
According to Higgs (2003), when corporate strategies fail or governance lapses, attention 
rightly focuses on the contribution of the non-executive director and against the 
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background of corporate turbulence it was significant to clarify the role and increase the 
effectiveness of non-executive directors. Higgs (2003) believes that the way forward was 
not legislation but rather his review built on the ‘comply’ or ‘explain’ approach 
established by the Cadbury (1992) report. The Higgs (2003) report, therefore, 
recommends specific guidelines regarding the non-executive directors and their role. To 
determine behaviour changes, the Higgs (2003) report propose to the government and the 
FRC to review progress against the recommendations of the report in two years’ time. 
While the Higgs (2003) report focuses on the role and the effectiveness of non-executive 
directors, the Tyson (2003) report focuses on the recruitment and developments of non-
executive directors. According to Tyson (2003), experts on corporate governance concur 
that the best boards consist of the right mix of personnel with different skills, experiences, 
and knowledge, and cites a quote from Conger and Lawler (2001) which states that “the 
best boards are composed of individuals with different skills, knowledge, information, 
power, and time to contribute. Given the diversity of expertise, information, and 
availability that is needed to understand and govern today’s complex businesses, it is 
unrealistic to expect an individual director to be knowledgeable and informed about all 
phases of business. It is also unrealistic to expect individual directors to be available 
always and to influence all decisions. Thus, in staffing most boards, it is best to think of 
individuals contributing different pieces to the total picture that it takes to create an 
effective board. The report, therefore, provides three key recommendations in terms of 
additional guidance and these include rigorous and transparent non-executive director 
selection process, more and better evaluation and training for board members and research 
and measurement to encourage greater board diversity. 
Following the dramatic corporate failures in the US in early 2002, the FRC on the request 
of the government set up the Smith committee to develop guidance on audit committees 
(Smith 2003). The Smith (2003) report issued guidance that included certain essential 
requirements that every audit committee should meet. However, it recognised that some 
of the requirements might be inappropriate for some small listed companies. For instance, 
many smaller companies may have fewer than three non-executive and independent 
directors. However, the report encouraged all listed companies to meet the requirements 
but where a requirement is inappropriate due to a company’s circumstances, the right 
course is to explain the position  (Smith 2003). It also recognised that best practice goes 
beyond meeting the essential requirements and that audit committee arrangements need 
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to be proportionate to the task and would depend on the size, complexity and risk profile 
of the company.  
The Turnbull Review Group (2005) was established by the FRC to consider the impact 
of the Turnbull (1999) guidance on risk management and systems of internal control and 
the related disclosures, and to determine whether the guidance needed an update. It 
revealed that the principles-based approach required boards to think seriously about 
control issues and enabled them to apply the principles in a way that appropriately dealt 
with the circumstances of their business and that the guidance had very successfully gone 
a long way to meeting its original objectives. However, the Turnbull Review Group 
(2005) noted that establishing effective internal control systems is not a one-off exercise 
and that the system needed to consider new and emerging risks, control failures, market 
expectations or changes in the company’s circumstances or business objectives to remain 
effective. 
In 2006, the FRC proposed three minor changes and this led to the publication of the 2006 
Code. The changes included board chair to sit on remuneration committee, supplementary 
provisions on ‘vote withheld,̕ and publishing the results of resolution on a show of hand 
while in 2007, 2008 and 2009,  the FRC reassured the Code‘s content after a periodic 
review (Appiah 2013). 
In 2009, considering the experience of critical losses and failures throughout the banking 
system, David Walker was asked to review corporate governance in UK banks. The 
review had 39 recommendations and these focused on: (i) board size, composition, and 
qualification (ii) functioning of the board and evaluation of performance (iii) 
communication and engagement (iv) the role of institutional shareholders (v) governance 
risk and (vi) remuneration. Overall, the code was found to be fit for purpose following 
the financial crisis (Walker 2009). 
The FRC in 2010 assumed responsibility for the Stewardship Code. The Stewardship 
Code established principles for institutional investors, which must be followed, and these 
included public disclosure of their policy, robust policy on managing conflicts of 
interests, monitoring, establishing clear guidelines on when and how their activities 
would be escalated, and a clear policy on voting and disclosure of voting activity. In the 
same way as the UK Corporate Governance Code, the Stewardship Code must be applied 
on a ‘comply’ or ‘explain’ basis and that the FRC regarded the Stewardship Code as 
complimentary to the UK Corporate Governance Code for listed companies.  
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To date, the FRC has been carrying a yearly review on developments in the corporate 
governance and the stewardship codes. While it recognised that compliance with the 
Codes remained high and that despite the improvement in the quality and quantity of 
investor monitoring and engagement, there is the need to do more to promote best 
practice. Hence, going forward to future years, the FRC objective is to continue to 
promote corporate governance and corporate culture that support the long-term success 
of companies. 
2.4 THE ‘COMPLY’ OR ‘EXPLAIN’ APPROACH 
The ‘comply’ or ‘explain’ approach is the trademark of the UK corporate governance and 
it has been in operation since the Code’s beginnings (FRC, 2014). According to the FRC 
(2014), it is the foundation of the Codes’ flexibility and it is heavily supported by both 
companies and shareholders. The ‘comply’ or ‘explain’ is based on two premises and 
these are; for effective corporate governance, first, there is no ‘one size fits all’, and 
second, an explanation should be given to the shareholders if companies decide not to 
follow the Code (Miles and Proctor 2002). While the Code is not a rigid set of rules, it 
comprises main and supporting principles as well as provisions. Stock Exchange Listing 
Rules require companies to apply the main principles and communicate to shareholders 
how the principles have been applied. However, if a company decides not to follow a 
provision of the Code due to circumstances, then the reason for doing so should be 
explained to shareholders. For instance, smaller listed companies, particularly those new 
to the listing, may judge that some of the provisions are disproportionate or less relevant 
in their case and may choose not to apply them. In such circumstances, those companies 
should explain clearly and carefully to shareholders their reasons for doing so and the 
shareholders may wish to discuss their position with the company (FRC 2014). Whereas 
rules usually set out what is the minimum acceptable standard, “ ‘Comply or explain’ 
codes complement rules by setting out higher and more aspirational standards, 
recognising that not all companies will achieve them immediately and that for some 
companies it may be more appropriate to take a different approach to protect the long-
term interests of their owners” (Miles and Proctor 2002). Though there have been many 
changes to the corporate governance framework since 1992, the concept of ‘comply’ or 
‘explain’, which has been widely adopted elsewhere, remains unchanged. Companies and 
shareholders both have responsibility for ensuring that ‘comply’ or ‘explain’ remains an 
effective alternative to a rule-based system (FRC, 2014). 
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2.5 THE PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE UK 
The Code (2014) mentions five fundamental principles which are important for firms to 
follow to avoid any issues surrounding governance to improve performance to avoid the 
likelihood of financial distress. These fundamental principles are discussed below. 
2.5.1 BOARD LEADERSHIP IN THE UK 
According to section 4.1 of Cadbury (1992), every public company must be headed by an 
effective board which can both leads and controls the business. The role of the board is 
to: (a) provide entrepreneurial leadership of the company within a framework of prudent 
and effective controls for the assessment and management of risk, (b) set the company’s 
strategic aims and (c) set the company’s values and standards (The Code 2014). The Code 
also makes it clear that the board must meet sufficiently and regularly to discharge its 
duties effectively. Within the context of the UK unitary board system, a company’s board 
is made up of the combination of executive directors who have intimate knowledge of the 
business, non-executive directors who can bring a broader view to the company’s 
activities and a chairperson who accepts the duties and responsibilities which the post 
entails (Cadbury 1992). There should be a clear division of responsibilities at the head of 
the company between the running of the board and the executive responsibility for the 
running of the company’s business and that no one individual should have unfettered 
powers of decision (The Code 2014).    
For the non-executive directors, the Cadbury (1992) report recommended that their 
number on the board and their calibre should be such that their views become very 
significant in the board’s decisions. It, therefore, required all boards to have a minimum 
of three non-executive directors, one of whom may be the chairperson of the company 
provided he or she is not also its executive head. The Higgs (2003) report also require 
potential new non-executive directors to carry out due diligence on the board and on the 
company to satisfy themselves that they have the knowledge, skills, experience and time 
to make a positive contribution to the board. The chairperson is responsible for: (a) 
leadership of the board and ensures its effectiveness, (b) setting the board’s agenda and 
ensuring that there is enough time to discuss all agenda items, (c) the promotion of the 
culture of openness and debate and (d) ensuring that directors receive accurate, timely 
and clear information (The Code, 2014). On his/her appointment, the Code (2014) 
specifies that the chairperson should meet the independence criteria set out in section 
B.1.1 of the 2014 Code. In addition, the chief executive should not become a chairperson 
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of the same company, meaning the code does not encourage CEO duality but in 
exceptional situations, the board should consult major shareholders in advance.  
2.5.2 BOARD EFFECTIVENESS IN THE UK 
The board and its committees should have the appropriate balance of skills, experience, 
independence, and knowledge of the company to enable them to discharge their respective 
duties and responsibilities effectively (Miles and Proctor 2002). The Code (2016) gives 
seven principles to strengthen board effectiveness of UK firms. These include board 
composition, appointments to the board, commitment, development, information and 
support, evaluation and re-election. These are discussed below. 
2.5.2.1 BOARD COMPOSITION 
The board and its committees should have the right balance of skills, experience, 
independence, and knowledge of the company to enable them to discharge their respective 
duties and responsibilities effectively. To meet the requirement of a company’s business 
and changes to the board’s composition as well as managing changes to its committees 
without undue disruption, the Code (2016) requires the board to be of enough size but 
warns that the size must not be so large as to be unmanageable. There should be an 
appropriate combination of executive and non-executive directors, particularly, 
independent non-executive directors on the board so that no individual or small group of 
individuals can dominate the decision taking of the board. According to the Code (2016), 
except for smaller companies which should have at least two independent non-executive 
directors, for FTSE100 and 350 companies, at least half the board apart from the 
chairperson should consist of non-executive directors determined to be independent by 
the board.  
2.5.2.2 APPOINTMENTS TO THE BOARD 
The Code (2016) requires a formal, rigorous, and transparent procedure for the 
appointment of new directors to the board. The appointment of board members should be 
made on merit against objective criteria and with due regard for the benefits of diversity 
on the board, including gender. It also makes it clear that to maintain an appropriate 
balance of skills and experience on the board, and to ensure progressive refreshing of the 
board, the board should satisfy itself that plans are in place, for an orderly succession for 
appointments to the board. Cadbury (1992) report, therefore, recommended the setting up 
of a nomination committee, with the responsibility of proposing to the board, in the first 
instance, any new appointments, whether of the executive or of non-executive directors. 
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According to the Code (2016), most members of the nomination committee should be 
independent non-executive directors. 
2.5.2.3 BOARD TIME COMMITMENT 
The Code (2016) requires all directors to allocate enough time to the company to 
discharge their responsibilities effectively. In appointing a chairperson, the nomination 
committee should prepare a job specification, including an assessment of the time 
commitment expected and disclose to the board significant commitments before the 
appointment. Any changes to such commitments should be reported to the board as they 
arise, and their impact explained in the next annual report. 
For the non-executive directors: (a) the terms and conditions should be made available 
for inspection, (b) the letter of appointment must set out the expected time commitment, 
and (c) must make an undertaken that they will have enough time to meet what is expected 
of them (The Code, 2016). 
2.5.2.4 BOARD DEVELOPMENT  
Cadbury (1992) recognises that the training and development of directors are of 
importance to good governance. Given the varying backgrounds, qualifications, and 
experience of directors, it is highly desirable that they should all undertake some form of 
internal or external training. For directors to perform effectively, they need to have the 
appropriate knowledge of the company and access to its operations and staff.  The Code 
(2016) specifies that in addition to receiving induction on joining the board of a company, 
all directors must also regularly update and refresh their skills and knowledge. The 
provisions of the Code make it clear that the chairperson should: (a) ensure that as part of 
the induction, directors make themselves available to meet the major shareholders and (b) 
regularly review and agree with each director their training and development needs. 
2.5.2.5 INFORMATION AND SUPPORT 
For information and support, the Code (2016) specifies that the board must be supplied 
in a timely manner with information in a form and of a quality appropriate to enable it to 
discharge its duties. Through the chairperson’s direction, the company secretary must 
ensure that good information flows within the board and its committees and between 
senior management and non-executive directors to facilitate induction and help with 
professional development, as required. Cadbury (1992) recommended that where 
directors consider it necessary to take independent professional advice, they should be 
entitled to do so at the company’s expense and this has been emphasised in section B.5.1 
of the Code (2016). 
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2.5.2.6 BOARD EVALUATION 
The main principle of section B.6 of the Code (2016) requires the board to undertake a 
formal and rigorous annual evaluation of its own performance and that of its committees 
and individual directors. The Code (2016) therefore requires the evaluation to consider 
the skills, experience, independence, and knowledge of the company on the board, its 
diversity, including gender, how the board works together as a unit, and other factors 
relevant to its effectiveness. While the non-executive directors, led by the senior 
independent director, should be responsible for performance evaluation of the 
chairperson, considering the views of executive directors, the evaluation of the board of 
FTSE 350 companies should be externally facilitated at least, every three years. However, 
the external facilitator must be identified in the annual report and a statement made as to 
whether they have any other connection with the company. 
2.5.2.7 RE-ELECTION OF DIRECTORS 
While all directors of FTSE 350 companies must be subject to annual election by 
shareholders, all other directors should be subject to election by shareholders at the first 
annual general meeting after their appointment, and to re-election thereafter at intervals 
of no more than three years (The Code, 2016). Further, the provisions of the Code make 
it clear that non-executive directors who have been in their positions for more than nine 
years must be subject to re-election and the board has a duty to set out to shareholders in 
the papers accompanying a resolution to elect a non-executive director why they believe 
an individual should be elected.  
2.5.3 BOARD ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UK 
The UK Corporate Governance Codes discuss accountability under three main headings 
which are financial and business reporting, risk management and internal control, and 
audit committee and auditors. 
2.5.3.1 FINANCIAL AND BUSINESS REPORTING 
The main principle requires the board to present a fair, balanced, and understandable 
assessment of the company’s position and prospects. The directors should make it known 
to the shareholders their responsibility for preparing the annual reports and accounts and 
the auditor should make a statement about their reporting responsibilities. As well as 
including in the annual report, an explanation of the business model and the strategy for 
delivering the objectives of the firm, the directors should report in annual and half-yearly 
financial statements that the business is a going concern, with supporting assumptions or 
qualifications as necessary (McNulty et al. 2012).  
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2.5.3.2 RISK MANAGEMENT AND INTERNAL CONTROL 
The board of a company is responsible for determining the nature and extent of the 
principal risks it is willing to take in achieving its strategic objectives as well as 
maintaining sound risk management and internal control systems (The Code, 2016). The 
directors are also to confirm in the annual report that they have carried out a robust 
assessment of the principal risks facing the company and should also describe those risks 
and explain how they are being managed. The monitoring of the company’s risk 
management and internal control systems by the directors must be carried out on a yearly 
basis and that it should cover all material controls, including financial, operational and 
compliance controls.  
2.5.3.3 AUDIT COMMITTEE AND AUDITORS 
The board of a company should establish formal and transparent arrangements for 
considering how they should apply the corporate reporting and risk management and 
internal control principles and for maintaining an appropriate relationship with the 
company’s auditors (The Code, 2016). The board must form an audit committee whose 
duties include keeping under review the scope and results of the audit and its cost 
effectiveness, and the independence and objectivity of the auditors (Hampel 1998). The 
audit committee should comprise at least three, or in the case of smaller companies, two 
independent non-executive directors but in smaller companies the company chairperson 
may be a member of, but not chair the committee in addition to the independent non-
executive directors, provided he or she was considered independent on appointment as 
chairperson (The Code 2016). The board should satisfy itself that at least one member of 
the audit committee has recent and relevant financial experience and the committee 
should have competence relevant to the sector in which the company operates. 
2.5.4 DIRECTORS REMUNERATION 
Hampel (1998) recommends that the levels of remuneration should be sufficient to attract 
and retain the directors needed to run the company successfully. The component parts of 
remuneration should, therefore, be structured to link rewards to corporate and individual 
performance. Section C of the Code (2014) discusses directors’ remuneration under the 
following headings: (a) the level and components of remuneration and (b) the procedure 
for remuneration. With the level and components of remuneration, the UK Corporate 
Governance Codes require that executive directors’ remuneration must be designed to 
promote the long-term success of the company. In addition, performance-related elements 
should be transparent, stretching, and rigorously applied. Although it is important for the 
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remuneration committees to consider where to position the company relative to other 
companies, this should be done with caution to avoid paying more than is necessary. The 
Code (2014) further obliges the remuneration committee to be sensitive to pay and 
employment conditions elsewhere in the group, especially when determining annual 
salary increases. In terms of procedure, it specifies that there must be a formal and 
transparent procedure for developing policy on executive remuneration and for fixing the 
remuneration packages of individual directors and that, no director should be involved in 
deciding his or her own remuneration. Cadbury (1992) and Greenbury (1995) both 
favoured the establishment of remuneration committees and made recommendations on 
their composition and on the scope of their limit. Thus, according to  Greenbury (1995), 
to avoid potential conflicts of interest, boards of directors should set up remuneration 
committees of non-executive directors to determine on their behalf and on behalf of the 
shareholders, within agreed terms of reference, the company's policy on executive 
remuneration and specific remuneration packages for each of the executive directors, 
including pension rights, and any compensation payments. The remuneration committee 
should consist of at least three, but for smaller companies, two independent non-executive 
directors, and in addition, the membership may include chairperson of the company but 
not in the capacity to chair the committee if he or she was regarded as independent on 
appointment as chairperson (The Code, 2014). The remuneration committee must take 
care to recognise and manage conflicts of interests, be responsible for appointing any 
consultants in respect of executive director remuneration, and carefully consider what 
compensation commitments their directors’ terms of appointments would entail in the 
event of early termination.  
2.5.5 RELATIONS WITH SHAREHOLDERS 
This focuses on first, the dialogue with shareholders and second, constructive use of 
general meetings. For dialogue with shareholders, the board has the responsibility to 
ensure that their companies and shareholders should each be ready, where practicable, to 
enter a dialogue based on the mutual understanding of objectives (Hampel 1998). The 
board chair should ensure that the views of shareholders are communicated to the board 
and in addition, should discuss governance and strategy with major shareholders. The 
Code (2014) requires the non-executive directors to be offered the opportunity to attend 
scheduled meetings with major shareholders and be expected to attend meetings if 
requested by major shareholders. The board must state in the annual report the steps they 
have taken to ensure that the members of the board, and the non-executive directors, 
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develop an understanding of the views of major shareholders about the company. For 
constructive use of general meetings, the board should use it to communicate with 
investors and to encourage their participation. At any general meeting, the company 
should propose a separate resolution on each substantially separate issue; a resolution at 
the Annual General Meeting (AGM) relating to the report and accounts; must ensure that 
all valid proxy appointments received for general meetings are properly recorded and 
counted; and arrange for the Notice of the AGM and related papers to be sent to 
shareholders at least twenty working days before the meeting. The chairperson must 
arrange for the chairpersons of the audit, remuneration, and nomination committees to be 
available to answer questions at the AGM and for all directors to attend.  
2.6 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT MARKET 
(AIM) COMPANIES 
The London Stock Exchange (LSE) requires the UK Corporate Governance Code (The 
Code) to serves as a standard to which public companies should aspire, but full adherence 
should not necessarily be the expectation for all AIM companies. The AIM rules for 
companies do not include provisions that are equivalent to the Code. Instead, corporate 
governance measures are considered under the wider requirement for AIM companies to 
have in place sufficient procedures, resources and controls, and in the context of the 
responsibility of a company’s nominated adviser (Nomad) to assess the ongoing 
suitability of their AIM company clients (Miles and Proctor 2012). AIM-quoted 
companies have more flexibility in the corporate governance regime that they can choose 
to adopt due to their circumstances and characteristics. This flexibility of the principles-
based approach to corporate governance stems from the LSE’s approach to the regulation 
of AIM in general, which recognises that a ‘one size fits all’ regime is not always 
appropriate for smaller and growing companies (Miles and Proctor 2012). However, this 
does not mean that corporate governance is less relevant for AIM companies. The LSE 
believes that good corporate governance is just as relevant and important for AIM 
companies as it is for those on the Main Market.  
Given the current public and political concerns on corporate governance, it is significant 
to establish investor confidence in AIM in general and successful investor relations for 
individual AIM companies by having stronger and more effective governance systems 
that contribute to improved company performance, and ultimately help a company to 
avoid financial distress. 
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2.6.1 BEST PRACTICE IN KEY AREAS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR AIM 
COMPANIES 
According to Miles and Proctor (2012), there are some key areas of corporate governance 
with which AIM companies must seek to comply and these are: 
2.6.1.1 THE ROLE OF THE CHAIRPERSON  
The role of chairperson and chief executive should be separated and not be exercised by 
the same individual as per the Quoted Companies Alliance (QCA) guidelines. However, 
where the roles are combined, there should be an explanation as to how governance is 
protected, the exceptional circumstances that cause the roles to be combined, and the 
intentions for the separation of the roles. Further, the chief executive should not go on to 
become a chairperson of the same company. If exceptionally, this occurs, an appropriate 
explanation must be provided. 
2.6.1.2 INDEPENDENT NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON THE BOARD 
The company must have at least two independent non-executive directors, one of whom 
may be the chairperson if regarded as independent at the time of appointment, and the 
board must not be dominated by one person, or a group of people according to the QCA 
Guidelines (Ward 2012).  
2.6.1.3 APPOINTMENT OF SENIOR NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR ON THE BOARD 
The UK Corporate Governance Code requires one of the independent non-executive 
directors, other than the chairperson, to be appointed as a senior independent director. 
However, according to the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF), the 
appointment of a senior independent director is required for an AIM company where the 
company has a combined chairperson and chief executive officer. 
2.6.1.4 INDEPENDENCE OF NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS 
The criteria for assessing the independence of non-executive directors set out in the UK 
Corporate Governance Code are useful for adoption by AIM companies. Independence 
should be demonstrated if the criteria are not met and the test of independence should not 
be done by ticking the boxes as per the QCA guidelines (Ward 2012). From the QCA 
Guidelines, in assessing non-executive directors’ independence, the following should be 
considered. First, payment of fees satisfied in shares of the company does not, of itself, 
impair independence if there are restrictions on how quickly those shares can be disposed 
of (Ward 2012). Second, the independence of a director may be compromised if a director 
has a beneficial or non-beneficial shareholding of more than three per cent of the 
companies issued share capital as per the NAPF Policy. Third, participation in the 
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company’s share option scheme or performance-related pay scheme may compromise 
independence.  
2.6.1.5 REMUNERATION COMMITTEE 
The UK Corporate Governance Code recommends that the remuneration committee 
comprises three or in the case of smaller companies, two independent non-executive 
directors. The remuneration committee should be composed of non-executive directors, 
all of whom must be independent. If the chairperson is considered as independent, he/she 
may be a member of the committee, but it is a best practice that he/she does not chair the 
committee. 
2.6.1.6 AUDIT COMMITTEE 
The UK Corporate Governance Code recommends that the audit committee comprises 
three but for smaller companies, two independent non-executive directors. For smaller 
companies, the chairperson if deemed independent may be a member of, but not the chair 
of the audit committee in addition to two other independent non-executive directors. The 
QCA recommendations are that at least two independent non-executive directors should 
comprise the audit committee and that, if the board regards the chairperson as independent 
and non-executive, then the chairperson may be one of the two independent non-executive 
directors on the audit committee. In addition, at least one member of the audit committee 
should have recent and relevant financial experience. Therefore, given the flexibility, 
directors of AIM companies must approach the implementation of effective and 
appropriate corporate governance structures. They should aspire to compliance with the 
Code, use the QCA guidelines as the benchmark for an AIM company’s corporate 
governance systems, actively consider what is appropriate for their company, consult with 
the company’s Nomad on an ongoing basis, and regard effective corporate governance as 
positively contributing to long-term growth and delivery of value to shareholders.  
2.7 DEFINITION OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS IN THE UK 
Section 128(f) of the UK Companies Act 2008 defines financial distress as a situation 
that appears to be: (i) reasonably unlikely that the company will be able to pay all its debts 
as they fall due, and payable within the immediately ensuing six months, or (ii) reasonably 
likely that the company will become insolvent within the immediately ensuing six 
months. Section 123 of the UK Insolvency Act 1986 also explains that a company is 
deemed unable to pay its debts: (i) if it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the 
company is unable to pay its debts as they fall due, and (ii) if it is proved to the satisfaction 
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of the court that the value of the company’s assets is less than the value of its liabilities, 
considering its contingent and prospective liabilities.  
Empirically, financial distress has been defined differently by different authors. For 
instance, Gilson (1989) defines it as a firm’s inability to meet its fixed payment 
obligations on debts and thus within a given firm-year, a firm is financially unhealthy if 
it is in default on its debts, bankrupt or privately restructuring its debts to avoid 
bankruptcy. According to Baldwin and Scott (1983), when a firm’s business deteriorates 
to the point where it cannot meet its financial obligations, the firm is said to have gone 
into a state of financial distress. Wruck (1990) identified that there are many stages that 
a firm can go through before it is stated as dead and these include financial distress, 
insolvency, the filing of bankruptcy, and administrative receivership. However, Platt and 
Platt (2002) believe that financial distress is a step decrease in financial condition that 
occurs prior to bankruptcy or liquidation. The main issue, therefore, in identifying firms 
facing financial distress is their inability to honour their contractual debt obligations. 
Thus, as long as the firm’s cash flow exceeds current debt obligation, then the firm has 
enough funds to pay its creditors (Elloumi and Gueyie 2001). 
2.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The chapter outlined the definitions of corporate governance and financial distress within 
the legal perspectives. It discussed the development of corporate governance in the UK 
as well as the principles in the code in the relevant sections and the sub-sections. Further, 
key areas of the corporate governance expected of AIM companies are discussed. In 
conclusion, the discussions in the various sections and the sub-sections of the chapter 
have provided the conceptual framework within which the hypotheses of the study are set 
and tested. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews the literature on the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and firms’ financial distress. The prediction of firms’ financial distress using 
corporate governance mechanisms has been a focus of much empirical research due to 
corporate scandals and the financial crisis such as the one that started in 2007. Empirical 
studies concentrate on different corporate governance mechanisms and how they affect 
firms’ financial distress in different corporate governance environments. This is because 
the literature on corporate failure and corporate financial distress is dominated by the ad 
hoc selection of variables approach, without any theoretical underpinning (Appiah 2013). 
Also, according to Balcaen and Ooghe (2006), the selection of financial predictors for 
failure prediction models is usually left as an empirical question, as the theoretical 
foundation is weak or totally neglected. This literature review is carried out with the aim 
of determining consistency in the findings of the relationship between corporate 
governance and financial distress, as well as to identify gaps in the literature. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 explains financial distress. 
Section 3.3 discusses corporate governance mechanisms. The moderating factors are 
briefly introduced in section 3.4 while the chapter summary is presented in section 3.5. 
3.2 FINANCIAL DISTRESS 
Financial distress can cause large economic and social losses for different groups of firms’ 
stakeholders. Many firms fall into financial distress every year and the causes are many 
including the fact that their markets mature, new competitors and technologies emerge, 
management malfunctions and demand for what they sell declines. Although a financially 
distressed firm has trouble raising the cash to meet the payments on its current financial 
obligations, particularly concerning those with contractual agreements that are 
enforceable by law including that of loans, debts to suppliers, salaries of employees and 
interest payments, there is no commonly accepted definition of financial distress. Thus, 
different scholars give different definitions to the meaning of financial distress according 
to their own study purposes (Sun et al. 2014). It is therefore not surprising that early 
researchers on financial distress in the 1980s and 1990s defined financial distress 
differently. From Baldwin and Scott (1983), when a firm’s business deteriorates to the 
point where it cannot meet its financial obligations, the firm is said to have gone into a 
state of financial distress. Gilson (1989) defines financial distress of a firm as the firm’s 
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inability to meet its fixed payment obligations on debts and thus, within a given firm-
year, a firm is financially unhealthy if it is in default on its debts, bankrupt or privately 
restructuring its debts to avoid bankruptcy. Earlier, Beaver (1966) stated that an enterprise 
is like a reservoir formed by the cash flow, composed of cash inflows and outflows and 
therefore an enterprise in financial distress is just like a reservoir whose water is drained. 
Beaver (1966) defines financial distress as the inability of a business firm to pay its 
financial obligations as they mature. According to  Doumpos and Zopounidis (1999), 
financial distress does not only involve an inability to repay important obligatory 
payments due to inadequate cash but also include the situation of negative net asset value, 
which means a firm’s total assets are less than its total liabilities from the view of 
accounting. Also, while Whitaker (1999) defines financial distress as the first year in 
which a firm’s cash flow is less than the current maturities of long-term debt, Chen et al. 
(1995) define financial distress as the condition where a firm’s liquidation of total assets 
is less than the value of creditors’ claims.  
Recent researchers do not significantly differ in terms of their definitions of financial 
distress. Wu et al. (2008) define the financial distress of a firm as a condition where 
obligations are not met or are met with difficulty. From Geng et al. (2015) financial 
distress of a company usually refers to the situation that operating cash flow of a company 
cannot supersede the negative net assets of the firm. According to Fawzi et al. (2015), 
financial distress occurs when companies suffer negative cash flows from operating, 
investing and financing activities and as a result, those companies default in loan payment 
due to the insufficient cash flow. However, Altman and Hotchkiss (2011) are of the view 
that corporate financial distress is a vague term which can be attributed to four generic 
terms commonly used in business research: failure, insolvency, bankruptcy, and default. 
These definitions indicate that there is no commonly accepted definition of financial 
distress but what is common is that when a firm lacks funds to pay its debts when due, 
then the firm is said to be in a state of financial distress.  
The main issue in identifying firms facing financial distress is their inability to honour 
their contractual debt obligations. This is confirmed by the UK Insolvency Act 1986 
(section 123) which states that a company is deemed unable to pay its debts: (i) if it is 
proved to the satisfaction of the court that the company is unable to pay its debts as they 
fall due and (ii) if it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the value of the 
company’s assets is less than the value of its liabilities, taking into account its contingent 
and prospective liabilities. However, as long as the firm’s cash flow exceeds current debt 
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obligations, then the firm has enough funds to pay its creditors (Elloumi and Gueyie 
2001). If a firm’s financial distress situation is prolonged, it can lead to forced liquidation 
or bankruptcy and because of this, financial distress is often recognised as the likelihood 
of bankruptcy, which is dependent on the non-availability of liquidity and credit. It is not 
surprising that Wruck (1990) identified that there are many stages that a firm can go 
through before it is stated as dead and these include financial distress, insolvency, the 
filing of bankruptcy, and administrative receivership. Hence, financial distress is best 
outlined as a continuum ranging from being financially weak to bankrupt, with the 
possibility of various degrees of financial weakness. Financially distressed firms are 
different from failed firms in the sense that the failure of a firm to meet its financial 
obligations does not inevitably lead to a filing for bankruptcy and that bankruptcy is the 
widely used outcome of financial distress of a company (Geng et al. 2015). Although 
bankruptcy, failure, insolvency, and default are the most common terms use to describe 
financial distress situation, many financially distressed firms never file for bankruptcy.  
From the above definitions and explanations, this study adopts the meaning of financial 
distress that explains a firm’s inability to honour its contractual debt obligations when 
they fall due. The study neither considers distressed firms as bankrupt nor failed since 
these are the final stages of the firms’ decline whereas financial distress is the beginning 
of a firm’s decline. 
3.2.1. FINANCIAL DISTRESS IDENTIFICATION BASED ON ACCOUNTING AND 
FINANCIAL INDICATORS 
Balcaen and Ooghe (2006) acknowledged that the accounting and finance criteria that 
have been used in identifying firms as financially distressed include several years of 
negative net operating income, suspension of dividend payments, major restructuring or 
layoffs, low- interest coverage ratio, and negative earnings before interest and tax. The 
rest are negative net income before special items, losses, selling shares to private 
investors, entering into a capital restructuring or a reorganisation and a few years of 
negative shareholders’ funds or accumulated losses. Empirical studies by some 
researchers on financial distress indicate that they use a combination of these criteria to 
classify firms as financially distressed. For instance, Manzaneque et al. (2016) in their 
research on the role of institutional shareholders as owners and directors and the financial 
distress likelihood in Spain, use the conceptual approach of financial distress, meaning a 
firm’s lack of capacity to meet its financial obligation to identify their financially 
distressed firms. The criteria for identifying their financially distressed firms were defined 
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by two conditions: (i) earnings before interest and taxes, depreciation and amortisation 
(EBITDA) are lower than the firm’s financial expenses for two consecutive years and (ii) 
a fall in the firm’s markets value occuring between two consecutive periods. Using these 
criteria, their study sampled 70 financially distressed and 70 financially non-distressed 
firms from a sample population of 734 listed firms on the continuous market of Spanish 
computerised trading system from 2007 to 2012. 
Also in a study of risk effects of acquiring distressed firms, Bruyland and de Maeseneire 
(2016) define financial distress as failure to meet financial obligations in line with Asquith 
et al. (1994), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Claessens et al. (2003) and Pindado et al. (2008). 
Their study identifies firms as financially distressed using a measure of interest coverage 
ratio calculated as the earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortisation 
divided by interest expense on debt. A firm was regarded as financially distressed if its 
interest coverage ratio was less than one in the first and the second year preceding the 
deal announcement and that this measure of identifying financially distressed firms was 
preferred since it proxied for distress and did not necessarily predict the event of 
bankruptcy. Using the interest coverage criterion, the study identified a subsample of 
15.9% distressed targets and seemed huge compared to the 2% reported by Meier and 
Servaes (2014), who use a severe and ex-post measure of distress classifying target firms 
as distress if they are in bankruptcy or liquidation at the time of the transaction, if the 
target is undergoing a restructuring, or if bankruptcy court approval is needed for the 
transaction to be completed. Nonetheless, the percentage of distressed firms that were 
obtained in the study of Bruyland and de Maeseneire (2016) was  reasonable when 
compared to other empirical work on the topic: Ang and Mauck (2011) classify 34.7% of 
their sample as distressed based on negative net income, while this is 18.7% in Eisdorfer 
(2008), who uses Altman Z-score.  
In the UK, Poletti-Hughes and Ozkan (2014) studied the ultimate controllers, ownership 
and the probability of insolvency in financially distressed firms. The study focused on 
financially distressed firms and as such the analysis adopted the same criteria as that of 
Claessens et al. (2003), where financially distressed firms are those with an interest 
coverage ratio (earnings before interest and taxes divided by interest expense) of less than 
one. In addition, as in Asquith et al. (1994), to include a firm in the financial distress 
sample, their study required that financial distress should remain for at least two 
consecutive years during the period of analysis. Using the above criteria, their study 
obtained a final sample of an unbalanced panel of 3092 firm-year observations, consisting 
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of 484 different companies. Also, in another UK study of financial distress and 
bankruptcy prediction among listed companies using accounting, market and 
macroeconomic variables, Hernandez et al. (2013) define financial distress by focusing 
on the ability of a firm to repay its financial obligations. The study identifies financially 
distressed firms based on two conditions. First, a firm is regarded as financially distressed 
whenever its earnings before interest and taxes, depreciation, and amortisation are lower 
than its financial expenses for two consecutive years and second, whenever the firms 
suffer from negative growth in market value for two consecutive years. These two 
conditions justify the fact that, first, whenever earnings before interest and taxes, 
depreciation, and amortisation are lower than the interest expense on the firm’s debt then 
it can be concluded that the operational profitability of the firm is not sufficient to cover 
its financial obligation. Second, the market as well as stakeholders are likely to judge 
negatively a firm that suffers from operational deficit until an improvement in the 
financial condition is perceived again and that the fall in market value for two consecutive 
years is interpreted as an indication that a firm is in effect in financial distress (Pindado 
et al. 2008). However, in order to complete the concept of financial distress and to 
enhance the scope and the discriminating power of the model for practical purposes, a 
definition based on  Christidis and Gregory (2010) was used. With this, a firm was 
regarded as being in financial distress not only when it satisfies the two conditions above, 
but also when it is deemed to have formally defaulted on its obligations. With the above 
criteria, the study had 1254 firm-years observations.  
In Australia, Miglani et al. (2015) examined the role of voluntary adoption of corporate 
governance mechanisms in mitigating the financial distress status of firms. The study 
identifies financially distressed firms as those experiencing five consecutive years of 
negative net income from 1999 to 2003, while the sample of financially healthy firms is 
identified as those which have experienced five consecutive years of positive net income 
within the same period. From a population of all Australian Securities Exchange listed 
firms as at June 1998, the study sampled 215 financially distressed firms and 123 
financially healthy firms. Although using the negative net income to define financial 
distress has limitations including the fact that management may reduce reported earnings 
during labour negotiations to improve their bargaining position, generally, however, 
companies are more likely to increase rather than decrease earnings and to create value 
through earnings management. In using negative net income to classify financially 
distressed firms, the researchers are of the view that, a firm reporting loss is taken as a 
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sign of an important event and as such, the use of a very strict definition of consecutive 
negative net income for 5 years is likely to serve as a suitable proxy of financial distress.  
3.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS 
Since the late 1980s and the 1990s, with corporate bankruptcy reaching epidemic 
proportions (Altman 1984; Gales and Kesner 1994), criticism relative to weaknesses of 
corporate governance structure has been commensurate (Elloumi and Gueyie 2001). 
Recently, Brédart (2014) noted that the number of filings for bankruptcy procedures 
exploded during and after the 2007 financial crisis and governance has been pointed out 
as one of the causes. To this end, empirical studies (Fich and Slezak 2008; Mangena and 
Chamisa 2008; Donker et al. 2009; Lajili and Zéghal 2010) have highlighted the 
significance of corporate governance mechanisms and their influence on the likelihood 
of firms’ financial distress. According to Poletti-Hughes and Ozkan (2014), corporate 
governance mechanisms of firms are significant both in lowering the probability of 
financial distress in the first place and in preventing firms from becoming insolvent when 
in distress. Hence, if a firm’s corporate governance structure were related to its probability 
of financial distress, the inclusion of corporate governance mechanisms in a prediction 
model for financial distress would provide better results (Lee and Yeh 2004). However, 
Ciampi (2015) noted that the relationship between corporate governance and company 
distress has been analysed by a limited number of studies, the results of which are not the 
same. There are different corporate governance mechanisms but based on Standard and 
Poor’s (2002) corporate governance score this literature review focuses on some 
mechanisms which make up: (i) board composition and structure; (ii) ownership 
structure; and (iii) disclosure and transparency.  
3.3.1 BOARD COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE  
3.3.1.1 BOARD SIZE 
Board size represents the number of members of the board and it is a significant board 
characteristic that affects board functioning and subsequently firms’ performance 
(Chaganti et al. 1985). A firm’s board may be able to dedicate enough energies to multiple 
functions only if there are sufficient members on the board to take up those roles 
(O’Sullivan 2009). Researchers make strong arguments for both larger and smaller 
number of directors on the boards (Daily et al. 2003; Fich and Slezak 2008). According 
to Simpson and Gleason (1999), a CEO will find it difficult to influence a larger board of 
directors and therefore a larger board of directors is necessary to raise their disciplinary 
control over the CEO (Brédart 2014). Dalton et al. (1999) also argue that larger boards 
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offer better advice to the CEO. Moreover, larger boards offer different benefits link with 
the firm’s ability to access the resources and information held by the directors and that 
might be needed to achieve firm objectives. These indicate that firms with a larger board 
size perform well to avoid financial distress. This is supported by Brédart (2014) who 
with a sample of 312 firms that were quoted on the AMEX, the NASDAQ and the New 
York Stock Exchange from mid-2007 to 2009 found that the size of the board was 
negatively related to financial distress occurrence. Also, Manzaneque et al. (2016b) 
between 2007 and 2012 using a matched-pairs research design with 308 observations, 
with each half classified as distressed and non-distressed in Spain, finds a negative 
relationship between board size and financial distress likelihood. Moreover, Fich and 
Slezak (2008) investigated whether bankruptcy forecast models that incorporate 
accounting, the stock market, and corporate governance characteristics are better able to 
predict bankruptcy than those that rely solely on financial and accounting information 
after sampling two groups of distressed firms (a Z-score sample of 508 and an ICR sample 
of 277). Using hazard models, the result shows that empirical analysis based on corporate 
governance features including board size significantly enhance the predictive power of 
bankruptcy hazards models.  
However, larger boards may have problems with balance, resulting in greater discretion 
of its members to satisfy their interests to the disadvantage of the general interest of the 
firm (Chaganti et al. 1985) or lack of effectiveness when turbulent economic environment 
need a change in strategic direction (Goodstein et al. 1994). According to Jensen (1993), 
large boards result in less effective coordination, communication and decision making, 
and that it is likely for CEOs to control those boards. This argument is supported by 
Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) who find that large boards are associated 
with lower firm value. This is because larger boards generally consume more pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary resources in the form of remuneration and perquisites than smaller 
boards (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Jensen (1993) therefore proposes that a smaller 
number of board members are more effective at monitoring firms’ management. This is 
because in a firm where the board size is smaller, directors are personally more involved 
and the decision-taking process is more efficient and rapid which guarantees a more 
effective management monitoring activity (Ciampi 2015), thereby decreasing the chances 
of the firm to achieve unstable economic and financial situations (Fich and Slézak 2008). 
This is evidence by Gales and Kesner (1994) who examined a sample of 127 bankrupt 
firms along with an equal number of non-bankrupt firms during the crisis period in the 
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US. The result of the study shows that boards of companies that have filed for a 
bankruptcy protection chapter are characterised by a smaller number of directors. 
Nonetheless, some studies do not show any significant relationship between board size 
and financial distress. For instance, in a study to analyse how the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and business failure changes in small enterprises in 
comparison to larger firms in Italy, Ciampi (2015) used a sample of 283 defaulting firms 
and 340 non-defaulting firms. Using corporate governance mechanisms including board 
size in logistic regression, the study finds that board size does not have a significant 
impact on the likelihood of small company default. In conclusion, Lipton and Lorsch 
(1992), and Jensen (1993) however, propose optimal board size, which must preferably 
fall between seven and nine directors, and argue that as the number of directors exceeds 
ten, there are higher additional costs linked with less cohesiveness, frank discussions, and 
slow decision-making than any marginal gains from intense monitoring of management 
activities (Ntim et al. 2015). 
3.3.1.2 PROPORTION OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS 
Board independence is determined by the degree to which the board consists of people 
who are not otherwise affiliated with the firm through employment or economic exchange 
relationships (Gordon 2007). A board has a high level of independence if the board has 
more independent members and if the chair of the board is not the same as the CEO of 
the firm (Gaur et al. 2015). According to Dowell et al. (2011), independent boards are 
generally considered beneficial because they are harder for top management to dominate 
and they may be more likely to encourage changes even in the face of management 
reluctance. The UK Corporate Governance Code (2012), recommends that a board be 
primarily composed of independent directors to ensure their effectiveness in exercising 
independent judgement in managerial oversight (Hsu and Wu 2014). Because 
independent directors do not have any relationship with the firm other than being part of 
the board, they are in a better position to monitor and control potential opportunism and 
avoid selfish behaviours of management to ensure that their decisions are consistent with 
the interests of shareholders (Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen 1993). Fama and Jensen 
(1983) therefore assert that independent directors are in a better position to play 
supervisory roles since they have a lower probability of engaging in behaviours that 
damage shareholders’ value. Fich and Slezak (2008) and Chang (2009) state that having 
independent directors on the board reduces the possible existence of information 
asymmetries and the agency costs between shareholders and management which impact 
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on firms’ financial health. Firms with a higher proportion of independent directors on 
their boards are therefore less likely to experience financial distress since they are more 
efficient in imposing the necessary measures to overcome a possible distress situation 
(Pregio de la Cruz et al. 2014). A study by Elloumi and Gueyie (2001) with 92 companies 
divided equally between distressed and healthy companies in Canada finds that the 
percentage of independent directors on the board of directors of distressed firms is 
significantly lower than that of the matched healthy firms and board independence 
inversely influence the firm’s financial healthiness. Also, Wang and Deng (2006) find 
that the proportion of independent directors have a negative correlation with default 
likelihood after applying logistic regression to a sample of 97 firms in distress and 97 
non-distress firms. Daily and Dalton (1994) ascertain that large firms that experienced 
bankruptcy had fewer independent boards than a matched sample of healthy companies. 
In the UK, Hsu and Wu (2014) examine whether a firm’s board structure is related to the 
likelihood of corporate failure by employing a matched-pairs research design with a 
sample of 234 companies comprising 117 failed firms and 117 non-failed control firms. 
Results from the study indicate that firms with a greater proportion of independent 
directors on their boards are less likely to fail. However, using publicly available data 
from the annual reports of a sample of 86 financially distressed firms listed on the Bursa 
Malaysia and a sample of matched 86 non-financially distressed firms for a period 
covering the 1999-2001 financial years, Nahar Abdullah (2006) examines whether board 
structure and ownership structure are associated with financial distress. Using pooled 
logistic regression analysis, the study results indicate that board independence is not 
associated with financial distress status. 
Although empirical evidence (Weisbach 1998) indicates that independent directors 
represent the interests of the shareholders better, they are, however, characterised by a 
more superficial understanding of the specificities of the firm and that many independent 
directors representing different interests may reduce the economic flexibility of the firm. 
Patton and Bake (1987) also argue that independent directors serve on a part-time basis 
and typically serve as directors on multiple boards and as such are less likely to have 
enough time to understand how each business operates. This may lead to independent 
directors depending on their general knowledge rather than firm- specific knowledge in 
assessing managerial performance (Hsu and Wu 2014). The problem, however, is that 
shareholders cannot rely on the internal directors because their positions in the firm and 
the existence of possible inherent contracts, as well as their loyalty with the CEO, may 
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affect their ability to replace the CEO when necessary, especially when firms are 
financially distressed. It is, therefore, unlikely that inside directors will be able to perform 
the monitoring role of the board as required by the shareholders. Hence, it is significant 
that independent directors monitor, advise, and challenge managers, especially when the 
firm needs to make changes to survive (Weisbsch 1988). 
Independent directors also bring access to different and varied sources of information, 
create alignment with the environment that improves firm performance, and avoids 
financial distress (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Hillman and Dalziel 2003). Firms obtain 
valuable technical and business counsel, information about the market, legitimacy and 
other resources from the independent directors (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Companies, 
therefore, appoint independent directors to their boards for the skills and knowledge they 
bring to the board and that they make it possible to widen the organisational knowledge 
of the firm (Cornett et al. 2008). Min and Bowman (2015) with a sample of 2842 firm-
years found out that foreign investors place considerable value on the appointment of 
independent directors because of the knowledge they bring to the board. Contrarily, 
Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) argue that independent directors do not have in their 
possession enough experience to do their jobs very well plunging firms into financial 
distress. This is because independent directors do not have enough knowledge of the 
strengths and weaknesses of their firms to give any useful advice (Davis et al. 1997). 
Nonetheless, the presence of independent directors on the board is significant because of 
the benefits they bring, especially to distressed firms including the fact that independent 
directors can challenge the CEO and top management whenever there are disagreements 
over the correct direction to take in times of distress (Dowell et al. 2011). Furthermore, 
independent directors are more likely to have the resources that are urgently needed by 
distressed firms, such as access to capital (Hillman and Dalziel 2003). 
3.3.1.3 BOARD GENDER DIVERSITY 
Board gender diversity has become a central focus of corporate governance rejuvenation 
efforts around the world, with firms being urged to appoint female directors to their 
boards  (Adams and Ferreira 2009). The benefits of gender diverse boards including 
enhancing the legitimacy of corporate practices (Hillman et al. 2007), promoting greater 
monitoring of the CEO's performance (Kramer et al. 2006), facilitating working across 
cultures, race, and ethnicities (Tavanti and Werhane, 2013), as well as producing higher 
quality decisions (Cruz et al. 2012) have led to better monitoring role and company 
performance by fostering additional solutions to the challenges of the modern corporation 
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(Poletti-Hughes and Briano-Turrent 2019). In addition to the social and ethical reasons, 
the economic arguments have also stimulated the demands for increasing the number of 
women representations on corporate boards. A study by Nguyen et al. (2015) with a 
sample of 120 companies ascertains that board gender diversity appears to influence firm 
performance and financial health. Carter et al. (2003) find a positive relation between the 
percentage of women on the board of directors and firm value. Also, Perryman et al. 
(2015) equally find that firms with greater gender diversity in top management teams 
show lower risk and deliver better performance to avoid financial distress. Adams and 
Ferreira (2009) therefore suggest that weakly governed firms may benefit from including 
more women on their boards, enhancing additional monitoring, and improving firm value. 
Grosvold (2011)  points out that the male-dominated nature of the corporate boardroom 
has been raised as a potential contributory factor to the collapse of WorldCom and Enron. 
Wilson and Altanlar (2009) find insolvency risk to be negatively related to the proportion 
of female directors. To this end, firms are encouraged to have more female representations 
on their boards, and that some countries including Belgium, Sweden, Italy, and Norway 
have laws that mandate more female representation on the board of directors for some 
firms. In the UK, the Corporate Governance Code incorporates recommendation for 
gender equality and that the Higgs (2003) report argues that diversity could enhance board 
effectiveness and specifically recommends that firms draw more actively from 
professional groups in which women are better represented (Adams and Ferreira 2009). 
Gender diversity may allow organisational heads to effectively reach common goals and 
decisions, regardless of whether they share similar meanings or opinions and that 
heterogeneity in decision-making and problem-solving styles produces better decisions 
through the operation of a wider range of perspectives and a more thorough, critical 
analysis of issues (Perryman et al. 2015a). Female on corporate boards might, therefore, 
provide a diversity of perspectives and opinions to board deliberations and help develop 
policies that are more responsive. Thus, board gender diversity is assumed to avoid 
earnings management, which may enhance firm financial performance and avoid 
financial distress. 
Greater gender diversity on corporate boards may provide better monitoring because 
female director representation assists in improving managerial accountability including 
that of board meeting attendance and CEO responsibility. Females on corporate boards 
might also make stronger existing control mechanisms over managers and executives 
because board gender diversity enhances board independence (Carter et al. 2010). Adams 
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and Ferreira (2009) find that female directors tend to have better monitoring ability since 
they think independently and are not influenced by the so-called old-boys’ club 
syndrome. Prior evidence from Burgess and Tharenou (2002) indicates the positive effect 
of board gender diversity on fostering good corporate practice. However, according to 
Goodstein et al. (1994), board diversity leads to clashes within groups since others find it 
hard to identify with those of a different gender (Pelled et al. 1999) and the greater the 
diversity of the board of directors, the greater the potential that conflict of interests may 
arise. Further, from Adams and Ferreira (2009), board gender diversity seems to have a 
harmful effect on well-governed firms because of unnecessary, excessive monitoring. 
Liu et al. (2014), indicates that more gender-diverse boards may also help to extend those 
firms important resources including the human capital of board members such as 
knowledge and skills, advice and counsel, channels of communication, and legitimacy. 
Thus, increasing the female representation on corporate boards may broaden the human 
capital and channels of communication of the board of directors by offering more insight 
into corporates’ strategic issues, more importantly, those that concern female employees, 
consumers, and business partners (Daily et al. 1999). Adams and Ferreira (2009) find that 
board gender diversity has a significant effect on board inputs. Farrell and Hersch (2005) 
document insignificant abnormal returns on the announcement of a woman added to the 
board.  
3.2.1.4 BOARD ACTIVITY 
The level of board meetings has been used as a measure of board activity (Brédart 2014) 
and that board meeting frequency is a significant dimension of board operations (Vafeas 
1999; Brick and Chidambaran 2010). Adams and Ferreira (2012) acknowledge that board 
meetings are fundamental for directors to acquire information, take part in decision 
making, avoid personal liability, and fulfil their monitoring and advisory roles. Conger et 
al. (1998) propose that board meeting time is an important resource in improving board 
effectiveness including the fact that directors meeting more frequently are more likely to 
counteract the entrenchment of managers (Linck et al. 2008). Board meetings, therefore, 
help the directors to obtain a better understanding and control of the company strategies 
that improve performance and avoid financial distress (Vafeas 1999). However, how 
frequently should the board meets has been topical, controversial, and has policy 
implications, yet, it is not directly covered by governance codes and the extant literature 
(Hahn and Lasfer 2016). Brick and Chidambaran (2010) assert that much of the regulatory 
and shareholder attention on the board of directors has assumed that board activity can 
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increase shareholder value. The UK Combined Code on corporate governance (2003), 
technically, recommends that the board should meet sufficiently regularly to discharge its 
duties effectively. Vafaes (1999) argues that the frequency of board meetings is a 
significant board characteristic that can have important implications for firm value. With 
a sample of 307 firms, Vafaes (1999) reported an inverse relationship between the number 
of annual board meetings and prior year performance proposing that the increase in board 
meeting happened due to poor performance. The study also ascertains that the operating 
performance improves following years of abnormal board’s activity and that the overall 
results of the study indicate that board meeting frequency is an important aspect of board 
operations. Brick and Chidambaran (2010) also reported an inverse relationship between 
board meetings and firm value. Lorsch and Young (1990) in a survey and case-based 
study of US boards find that boards of directors increased their meeting frequency in 
times of crises and major challenges and poor performances. The increase in boards’ 
activity in poorly performing firms may occur since directors may want to protect 
themselves from being blamed for not doing enough when needed. The board of directors 
of poorly performing firms may also increase their activity with the hope of turning 
performances around. Jensen (1993) however, has doubts about the effectiveness of board 
meetings on firms’ financial health since the CEO sets the agenda of the meeting, and 
therefore, routine tasks take much of the meeting time and limit the opportunities for 
directors to exercise meaningful control over management. Brédart (2014), with a sample 
of 312 US firms in a study of financial distress and corporate governance concentrating 
on board configuration, finds that board activity does not lead to firms’ financial distress. 
Directors are often criticised for not attending all board meetings since they take up 
directorship in different companies but there are costs associated with such meetings 
including travel expenses and directors’ fees and these affect firms, especially, those 
struggling to meet their financial obligations (Vafeas 1999).  
3.3.1.5 BOARD MEMBER QUALIFICATION 
Board of directors makes ultimate decisions for firms (Fama and Jensen 1983) and as 
such, they are expected to have qualifications which are relevant to the firms’ industry 
(Christy et al. 2013). According to Cox and Blake (1991), having more qualified members 
on the board would extend the knowledge base, stimulate board members to consider 
other alternatives and enhance more thoughtful processing of problems (Bathula 2008). 
Also, having boards with highly qualified members provide for ability and expertise 
necessary for the effective decision-making process (Milliken and Martins 1996), as well 
      
45 
 
as understanding the concerns of all stakeholder groups, and assist the firm to come out 
with strategies to deal with a different group of stakeholders. Board members with 
qualifications are probably more critical of the firm’s financial reporting and are also in 
a better position to advise CEOs on firms’ financial communication strategy and that their 
presence is likely to give assurances to potential investors as well as creditors (Jeanjean 
and Stolowy 2009). Westphal and Milton (2000) also maintain that board members with 
higher educational qualifications in general or research and analysis intensive 
qualification like PhD will provide a rich source of innovative ideas to develop policy 
initiatives with analytical depth and rigour that will provide unique perspectives on a 
strategic issue (Bathula 2008). Thus, when members of the board have higher 
qualification, it benefits the firm through a mix of competencies and capabilities 
(Carpenter and Westphal 2001). Contrarily, lack of competence on the board results in a 
lack of critical thinking, business analysis, and innovation which affect firms’ financial 
health (Gaur et al. 2015). 
The members of the board of directors also constitute the various committees including 
the audit, nominations and remuneration committees and as such their qualifications in 
specific accounting and financing, arrangements can help reduce corporate scandals and 
corporate financial distress. A study by Cunningham (2010) shows an inverse relationship 
between financial qualification and the likelihood of financial reporting irregularities, 
fraud and earnings management. This means that the more financial qualifications the 
board members have, the less likelihood of these corporate scandals occurring. Also, 
Mohid Rahmat et al. (2009) investigate whether there is any difference in the 
characteristics of audit committee between financially distressed and financially non-
distressed companies listed on Bursa Malaysia. Data for the study are obtained from a 
sample of 73 financially distressed and the matched pair of 73 financially non-distressed 
companies. Results from the logistic regression analysis show that financial distress is 
significantly associated with the financial literacy of audit committee members. 
Qualification of the members on the audit committee would strengthen corporate 
governance by intensifying the ability of the board to protect shareholder interest thereby 
increasing shareholder value. According to Gaur et al. (2015), scholars find that the stock 
market reacts more favourably to announcements of professionally qualified directors on 
the board. Though there is limited literature linking board member’s educational 
qualification to firms’ financial distress, the literature suggests that educational 
qualification is associated with benefits for shareholders including lowering earnings 
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manipulation (Xie et al. 2003) and higher quality audit service. Carcello et al. (2006) 
found that both accounting and certain types of non-accounting financial expertise reduce 
earnings management for firms with weak corporate governance mechanisms, but that 
independent audit committee members with financial expertise are most effective in 
mitigating earnings management. A study by Li et al. (2010) on financial executive 
qualifications, financial executive turnover, and adverse Sarbanes Oxley 404 opinions 
found out that firms receiving initial adverse SOX 404 opinions in 2004 have less 
qualified Chief Finance Officers.  Thus, firms are less likely to restate their earnings if 
their Chief Financial Officers have more years’ experience, have an MBA (Master’s in 
Business Administration) degree and/or have CPA (Chartered Public Accountant) 
credential. However, having members of the board who have the relevant and 
qualifications comes with a high cost since they are expensive to recruit and keep.  
3.2.1.6 AUDIT COMMITTEE INDEPENDENCE 
The audit committee interacts with the firm’s auditors to ensure that the audited financial 
statements appropriately and accurately show the company’s financial position (Platt and 
Platt 2012). The audit committee is regarded as one of the influential mechanisms of 
corporate governance as it helps the board members in discharging their duties in 
overseeing management (Bedard and Gendron 2010)). Although the responsibility for 
safeguarding the financial health of the firm is borne by the board of directors, the audit 
committee plays a prominent role in ensuring the integrity of firms’ financial reports and 
that the monitoring role that the audit committee plays in firms’ financial status makes 
this group particularly well positioned to protect shareholders’ interest (Daily 1996). An 
effective audit committee leads to the enhancement of the financial reporting process 
thereby reducing information asymmetry between management and shareholders (Li et 
al. 2012). From the perspective of corporate governance, the audit committees are 
responsible for the financial reporting process, the internal control structure, the internal 
audit functions and the external audit activities of firms (Salloum et al. 2014). The audit 
committee also maintains and enhances public confidence in the credibility and the 
objectivity of the financial reporting through improving the disclosure practices of 
published information (Bedard and Gendron 2010; Kelton and Yang 2008). The role of 
the audit committee is therefore very important to stakeholders as better quality disclosed 
financial reporting improves firms’ market performance and reduce the probability of 
financial distress (Wild 1996). Daily (1996) examines the impact of audit committee 
composition on the incidence and form of a bankruptcy reorganisation filing for the 5-
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year period preceding the filing by sampling 53 bankrupt and 53 non-bankrupt US firms. 
Results from logistic regression analysis demonstrate that audit committee composition 
is significantly related to a pre-packaged filing and the length of time spent in 
reorganisation during the 5-year period preceding a bankruptcy filing. Also, in a study to 
examine the association between the voluntary adoption of corporate governance 
mechanisms and the likelihood of financial distress, Miglani et al. (2015b) sampled 171 
financially distressed firms and 106 healthy firms listed in Australia over the 5-year 
period. Using logistic regression in the analysis, the study concludes that, the existence 
of a separate audit committee is associated with lower financial distress likelihood.   
The independence of the audit committee is significant because the presence of the 
independent directors in the audit committee ensures corporate accountability, reduces 
the likelihood of a financial problem and protects the best interests of shareholders 
(Salloum et al. 2014). The independence of the audit committee is determined when the 
domination of the independent directors is considered. Carcello and Neal (2000) observe 
that the audit committee should consist of a higher proportion of independent directors. 
Corporate governance regulators are much concerned with the independence of the audit 
committee and in the UK, the Corporate Governance Code (2012) recommends that an 
audit committee is composed of a minimum of three independent directors. Where the 
audit committee is fully independent, that is, when all the members of the committee are 
independent, it provides better monitoring of management than the existence of the 
executive members with objective decisions (DeFond and Francis 2005). This is because, 
according to Fama and Jensen (1983), independent directors are free from economic 
interests or personal links with corporate managers and as such are better suited to 
exercising their monitoring role. Further, independent directors have a stronger 
motivation to maintain the value of their reputational capital in the external labour market 
(Fama 1980). Independent directors are, therefore, deemed likely to play a more effective 
monitoring role and to have greater incentive to enhance the quality and transparency of 
financial information released to shareholders (Wu et al. 2014). Beasley (1996) posits that 
the presence of an audit committee does not affect the likelihood of fraud, but a higher 
number of independent directors on the board should reduce the possibility of fraud. 
Likewise, McMullen and Raghunandan (1996) acknowledge that the presence of 
independent directors in an audit committee reduces the likelihood of a financial problem. 
Carcello and Neal (2003) examine the relation between audit committee independence 
and disclosure choice for a sample of 138 publicly held manufacturing firms experiencing 
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financial distress. Results from a logistic regression show a significant positive relation 
between the percentage of affiliated directors on the audit committee and optimistic 
disclosures for entities experiencing financial distress and that this relation holds 
regardless of whether the means of disclosure is financial statement notes or management 
discussion and analysis. Also in the US, Bronson et al. (2009) examine whether the 
regulatory requirements of a completely independent audit committee are necessary to 
obtain the monitoring benefits related to audit committee independence that has been 
documented in the prior literature. From the logistic regression analysis, the study 
establishes that the benefits of audit committee independence are consistently achieved 
only when the audit committee is completely independent and that these results provide 
support for the Sarbanes-Oxley requirement of 100% independent audit committees. The 
results further suggest that allowing even one non-independent member to serve on the 
audit committee appears to be problematic in the financial distress process. Chan and Li 
(2008) with a sample of Fortune 200 companies find that the independence of the audit 
committee results in a higher firm value when most expert-independent directors serve 
on the board. However, audit committee members are compensated by the company and 
in some cases, may be reliant on company management for their appointment (Bronson 
et al. 2009). Bronson et al. (2009) also find that audit committee effectiveness is reduced 
when the chief executive officer is involved in the director selection process after 
examining the relation between executive management involvement in the selection of 
board members and audit committee effectiveness. Moreover, having a fully independent 
audit committee may be costly which may place cash trap firms into disadvantageous 
positions. 
3.3.1.7 BOARD MEMBER FINANCIAL EXPERTISE 
The Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) explains a ﬁnancial expert as a person 
who has the following attributes: an understanding of ﬁnancial statements and generally 
accepted accounting principles; an ability to assess the general application of such 
principles in connection with the accounting for estimates, accruals and reserves; 
experience in preparing, auditing, analysing or evaluating ﬁnancial statements that 
present a breadth and level of complexity of accounting issues that are generally 
comparable to the breadth and complexity of issues that can reasonably be expected to be 
raised by the registrant’s ﬁnancial statements, or experience actively supervising one or 
more persons engaged in such activities; an understanding of internal controls and 
procedures for ﬁnancial reporting; and an understanding of audit committee functions 
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(SEC 2003). The SEC, however, responded to the criticism of the definition of a financial 
expert for being narrow and only focuses on accounting related expertise by broadening 
the definition of ﬁnancial expertise in its ﬁnal version of the SOX provision. Abbott et al. 
(2004) define a financial expert as a CPA, investment banker, venture capitalist, CFO, 
controller, or someone who has held a senior management position with financial 
responsibilities. According to Christy et al. (2013), expertise can be either specific 
industry expertise, general business expertise or professional affiliations in such areas as 
accounting, finance, survey, taxation, banking, and law. Specific industry expertise which 
benefits small firms (Linck et al. 2008) refers to formal degrees in specific areas of study 
including pharmacy, medical science, and engineering whereas general business expertise 
which is significant for established firms (Coles et al. 2008) refers to qualifications such 
as MBA. The general business expertise assists board members to carry out their duties 
including oversight of the firm inputs to corporate strategy and monitoring of senior 
management. Using an unbalanced panel data from 1999 to 2012 from the United 
Kingdom’s non-life insurance industry, Adams and Jiang (2017) examine the collective 
and individual impact on six performance indicators of three types of professionally 
qualified board-level financial expert accountants, actuaries, and underwriters. The study 
finds that, collectively, financial experts have a beneficial influence on the performance 
outcomes of insurers and it also observes that board-level qualified accountants and 
actuaries are linked with superior performance in all six of the selected financial outcome 
measures. Christy et al. (2013) use a hand-collected data that captures the directors’ 
formal qualifications from the annual reports for every director, for each year and for 
those listed Australian Securities Exchange firms with a total of 2329 firm-year 
observation. Results from the regression analysis indicate that formal industry 
professional afﬁliations and MBAs provide beneﬁts for the shareholders of large ﬁrms. 
There is, however, limited evidence from the study to show that ﬁnancial expertise on the 
board systematically inﬂuences shareholders’ risk assessments for small or large 
companies.  
3.3.1.8 AUDIT COMMITTEE SIZE 
The size of an audit committee is an essential variable for firms in delivering good 
corporate reporting. To be effective in their role, and due to the technical and complex 
issues in audit committees, members require adequate resources and authority to 
discharge their demanding responsibilities. A board with many directors may have a large 
committee than a board with fewer directors. As the size of the audit committee increases, 
      
50 
 
firms are more likely to include outside directors who bring in additional technical skills 
to the audit committee to enhance its effectiveness to improve firms’ financial reporting 
process. The Code (2014) therefore requires the board to establish an audit committee of 
at least three, or in the case of smaller companies, two independent non-executive 
directors. Large members of the audit committee are more likely to bring a diversity of 
views, expertise, experiences, and skills to ensure effective monitoring (Bédard and 
Gendron 2010) which enhances the firm’s survival. According to Bedard et al. (2004), 
the larger the size of the audit committee, the more likely to detect and resolve potential 
problems in the financial reporting process, because it is likely to provide the necessary 
strength and diversity of views and expertise to ensure effective monitoring. Also, the 
greater the need for effective linkage, the larger the board, and its committees should be 
(Appiah and Amon 2015) since during financial distress, firms with both smaller boards 
and committee sizes are regarded as ineffective due to lessened ability of directors to co-
opt resources from their environment (Chaganti et al. 1985). In examining how the 
composition and characteristics of corporate boards relate to firms’ success and solvency, 
Platt and Platt (2012) sampled 87 bankrupt and 205 non-bankrupt firms. The results of 
the study indicate that the size of the audit committee is related to the firms’ financial 
status and that the audit committees of firms not filing for bankruptcy on average have 
3.89 members compared with the size of bankrupt firms having a significantly lower 
number of 3.45 members. However, Mohid Rahmat et al. (2009) argue that an audit 
committee with a large number of members tends to lose focus and be less participative 
compared to those of a smaller size. Thus, when the size of the audit committee is large, 
it loses concentration and becomes less participative than the smaller one (Salloum et al. 
2014). Jensen (1993), therefore, suggests that boards and their committees should be kept 
small to function more efficiently and not to be controlled by the CEO.  
Mohid Rahmat et al. (2009) on the other hand argue that an audit committee with a small 
number of members lacks the diversity of skills and knowledge and hence becomes 
ineffective which can affect firms’ survival. Also, smaller audit committee size may not 
have the required human resources to carefully monitor the CEO’s performance and 
demand accountability (Chaganti et al. 1985). This creates a conducive environment for 
opportunistic CEOs to pursue corporate strategies in an effort to satisfy their own egos, 
but at the expenses of their firms’ long-term success (Kets de Vries and Miller 1985) and 
this can plunge firms into financial distress. Some studies meanwhile have indicated no 
relationship between financial distress and audit committee size. For instance, in 
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examining whether audit committee characteristics have any effect on corporate 
insolvency, Appiah and Amon (2015) use 1,835 firm-year observations for 98 insolvent 
and 269 solvent UK-listed non-financial firms from 1994 to 2011. Using logistic 
regression, the study finds that the audit committee size is not related to corporate 
insolvency. Also, Salloum et al. (2014) had a sample which consisted of 149 firm years 
of data from financially distressed and financially non-distressed banks operating in 
various Lebanese territories during the period of 2009 to 2011. Results from logistic 
regression analysis indicate that there is no significant relationship between financial 
distress and audit committee size.  
An audit committee, therefore, must have the right size that would allow members to use 
their resource linkage capacity, experience, and expertise for the best interest of all 
stakeholder groups. 
3.3.1.9 PRESENCE OF A FIRM’S CHAIRPERSON ON AUDIT COMMITTEE 
The chairperson is responsible for leadership of the board, ensuring its effectiveness in 
all aspects of its role and setting its agenda so that adequate time is available for 
substantive discussion on strategic issues. The chairperson should facilitate, encourage, 
and expect the informed and critical contribution of the directors in discussion and 
decision-taking on matters of risk and strategy, and should promote effective 
communication between the executive and non-executive directors. The chairperson is 
responsible for ensuring that the directors receive all information that is relevant to the 
discharge of their obligations in an accurate, timely and clear form (Walker 2009). 
However, a firm’s chairperson is not able to perform these roles because he/she is not 
allowed to become the chair of the audit committee although he/she can be a member of 
the audit committee if he/she was independent at the time of appointment as a chairperson. 
The firm’s chairperson is responsible for the day-to-day running of the company and has 
a detailed knowledge of the firm and its operation, hence, the inclusion of the chairperson 
as a member of the audit committee improves the informational linkage between the board 
and the audit committee which may enhance firms’ performance and improve their 
survival. The UK Corporate Governance Code, therefore, recommends that companies 
especially, for smaller companies, the chairperson if considered independent may be a 
member of but not chair the audit committee.  
3.3.1.10 REMUNERATION COMMITTEE SIZE  
Board sub-committees are established to help the board perform its role, particularly with 
increased responsibilities and pressures placed on the board, and one of such committees 
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is the remuneration committee (Tao and Hutchinson 2013). The remuneration committee 
is an important corporate governance mechanism that protects shareholders’ interests by 
providing independent oversight of various board activities including overseeing 
remuneration practices which are designed to attract and retain employees (Harrison 
1987). The remuneration committee is hence, responsible for evaluating management’s 
performance and creating appropriate remuneration packages (Nelson et al. 2010). 
Therefore, given that the motive of the remuneration committee is to supervise the 
performance of the executive directors and to come out with suitable reward packages, 
its effectiveness is likely to be related to its structure and membership (Weir et al. 2001). 
The size of the remuneration committee may arguably have an impact on its monitoring 
function. Nelson et al. (2010) argue that a larger remuneration committee has more 
resources to construct, evaluate and monitor compensation and ensure its alignment with 
the goals of the shareholders and the performance of the company. Thus, large 
remuneration committee, due to enhanced status and increased resources, is more likely 
to improve the quality of its oversight responsibilities, relative to a smaller remuneration 
committee and the enhanced monitoring may reduce the likelihood of a firm’s financial 
distress (Appiah and Chizema 2015). This is because, during financial distress, firms with 
smaller remuneration committee size are recognised as ineffective due to a reduced ability 
of directors to co-opt resources from its environment (Gales and Kesner 1994). The lack 
of resources especially, human resources may affect firms’ ability to rigorously monitor 
the CEOs performance (Zahra and Pearce 1989), giving CEOs the opportunity to pursue 
corporate strategies in an effort to satisfy their own egos, but at the expense of their firm’s 
long-term success (Appiah and Chizema 2015). Chan et al. (2015) with a sample of 134 
bankrupt firms and 134 matched firms and using proportional hazard survival model 
conclude that bankrupt firms are likely to have smaller remuneration committee sizes. 
Also, using a final dataset which included 87 bankrupts and 205 non-bankrupt US 
companies from 1998 to 2009, Platt and Platt (2012) examine how the composition and 
characteristics of corporate boards relate to firms insolvency. Results from the study 
indicate that companies that avoided bankruptcy had on average 3.85 members on their 
remuneration committee while companies that sought protection from the bankruptcy 
courts had a significantly smaller compensation committee of just 3.49 members. Jensen 
(1993) however, proposes that boards and their committees should be kept small to 
function more efficiently and not to be controlled by the CEOs. 
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3.3.1.11 PRESENCE OF A FIRM’S CHAIRPERSON ON REMUNERATION 
COMMITTEE 
Executive compensation plays a fundamental role in attracting and maintaining quality 
managers and provides motivation for directors to perform their duties to increase firm 
performance which may increase shareholders’ value (Anderson and Bizjak 2003). The 
remuneration committee, which sets the executive remuneration plays a significant role 
in ensuring firms’ survival since it concerns itself with setting and structuring the pay 
packages that attract and retain top management to provide the right incentives for 
managers to operate in the interest of the shareholder. For the remuneration committee to 
perform its functions efficiently, the chairperson and the other members of the 
remuneration committee must play a key role in shaping remuneration proposals through 
negotiations with management and staff in the company as well as remuneration 
consultants (Main et al. 2008). The chair of the remuneration committee must have the 
relational skills to lead through complex boardroom interactions, must be mindful of 
respecting yet being assertive with critical board members, must display a maturity of 
temperament in order not to appear as threatening to other committee members and 
executive management and must facilitate open communication (Roberts 2002). The 
contribution of the chairperson’s perspective to the remuneration committee is regarded 
as essential. The Combined Code (2006) permits the chair to be a member of the 
remuneration committee. Anderson and Bizjak (2003) sample 90 firms to examine 
whether the CEO’s presence on the compensation committee leads to opportunistic pay 
structure. The study finds no evidence that CEOs serving on the compensation committee 
act opportunistically in terms of pay structure. One finding from Main et al. (2008) whose 
study involved interviews conducted in late 2006, with 22 members of various UK 
remuneration committees emphasises the key role played by the chairperson of the 
remuneration committee and reveal that the strength of the remuneration committee 
chairperson is important. Though the role of the chairpersons of the remuneration 
committee is highly significant, they are not in the position to influence their own 
remuneration.  
3.3.2 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
3.3.2.1 DIRECTORS OWNERSHIP 
Directors’ shareholding is another principal means of aligning the interest of both the 
shareholders and the management and provide a means to monitor the behaviour of 
managers (Fama 1980; Meckling 1976). Shleifer and Vishny (1997a) indicate that 
following the arguments of convergence theory the participation of the board of directors 
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in shareholding is also a powerful incentive to achieve the alignment of their interest with 
the interest of the other shareholders. Jensen (1993) suggests that many problems happen 
because neither managers nor directors normally own a substantial proportion of the 
firms’ shares. This reduces the incentives of managers and directors to pursue the 
shareholders’ interests, therefore, increasing firms’ financial distress likelihood (Simpson 
and Gleason 1999). According to Jensen (1993), encouraging independent board 
members to hold substantial equity interests would provide a better incentive to monitor 
management. Beatty and Zajac (1994) further argue that the degree to which independent 
directors hold shares in companies is linked with their strength in monitoring management 
and in ensuring management pursue value-maximising activities. This is because, when 
board members have substantial holdings in the firm’s shares, either through direct 
holdings of shares or options in the firm’s shares, their decisions affect their own wealth. 
Booth et al. (2002) contend that the effect of the directors’ decisions on their wealth is 
compounded when the receipt of shares or options is part of their compensation package 
and thus, the directors are less likely to embark on actions that would diminish 
shareholder wealth. Further, when independent directors have interests in shares, they 
help them to create incentives as well as make them become closer to the firm, thereby 
becoming more involved in their oversight and more generous in their time, attention, and 
effort. Jensen and Meckling (1976) therefore argue that substantial shareholdings by 
independent directors should provide greater incentives for them to monitor top 
management. A study by Manzaneque et al. (2016a) ascertains that in difficult situations 
prior to the bankruptcy, the impact of board ownership on business failure likelihood is 
like those exerted in more extreme situations. Fich and Slezak (2008) report a negative 
relationship between the proportion of shares held by the board and the probability of 
firm failure. Platt and Platt (2012) analyse a sample of 292 firms and find that non-
bankrupt firms’ independent directors own fewer shares. Empirical evidence from Nahar 
Abdullah (2006) further supports the contention that ownership by non-executive 
directors and outside block holders effectively increases their incentives to monitor 
management to improve performance and avoid financial distress, as well as ensuring that 
their wealth in the firm is intact. The non-executive directors are therefore expected to 
fight for the survival of the firms in which they hold shares (Pregio de la Cruz et al. 2014).  
3.3.2.2 INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP 
Institutional investors including mutual funds, hedge funds, pension funds, insurance 
companies, and banks are leading players in the financial markets and primary owners of 
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UK equity. In addition to providing funds for firms’ expansion or using their relationships 
to assist the firm's source of financing, institutional investors use their highly developed 
managerial skills, professional knowledge, and voting rights to influence managers to 
improve both firm efficiency and corporate governance (Lin and Fu 2017). Thus, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997) regard institutional investors as actively monitoring firms’ business, 
reducing information asymmetry and agency problem, and enhancing firm performance 
to avoid the likelihood of financial distress. Whereas some institutional investors may 
actively monitor firms’ business to reduce information asymmetry and agency problems, 
others may either, consider short-term trading profit based on information advantages to 
satisfy their portfolio needs or may support management to exploit small shareholders 
and undermine firm performance which may affect its financial distress and survival 
likelihood. Hence, although, institutional shareholders have, generally, been considered 
as a large group in many studies, however, both theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976) and 
empirical findings (Chaganti and Damanpour 1991) advocate that shareholders are 
differentiable and pursue different agendas (Bhattacharya and Graham 2009) and as a 
result, may have different impacts on firms’ financial distress likelihood. In investigating 
the relationship between the ownership structure of firms and the probability of 
insolvency, Poletti-Hughes and Ozkan (2014) sample 484 UK firms with an unbalanced 
panel of 3092 firm-year observations. Using a multiperiod logit model, the study provides 
strong evidence that firms controlled by financial institutions have a higher probability of 
insolvency when in financial distress. In the Netherlands, Donker et al. (2009) examine 
the impact of ownership structure on the likelihood of financial distress of 177 firms that 
are traded on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange over the period 1992-2002. Using logit-
regression models, the study finds no evidence that high levels of institutional 
shareholdings are associated with a lower probability of financial distress. Also, in 
examining the role of institutional shareholders in business financial distress likelihood, 
Manzaneque et al. (2016) sampled 70 non-financial Spanish listed firms for a continuous 
period from 2007 to 2012. The findings of the study show that the role of institutional 
shareholders as owners is not associated with a lower likelihood of business failure. 
However, the results indicate that the role of pressure-resistant institutional shareholders 
as directors is associated with a lower likelihood of business failure. 
Institutional investors due to the size of their investment may monitor management on its 
risk-taking activities which may influence firm performance and affect shareholder value. 
Using a final sample that consists of an unbalanced panel data set of 256 firms listed on 
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the Australian Securities Exchange for the years 2006 to 2008, Hutchinson et al. (2015) 
investigate whether institutional investors differ in their ability to influence 
management’s pursuit of firm value. The result shows that increasing institutional 
ownership is associated with increasing accounting performance and firm value. The 
result further indicates that when firms are financially distressed, institutional investors 
engage in promoting the short-term performance or exit rather than supporting long-term 
value creation. Lin and Fu (2017) employ a simultaneous equation model with a GMM 
estimator to a new and large data sample of 2465 listed ﬁrms on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange over the 2004–2014 period to provide additional evidence on whether all types 
of institutional investors act as active monitors and contribute equally to ﬁrm 
performance. The results generally indicate that institutional ownership signiﬁcantly and 
positively aﬀects ﬁrm performance. However, not all institutional investors act as active 
monitors and improve ﬁrm performance particularly, the results indicate that pressure-
insensitive, foreign and large institutional shareholders have greater positive eﬀects on 
ﬁrm performance than pressure-sensitive, domestic, and small institutions, respectively. 
3.3.2.3 CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP 
Concentrated ownership is an internal governance mechanism that could potentially add 
or substitute from board independence and lead to active and more effective oversight of 
managerial actions and decisions consistent with agency theory predictions (Lajili and 
Zéghal 2010). Blair (1995) points out that this would be particularly the case when board 
independence and other composition elements are not in place in a firm. Concentrated 
owners utilise their knowledge and resources to improve the resource base of firms 
(Carney and Gedajlovic 2001). Also, a high degree of ownership concentration leads to 
positive effects on firm performance and reduce the likelihood of financial distress since 
large shareholders are incentivised and often possess the expertise to effectively monitor 
managers (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Shleifer and Vishny 1986). Lajili and Zéghal 
(2010) therefore note that block holding could be a positive and effective corporate 
governance mechanism to ensure objective and effective oversight of management. Large 
shareholders could suffer great losses due to their participation in financially distressed 
firms and as such, they are expected to exercise an important monitoring function on 
opportunistic management behaviour (Manzaneque et al. 2016b). This is because, 
according to Donker et al. (2009), the conflict of interests between management and other 
shareholders is more severe in financial distress situations. Management, therefore, could 
make decisions aimed at getting short-term personal advantage instead of dealing with 
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the firm’s financial distress situation, due to the insecurity of their jobs. In such situations, 
a high degree of ownership concentration could contribute to lessening the management-
shareholders conflict of interests. Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) assert that whether equity 
ownership is concentrated in the hands of institutional investors, company founder, 
family members, and relatives, or banks and lending institutions could have varied effects 
on firm performance and financial distress occurrence. Donker et al. (2009) sample 33 
firms in financial distress and 144 healthy firms that traded on the Amsterdam Stock 
Exchange between 1992 and 2002. Using logit regression analysis, the results indicate 
that large outside shareholders reduce the probability of financial distress. To answer the 
question of whether ownership structure affects the degree of corporate financial distress 
in China, Hu and Zheng (2015) sample 378 listed companies that got into financial 
distress between 2000 and 2008. The study uses three dimensions of ownership structure 
and these are; the ownership concentration, ownership component and separation of 
ownership as independent variables. Results from the regression analysis indicate that 
ownership concentration is negatively related to the degree of corporate financial distress. 
In Germany, to empirically investigate how ownership structures change when firms are 
in financial distress, Jostarndt and Sautner (2008) sample 267 firms that suffered from 
repeated interest coverage shortfall between 1996 and 2004. Using regression analysis, 
the study establishes a significant decrease in ownership concentration. Deng and Wang 
(2006) also find that ownership concentration has a negative correlation with default 
likelihood after applying logistic regression to a sample of 97 firms in distress and 97 
non-distress firms. In the UK, Poletti-Hughes and Ozkan (2014) investigated the impact 
of corporate ownership and control on the outcome of financial distress. The research 
samples 484 firms, 81 of which filed for insolvency. Using multi-period logit analysis, 
findings of the study give strong evidence that firms controlled by family and financial 
institutions have a higher probability of insolvency when in financial distress but 
confirmed however that the probability of insolvency decreases significantly as the 
controllers’ cash flow ownership increases beyond 10%.  
However, notwithstanding the benefit, ownership concentration may create agency costs 
and information asymmetries between dispersed shareholders and the large or controlling 
shareholder group (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Jensen 1993).  In addition, in situations 
where ownership concentration goes above certain thresholds, large shareholders tend to 
exercise their control rights thereby creating private benefits, sometimes expropriating 
minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
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3.3.3 DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY 
3.3.3.1 DIRECTORS REMUNERATION 
Directors remuneration packages are composed of the financial and other non-financial 
rewards and it is typically a mixture of salary, bonuses, shares or call options on the 
company’s share, benefits, and perquisites received by directors from their firm for their 
service to the firm (Sari and Tjoe 2017). Directors’ remuneration packages should be 
attractive enough to attract and retain the directors who have the capacity needed to 
manage the company successfully and that the structure of the packages for the executive 
directors should be linked to the corporate and individual performance (Nahar Abdullah 
2006). Directors serve as agents for dispersed shareholders in monitoring management 
and as a result, they are also susceptible to the agency problem, which means that their 
pay should show sensitivity to firm performance and survival likelihood (Schultz et al. 
2017). Thus, from the perspective of the agency theory, directors should be rewarded 
based on their performance to avoid agency conflict. However, high compensation 
packages may weaken the directors’ judgement, giving managers the advantage of being 
able to pursue their own interests at the expense of performance (Afrifa and Tauringana 
2015). Although remuneration should be enough to attract board members, high directors’ 
remuneration may have an impact on firms’ performance and survival likelihood. Citing 
from (Kang 2009), researchers including Belkaoui (1992), Sridharan (1996), Conyon 
(1998), Cordeiro et al. (2000), Ghosh (2003), Gu and Choi (2004), Cahan et al. (2005), 
Doucouliagos et al. (2007), Jobome (2006), Merhebi et al. (2006) Hijazi and Bhatti (2007) 
all find a significant positive relationship between corporate performance and executive 
compensation. However, Conyon and Gregg (1994), Ogden and Watson (1996), Veliyath 
and Ramaswamy (2000) Parthasarthy et al. (2006) find no significant relationship 
between corporate performance and executive compensation. 
Using 76 US banks and 41 European banks (Vallascas and Hagendorff 2013) investigated 
the link between executive compensation in banking and risk-taking by providing the first 
cross-country evidence on the bonus-risk relationship in the banking industry. The study 
finds that increases in CEO cash bonuses lower the default risk of a bank. The study, 
however, finds no evidence of cash bonuses exerting a risk-reducing effect when banks 
are financially distressed. Also, from a sample of 51 viable but loss-making Bombay 
Stock Exchange listed companies in 2009-2011 financial years, Gill (2014) obtained 
remuneration and performance data in a study of a reward for failure. Results from the 
univariate and multivariate analyses highlight that both the remuneration-performance 
sensitivity and elasticity are weak. 
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3.3.3.2 DISCLOSURE OF ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING NOTICE IN THE ANNUAL 
REPORTS 
The Annual General Meeting (AGM) is a compulsory yearly gathering of a firm’s 
shareholders and form an important part of the UK’s corporate governance. Hence, a 
notice of when and where an AGM is held can be communicated to the shareholders in 
the annual reports. It is the directors’ responsibility to ensure that the date, location as 
well as any other information that is relevant for the AGM is communicated to the 
shareholders and one way to deliver such information is through the annual reports. 
Section 336 of the 2006 UK Companies Act requires firms to hold AGMs within six 
months of a public limited company’s accounting reference date (Conyon and Sadler 
2010) and that firms’ directors are prosecuted if they fail to hold an AGM within this time 
limit.  
Traditionally and legally, the core business of AGMs consists of three elements and these 
include legal formality, communication, and accountability. According to Apostolides 
and Boden (2005), it is the accountability that holds the key to the effectiveness of the 
AGM since it is less controllable or predictable than the other two elements. This is 
because accountability offers the shareholders and even sometimes their proxies to take 
the board to task on matters relating to certain resolutions such as appointing auditors, 
receiving the accounts, approving the dividend and electing directors. However, share 
ownership, which allows members to attend AGMs, is mainly dispersed amongst a very 
large number of private shareholders holding relatively few shares each and a small 
number of institutional investors holding most shares (Apostolides 2007) and their 
participation in AGMs has questioned the accountability issue of the AGM. To the 
institutional shareholders, the AGM may be of signiﬁcantly less importance to them, as 
prior discussion and agreement are normally secured before the day of the AGM. 
Similarly, according to Apostolides and Boden (2005), agency theory indicates that the 
characteristics of private shareholders have decreased the accountability effectiveness of 
AGMs mainly due to the fact that the dominant voting power of institutional shareholders 
means that private investors have little or no opportunity to influence company strategy 
because it is unlikely that their votes will make a difference. AGMs may be remote 
geographically from the investor and involve opportunity and other financial costs that 
further deter participation, and the dispersal of private individuals' shareholdings amongst 
a numerically large group (Becht and Röell 1999) frustrates the concerted exercise of 
voice that an AGM in theory permits. These have therefore reduced the participation of 
institutional and private investors in AGMs. For instance, Strätling (2003) notes that on 
      
60 
 
average, only one in a thousand shareholders ever attends a meeting, with this proportion 
rising to only one in a hundred even when the company is in ﬁnancial difﬁculties. 
Notwithstanding these, AGMs is recognised as an important UK legal requirement and 
forms one of the few occasions that all stakeholders in a firm can come together at one 
place to have their say in public in the full glare of both conventional company processes 
and the media (Apostolides 2007). Also, since AGMs are live events, shareholders can 
pursue a topic with further questions, an option that is not available in other modes of 
corporate communication (Carrington and Johed 2007). Hence, it is significant that 
directors disclose notice of AGM in the annual reports since a 2004 report of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) emphasized that 
shareholders should be provided with enough and timely information concerning the date, 
location, and agenda of general meetings, as well as full and timely information regarding 
the issues to be decided at the meeting.  
 
3.3.3.3 DISCLOSURE OF PROXY VOTING ARRANGEMENTS IN THE ANNUAL 
REPORTS 
Corporate governance mechanisms such as those relating to the board of directors, the 
ownership structure, and the executive compensation are aimed at reducing agency cost 
that results from the separation of ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling 1976). In 
addition to these mechanisms, shareholders can undertake certain activities to remedy 
agency costs and among them is the shareholders’ voting which according to Easterbrook 
and Fischel (1983), is potentially the most powerful course of action. This is because 
shareholders may use their voting rights not only to veto value-destroying firms’ actions 
(Hansmann and Kraakman 2004) but also to publicly express their dissent by voting 
against management (David et al. 2007). However, according to Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986), shareholders often lack the incentives to effectively use their voting rights to voice 
dissent, since they would bear the full costs of expressing dissent but can capture only a 
fraction of its benefits. Firms’ shareholders are required to vote on matters such as the 
election of directors to the board, the approval of auditors’ report, the approval of a merger 
or an acquisition, and approval of share compensation plan at the firms’ AGM. Instead of 
being physically present at the AGM, shareholders may choose to vote by proxy whereby 
the shareholders elect someone else to vote in line with the shareholder's direction as 
stipulated on the proxy card. Aggarwal et al. (2015) argue that proxy voting is one of the 
key mechanisms used by institutional investors to exert their influence on corporate 
decision-making. Since proxy voting is one of the mechanisms that shareholders can use 
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to voice their concerns over firms’ activities and performances, shareholders should be 
made aware of whether proxy materials are included in the annual report. In a study to 
investigate the nature of institutional shareholder activism in South Africa with a focus 
on proxy voting as a public form of shareholder discontent, Viviers and Smit (2015) 
analyse 24,510 votes cast by 17 local investment management companies in 2013. The 
evidence of the study suggests that all the 17 investment management companies had 
proxy voting policies at the end of 2013, just over half of these policies (53%) were 
available online. The results further indicate that very few of these investment 
management companies (41%) published their proxy voting results online, even though 
the United Nations’ Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) signatories are required 
to make their proxy voting results available to the public. In addition, a transparency 
report on proxy voting written to the US Senate, in 2004, discloses that even though 
conflict of interest in proxy voting can occur because of the existence of various business 
relationships, limited disclosure of proxy voting guidelines and votes may make proxy 
voting more vulnerable to such conflicts. Furthermore, due to limited transparency, 
concerned parties do not have the information necessary to raise questions regarding 
whether proxy votes were cast solely in the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries. 
It should be noted that firms that disclose proxy voting information improve their 
transparency and accountability, and that might go a long way to enhance public trust 
which could improve performance and reduce the likelihood of financial distress. 
Moreover, by disclosing proxy voting information in the annual reports, shareholders can 
vote on significant voting matters such as the election of directors, executive 
compensation packages, and mergers and acquisitions that may affect long-term share 
value and survival of firms.  
3.3.3.4 PRESENCE OF SENIOR INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR 
The senior independent director is appointed from the non-executive directors to support 
the chairperson on all governance issues, to provide an alternative communication 
channel between the chairperson and the board, and to provide a point of contact for 
principal shareholders to raise issues and concerns which contact through the normal 
channels of chairperson, chief executive or other executive directors has failed to resolve, 
or for which such contact is inappropriate (Sadan 2017). The senior independent director 
has the responsibility to improve the relations between directors and shareholders. This 
could enhance firms’ governance relations and improve firms’ performance because 
where firms fail to resolve misunderstandings between directors and the shareholders, it 
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creates an unstable investment environment which affects firms’ performance and the 
likelihood of financial distress. The recommendation by the Higgs Review of the UK 
Combined Code in 2003 to appoint a senior independent director from the non-executive 
directors therefore aimed at enabling shareholders to have someone to report to when 
contact through the normal channels of the chairperson or chief executive has failed. For 
the senior independent director to fulfil his/her role, he/she needs healthy and actively 
maintained relationships with both fellow directors and investors. According to Sadan 
(2017), the role of the senior independent director as a highly skilful intermediary is 
indispensable on a well-run board and that at different times and from different 
perspectives, the senior independent director is sometimes an ambassador, a kingmaker, 
a counsellor, a senior prefect, and occasionally a self-appointed successor. Despite the 
significance and the responsibilities of the senior independent director at corporate 
boardrooms, for over fifteen years there has been no attempt in the literature to recognise 
the role of the senior independent director in firms’ governance, performance, and 
survival. Although initially there was a concern that the position of a senior independent 
director would make governance difficult and weaken the position of the chairperson, 
currently the senior independent director is an established feature of UK corporate 
governance. However, researchers have paid little attention to the senior independent 
director as a corporate governance mechanism that could have a significant impact on 
firms’ performance and financial distress likelihood. Hence, writing the literature on the 
senior independent director and its impacts on firms’ financial distress in this study is 
limited by the empirical evidence from the literature.  
3.4 MODERATING FACTORS 
3.4.1 ENVIRONMENT 
A firm’s environment according to Duncan and Duncan (2016), is the totality of physical 
and social factors that are taken directly into consideration in the decision-making 
behaviour of individuals in the organisation. They also differentiate between the internal 
environment, which is composed of physical and social factors within the boundaries of 
an organisation, and the external environment, which is composed of social and physical 
factors outside the boundaries of an organisation. Firms external environment puts 
constraints on their strategic actions and the beneﬁts they can derive from those actions 
(Dess and Beard 1984). Since the external environment is outside the parameters of a 
firm, it is almost unlikely for the firm to control it but to deal with it by creating some 
internal mechanisms. In conditions of environmental uncertainty, strategic ﬂexibility is 
regarded as the basic method to adapt ﬁrms to environments and then contribute to 
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competitive advantage (Hitt et al. 1998). This is because strategic ﬂexibility generates 
better ﬁrm performance by quickly responding to environments, efﬁciently using the 
resources and lowering survival threat (Lin et al. 2014). Both the organisational owners 
and top managers need to deal with the impact of the environment (Chaganti and 
Damanpour 1991). Organisational managers need to scan the environment constantly to 
acquire accurate and reliable information so that where necessary, strategies can be 
adjusted or changed entirely at a moment’s notice, as unpredictable and uncertain 
conditions have a considerable impact on firms’ survival likelihood (Krishnan et al. 
2006). Although research indicates that environments are an important consideration for 
firms, there is a lack of evidence about how environmental dimensions which according 
to Dess and Beard (1984) include environmental dynamism, environmental complexity, 
and environmental munificence moderate corporate governance mechanisms and 
financial distress relationship (McArthur and Nystrom 1991). This is because a thorough 
literature search failed to locate any empirical studies using the environmental dimensions 
as moderators in the corporate governance and financial distress relationship. However, 
studies in other disciplines have established the moderating role of the environmental 
dimensions. For instance, Goll and Rasheed (1997) in examining the relationships 
between top management demographics, rational decision making (RDM), and ﬁrm 
performance as well as establishing the moderating effect of environmental muniﬁcence 
on the rational decision making and ﬁrm performance relationship found that 
environmental munificence moderates the relationship between decision making and 
organizational performance. Also, McArthur and Nystrom (1991) found that 
environmental muniﬁcence interacts with strategy to affect performance and this means 
that environmental muniﬁcence moderates strategy and performance relationships. that 
environmental dynamism appears to moderate this relationship. In a study to examine the 
moderating effect of environmental dynamism on the insider ownership and performance 
nexus, Li and Simerly (1998) found that for ﬁrms in the industry experiencing greater 
environmental dynamism, there exists a greater positive relationship between insider 
ownership and performance. 
3.4.2 RESOURCES 
Saji and Mishra (2013) acknowledge that there is a visible lack of consensus among 
researchers on what constitutes the ﬁrms resources. However, citing from Daft (1983), 
Barney (1991) defines a firm’s resources to “include all assets, capabilities, organisational 
processes, firm attributes, information, knowledge, etc. controlled by a firm that enable 
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the firm to conceive of  to invest in systems for product improvements and new product 
development to respond to the challenges created by competitors (Gaur et al. 2011). A 
firm’s competitive advantage is contingent on the bundle of resources held by the firm. 
Firms that have more resources at their disposal are likely to have good corporate 
governance structure to effectively monitor management to ensure improved firms’ 
performance and financial health. However, the moderating role of resources which 
include tangible and intangible resources is lacking in the literature. Researches in other 
disciplines meanwhile have established the moderating role of resources. For instance, 
Gaur et al. (2012) found that ﬁrm resources and competitive intensity moderate the 
relationship between some of the sub-dimensions of market orientation and ﬁrm 
performance. Also, Pattnaik and Elango (2007) used 787 Indian manufacturing firms to 
capture the impact of firm resources on the internationalization and performance 
relationship and the results indicated that indicate that a firm’s capabilities in cost 
efficiency and marketing have a moderating impact on this relationship.  
3.4.3 TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY 
Technological capability “is the ability to perform any relevant technical function or 
volume of activity within the firm including the ability to develop new products and 
processes and to operate facilities effectively” (Teece et al. 1997: 521). Technological 
capabilities increase the ability of the ﬁrm to assess and use their internal resources in the 
development of new products (Zahra and George 2002) so that, with better technological 
capabilities, ﬁrms can identify new technology threats, experiment with new emerging 
designs and develop new product innovations (Zhou and Wu 2010) for their long term 
survival. Firms with superior technological competencies tend to be more innovative and 
this may lead to higher ﬁnancial performance thereby reducing the likelihood of financial 
distress for the ﬁrm (Zahra et al. 2000). This is because, with better technological 
capability, firms can secure more efficiency gains by pioneering process innovation 
(Teece et al. 1997) and achieve higher differentiation by innovating products in response 
to the changing market environment (Teece and Pisano 1994). Using total expenditure on 
R&D and on-the-job training as surrogates for technological capability, Acha (2000) 
acsertains a positive correlation with firm efficiency (Ortega 2010) which may improve 
firm performance to reduce the likelihood of financial distress. Research on the 
moderating role of technological capability on the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and financial distress is limited but studies in other discipline 
have established the moderating role of technological capability. For instance, in 
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examining the moderating effect of technology intensity on the relationship between 
executive compensation dispersion and firm performance in China manufacturing 
industry, Zhang et al. (2015) found that technology intensity negatively moderates the 
relationship between executive compensation dispersion and firm performance. Also, 
using a sample of 253 companies from the information and communications technology 
industry in Spain to evaluate the role of technological capabilities in moderating the 
relationship between competitive strategies and firm performance, Ortega (2008) found 
that technological capabilities enhance the relationships between quality orientation and 
performance, and cost orientation and performance, respectively. Wu (2013) in 
investigating the relationship between cooperation with competitors and product 
innovation performance along with the moderating effect of the innovating firm’s 
technological capability and its alliances with universities found technological capability 
weaken the relationship. 
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TABLE I: A SUMMARY OF SOME PREVIOUS STUDIES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL DISTRESS. 
Author, Year and 
Country 
Sample type and 
Sample Size 
Variables Confirmed Variables not Confirmed 
Gales and Kesner 
(1994), US 
127 bankrupts, 127 non-
bankrupts 
Board size, outside directors Inside directors 
Daily (1996), US 53 bankrupts, 53 non-
bankrupts 
Total directors, outside directors, return on 
assets, current ratio, equity/debt, working 
capital/sales, firm age 
Affiliated director on the audit 
committee, institutional 
investor holdings, audit 
committee composition,  
Simpson and Gleason 
(1999), US 
287 banking firms CEO duality, bank size, the riskiness of loan 
portfolio, financial leverage 
Directors ownership, officer’s 
ownership, the percentage of 
insiders on the board, number 
of directors on the board 
Elloumi and Gueyie 
(2002), Canada 
46 distressed, 46 healthy 
firms 
Board composition, outside directors’ 
ownership and directorship, CEO change, 
leverage 
The audit committee, block 
holders, liquidity 
Parker et al. (2002), 
US 
176 distressed firms Blockholder ownership, insider ownership, 
replacement of CEO with an outsider, firm 
size, liquidity, profitability 
Creditor ownership, board 
size, financial risk 
(inconclusive) 
Carcello and Neal 
(2003), US 
138 distressed firms Percentage of affiliated director on the audit 
committee, firm size 
Zmijewski’s (1984) financial 
condition index, going 
concern modified report 
Lee and Yeh (2004), 
Taiwan 
45 distressed, 88 non-
distressed 
Adjusted control rights, the ratio of cash 
flow to control rights, the percentage of 
board seats and supervisory seats, change in 
leadership, debt ratio  
Institutional shareholding, 
second largest shareholder, 
directors held by the non-large 
shareholder, founder 
participation 
Abdullah (2006), 
Malaysia 
86 distressed, 86 non-
distressed 
Board size, management interest, non-
executive directors’ interests, gearing, 
liquidity 
Board independence, CEO 
duality,  
Charitou et al. (2007) 859 bankruptcy-filing 
firms 
Top-level management turnover, qualified 
audit opinion, lower (higher) institutional 
ownership 
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Fich and Slezak 
(2007), US 
508 Z-score firms, 277 
ICR firms 
Board size, board composition, board 
ownership, number of outside directors, 
R&D expenditure to sales, stock-option 
reset 
Firm’s stock returns, a greater 
number of inside directors, 
CEO option compensation, 
institutional ownership, firm 
size 
Li et al. (2007), China  404 distressed, 404 non-
distressed  
Ownership concentration, state ownership, 
ultimate owner, independent directors, 
auditors’ opinion, administrative expense 
ratio 
Managerial ownership 
Jostarndt and Sautner 
(2008), Germany 
267 interest coverage 
shortfalls 
Ownership concentration, bank ownership, 
private ownership, executive director 
ownership, non-executive director 
ownership 
Insider ownership 
Chen and Du (2009), 
Taiwan  
34 distressed, 34 non-
distressed 
Debt /equity, gearing ratio, debt to equity 
ratio, return on assets, earnings per share, 
return on equity, current ratio, acid-test 
ratio, current assets to total assets, cash flow 
to total debt ratio, cash flow ratio, inventory 
to total assets ratio, inventory to sales ratio 
Margin before interest and 
tax, the turnover rate of fixed 
assets, the turnover rate of 
total assets, cash flow to short 
term and long-term debt ratio 
Bronson et al. (2009), 
US 
53 audit dismissals, 53 
non-audit dismissals 
Percentage of independent directors on the 
audit committee, 100% audit committee, 
only one audit committee member is not 
independent, going concern-modified 
report in the prior year 
Firm size, a development 
stage 
Donker et al. (2009), 
Netherlands  
33 distressed, 144 
healthy 
Managerial shareholding, large outside 
shareholders, trustees’ shareholding, 
leverage 
Percentage of family 
shareholders, block holders, 
institutional shareholders, 
size, the book value of debt to 
total debt, pay-out ratio. 
Rahmat et al. (2009), 
Malaysia 
73 distressed, 73 non-
distressed 
Quality audit service, financial literacy Frequency of audit committee 
meetings, audit committee 
size, audit committee 
composition 
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Lajili and Zéghal 
(2010), US 
59 distressed, 59 healthy 
firms 
Ownership structure, internal turnover, 
board changes, board composition 
CEO, director turnover, board 
independence, duality 
structure (all significant when 
combined but not 
individually) 
Dowell et al. (2011) 227 firms Shareholders with higher proportions, 
independent board, CEO power, the smaller 
board size  
Venture capital ownership, 
independent director 
proportion, sales growth, firm 
size 
Aldamen et al. (2012), 
Australia 
150 listed firms Number of audit committee members, 
number of audit committee meetings, 
independence of committee member, 
blockholder committee member, committee 
member education, total assets, the 
expertise of committee member 
Leverage, industry, grey 
directors, the directorship of 
an audit committee member, 
external director, the 
commitment of the audit 
committee 
Lakshan et al. (2012), 
Sri Lanka 
70 failed, 70 non-failed 
firms 
Outside directors’ ratio, audit committee 
presence, board member remuneration, 
CEO duality 
Board size, auditor’s opinion, 
outside ownership 
Robinson et al. 
(2012), US 
80 liquidate, 72 non-
liquidated firms 
Outside directors’ stock ownership, CEO 
age, stock performance, ROA, liquidity, 
firm size 
The proportion of outside 
directors,  
Industry,  
Fan et al. (2013), 
China 
67 defaulted companies Private ownership, corporate ownership, 
government quality 
State ownership, firm age, 
tangible assets, leverage, firm 
size 
Brédart (2014), US 156 bankrupts, 156 non-
bankrupt companies 
 Board size, board activity, solvency Board independence, CEO 
duality 
Gill (2014), India  51 loss-making 
Firms 
Remuneration sensitivity, changes in cash 
remuneration, remuneration performance 
sensitivity, stock return volatility, changes 
in institutional ownership, family 
ownership 
Executive remuneration, 
larger boards 
Hsu and Wu (2014), 
UK 
117 failed, 117 non-
failed 
A greater proportion of grey directors, 
independent directors, the ratio of grey 
directors to executive directors, 
Executive directors on the 
board, the ratio of an 
independent director to 
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profitability, leverage, firm size (little 
evidence) 
executive directors, leadership 
duality, senior independent 
director, CEO tenure, external 
shareholding, firm age 
Poletti-Hughes and 
Ozkan (2014), UK 
484 companies of which 
81 filed insolvency 
Family-controllers, financial institutions 
controllers, leverage, firm size, stock return, 
return volatility 
Other controllers,  
Salloum et al. (2014), 
Lebanon 
54 distressed, 54 non-
distressed banks 
Frequency of meetings Bank size, composition, 
financial expertise 
Wan et al. (2014), 
Malaysia 
227 listed companies The audit committee, internal audit 
effectiveness, independent non-executive 
directors’ effectiveness 
Board size, a board member 
with international experience 
Appiah and Chizema 
(2015), UK 
98 failed, 269 non-failed Leverage, industry effects Remuneration committee: 
effectiveness, size, meetings; 
board size, liquidity, firm size, 
chairman’s independence, 
profitability, firm age 
Ciampi (2015), Italy 283 default firms, 340 
non-default firms, 
(validation sample:142 
default, 169 non-default) 
CEO duality, outside directors lower than or 
equal to 50%, outside directors equal to 
50%, ownership concentration, inside 
director ownership  
Board size, venture capital 
ownership, outside director 
ownership, firm size, the 
business sector 
(Manzaneque et al. 
2016b), Spain 
154 distressed, 154 non-
distressed 
Board ownership, the proportion of 
independent directors, board size 
Ownership concentration, 
institutional or non-
institutional shareholding, 
CEO duality 
Miglani et al. 2015b), 
Australia 
171 distressed firms Greater levels of block holders, director 
ownership, separate audit committee, 
voluntary adoption of governance 
structures 
Board independence, CEO 
duality,  
Min and Bowman 
(2015), South Korea 
2842 firm-years Outside directors, independent directors, 
firm size 
Dividend pay outs,  
 
Hu and Zheng (2015), 
China  
378 distressed firms Concentrated state ownership structure, 
separation of cash flow rights and control 
rights 
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Schultz et al. (2015), 
Australia 
222 unique firms Inside ownership, executive remuneration, 
the proportion of non-executive directors on 
the board, board structure, ownership 
structure 
 Executive pay, board 
structure, ownership structure 
(at controlled endogeneity not 
significant) 
Shahwan (2015), 
Egypt  
86 non-financial firms,  ownership type, a current ratio Corporate governance index, 
ownership concentration, 
institutional ownership, 
leverage, size, return on sales 
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3.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The chapter concentrated on the literature relating to corporate governance mechanisms 
and financial distress prediction. What constitutes financial distress and how it is 
identified by different authors in different study environment was discussed in the 
chapter. The literature on corporate governance variables and their influence on financial 
distress were also reviewed in the chapter. The review indicates different results in 
different governance environment. By identifying the gaps in the literature, the chapter 
provides the platform upon which this study is established.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
72 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THEORETICAL REVIEW 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
 Lajili and Zéghal (2010) maintain that given the complex nature of corporate governance, 
different and competing theories have been developed from the management and strategic 
literature to deal with the different requirements of corporate governance characteristics. 
These include the agency theory, the resource dependence theory, the stakeholder theory, 
and the stewardship theory. The chapter discusses these theories and their significance to 
corporate governance mechanisms and firms’ financial distress. The discussion of these 
theories is motivated by the fact that in most cases, the corporate governance mechanisms 
could be looked at differently from each of the above-mentioned theories. Hence, the need 
for a multi-theoretic approach towards corporate governance is also examined in the 
chapter.  
The chapter is structured as follows: section 4.2 discusses the agency theory and section 
4.3 considers the resource dependence theory. In sections 4.4 and 4.5, the stewardship 
theory and the stakeholder theory are respectively explained. Finally, section 4.6 
deliberates on the multi-theory approach to corporate governance, while the chapter 
summary is presented in section 4.7.  
4.2 THE AGENCY THEORY 
Companies are owned by shareholders, and especially in listed companies, the 
distribution of shareholding results in the separation of ownership and control, hence the 
agency problem. According to Eisenhardt (1989), the agency theory regards the universal 
agency relationship, in which the principal gives work to the agent. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), explain that in terms of corporate organisations, agency theory involves a contract 
under which the shareholders engage the managers to perform some service on their 
behalf, which includes delegating some decision-making authority to the managers. 
Agency theory assumes that managers are opportunists who will self-satisfy rather than 
profit maximises on behalf of the shareholders (Eisenhardt 1989) but shareholders require 
the specialised knowledge of managers to generate wealth for those businesses in which 
they have invested. From the agency theory perspective, a firm’s managers are 
responsible for conducting business in the interest of the firm, and that a manager’s own 
self-interests will never align completely with the interests of the firm. Managers of a 
firm will sometimes experience conflicts of interest when conducting business on behalf 
of the firm (Bryant and Davis 2012). This gives the central argument of agency theory 
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which is that managers acting as agents are likely to pursue private objectives that deviate 
and even conflict with the goals of the shareholders if they are not monitored. Because 
there are conflicts between the interests of the shareholders and management (Fama and 
Jensen 1983), agency theory is concerned with aligning the interests of shareholders and 
managers (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983). 
Consequently, firms must either increase the incentive structures that align the interests 
of shareholders and managers (Fama and Jensen 1983) or increase the monitoring, 
control, and oversight of managers by owner principal delegates such as the board of 
directors (Bryant and Davis 2012). Increasing the incentive alignment which is regarded 
as an internal governance mechanism involves two related components which are the 
financial alignment created with outcome-based contracts, share options, and alignment 
of preferences and actions, whereby the management’s preferences become more aligned 
with those of the shareholders (Nyberg et al. 2010). Jensen and Meckling (1976) are of 
the view that when incentives are aligned with the interest of the shareholders, the board 
of directors becomes more effective monitors of management, which then leads to an 
improved firms’ performance and consequently avoiding financial distress. In terms of 
monitoring and control, it is assumed that the board of directors monitor and control the 
opportunistic behaviours of managers. According to Fama and Jensen (1983), the board 
of directors are the main control mechanism for the organisations and are authorised for 
the control of organisational decisions. Other corporate governance mechanisms, 
including the audit committees, also monitor and control management’s behaviour. Thus, 
shareholders may use a different range of corporate governance mechanisms, including 
monitoring by boards of directors and mutual monitoring by managers (Fama and Jensen 
1983), as well as monitoring by large outside shareholders to control management 
opportunistic behaviour. The assumption here is that by managing the principal-agency 
problem between shareholders and managers, firms will operate more efficiently and 
perform better (Filatotchev 2007) to avoid the likelihood of financial distress. If the firm 
is to survive and avoid financial distress, the shareholder-management relationship should 
reflect an efficient form of organisation of information and risk-bearing cost (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Fama, 1980).  
In conclusion, agency theory provides the theoretical foundation of the monitoring 
function, which refers to the responsibility of directors to monitor management, on 
shareholders’ behalf and according to Bryant and Davis (2012), it has proven to be a 
popular theoretical framework from which to investigate the role of the board of directors. 
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Boards, especially, ones with most outside directors, monitor the actions of managers to 
protect the interests of owners (Jensen and Meckling 1976), thereby reducing the 
likelihood of financial distress. It is also a powerful tool for understanding and prescribing 
the compensation structures of top executives and the structures and actions of the board 
of directors. However, according to Wiseman et al. (2012), despite the considerable 
evidence in support of agency predictions, critics of agency theory have argued that the 
theory lacks validity outside a specific social context and they specifically contend that 
agency theory relies on an assumption of self-interested managers who seek to increase 
personal economic wealth while minimising personal effort. Critics of the theory, 
therefore, view it as being applied to settings in which managers and possibly 
shareholders hold little regard for others and have little compunction when it comes to 
one’s responsibilities (Davis et al. 1997).  
4.3 THE RESOURCE DEPENDENCY THEORY 
From resource dependence theorists, a firm is an open system, dependent on external 
organisations and environmental contingencies and that a firm’s survival is dependent on 
its ability to establish control over resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). The core insight 
of resource dependence theory is that firms are dependent upon actors outside the firm 
for critical resources (Berman et al. 2005). The reliance of the firm on these external 
stakeholders is due to a disparity of power between the firm and these stakeholder groups 
(Frooman 1999). Since companies are not internally self-sufficient, they must acquire 
resources from other companies and that the need for resource acquisition renders the 
acquiring company dependent upon the supplying company (Peng and Beamish 2014). 
The external dependency creates uncertainty for the acquiring company which is harmful 
because it obscures the firm’s control of resources and choice of strategies obstructing 
everyday functioning which affect the firm’s financial health (Rivas 2012). Since firm 
interdependence with the environment can lead to a reduced firm’s autonomy and to a 
less certain future for the firm, the acquiring company is motivated to enhance its 
autonomy by avoiding external dependence (Rivas 2012). Thus, firms seek to minimise 
uncertainty linked with the acquisition of significant resources by attempting to control 
the external environment and that when firms can cope effectively with uncertainty, it 
leads to power (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) and increased firms’ survival likelihood. 
Hence, from the resource dependence theory, firms attempt to exert control over their 
environment by co-opting the resources needed to survive (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). 
Accordingly, this perspective views governance structure and the board composition as a 
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resource that can add value to the firm (Carpenter and Westphal 2001). Also, from 
Hillman and Dalziel (2003), boards of directors are a key source of various resources and 
that board members are selected based on their resource provision capabilities, which are 
important for the firm. According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), the boards’resource 
dependence role encourages access to the critical assets, capabilities, and knowledge that 
are critical and may be otherwise unavailable to the firm. Dalton et al. (1999) mention 
that the resource dependence roles of the board of directors, which forms a link to the 
firms’ external environment are the basis for firm survival. Researchers have analysed 
board composition and its effect on firm performance using the resource dependence 
theory and have found support for the argument that boards have a larger role in terms of 
securing resources from the external environment than simply monitoring firm 
management (Hermalin and Weisbach 1988; Pearce and Zahra 1992). The resource 
dependence theory, therefore, considers the board of directors as a mechanism that 
reduces the environmental uncertainty (Pfeffer 1972), manages the external firm 
dependencies (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), and increases organisational legitimacy ( 
Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Zahra and Pearce 1989).   
4.4 THE STEWARDSHIP THEORY 
Stewardship theory as defined by Hernandez (2012) is the extent to which an individual 
willingly subjugates his or her personal interests to act in protection of others’ long-term 
welfare. According to Davis et al. (1997), given a choice between self-serving behaviour 
and pro-organisational behaviour, a steward’s behaviour will not depart from the interests 
of his or her organisation and will also not substitute self-serving behaviours for 
cooperative behaviours. Stewardship theory holds that a manager when faced with a 
course of action seen as personally unrewarding, may comply based on a sense of duty 
and identification with the firm (Etzioni 1975). The stewardship model is one based on 
the manager as a steward instead of the entirely self-interested rational economic man of 
agency theory (Muth and Donaldson 1998). From Davis et al. (1997), the stewardship 
theory argues against the opportunistic self-interest assumption of the agency theory, 
claiming that managers are motivated by a need to achieve, to gain intrinsic satisfaction 
through successfully performing inherently challenging work, to exercise responsibility 
and authority, and thereby gain recognition from peers and bosses. In contrast to the 
agency theory, the stewardship theory proposes that managers are essentially trustworthy 
individuals and hence, are good stewards of the resources entrusted to them (Donaldson 
1990; Donaldson and Davis 1991). The stewardship theory takes a broader view of human 
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behaviour, proposing that individuals are motivated not only by self-interest, but also by 
service to others, altruism, and generosity. Moreover, as opposed to people having homo 
economicus, and being motivated solely by economic considerations, stewardship theory 
proponents regard as pivotal higher-level needs, including self-actualisation, through the 
fulfilment of personal values and aspirations (Donaldson 1990). Stewards enjoy higher 
monetary rewards and are averse to risk, and effort. Also, stewardship theory regards a 
range of non-financial motives for managerial behaviour including the need for 
achievement and recognition, the intrinsic satisfaction of successful performance, respect 
for authority and the work ethic (Muth and Donaldson 1998). Agency conflicts are 
reduced under stewardship theory since the steward attaches positive marginal utility to 
the pursuit of firm collective ends (Nicholson and Kiel 2007) and stewards believe that 
their interest is aligned with that of the firm and its owners’. Steward’s interests and 
motivations are therefore directed to organisational rather than personal objectives (Davis 
et al. 1997). 
4.5 THE STAKEHOLDER THEORY 
The stakeholder theory is a theory concerned with the relationship between a firm and its 
stakeholders. Since its introduction, the stakeholder approach has become a consistent 
dimension in corporate life and is henceforth difficult to discount in any corporate model 
(Andriof and Waddock 2002). Freeman (1984) defines stakeholders as any group or 
individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the firm’s objectives while 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) define stakeholders as persons or groups with legitimate 
interests in procedural and/or substantive aspects of corporate activity (Shafiq et al. 2014). 
Chiu and Wang (2015) view stakeholders as those who have a stake in a firm and have 
something at risk and they normally include shareholders, creditors, employees, public 
interest groups, customers, suppliers, governmental agencies and the community. 
According to Sternberg (1997), due to the increasing internationalisation of modern life, 
and the global connections made possible by improved transportation, 
telecommunications, and computing power, those affected at least distantly and indirectly 
by a firm include almost everyone. From the stakeholder theory perspective, a firm must 
meet the multiple expectations of the different stakeholder groups instead of meeting only 
the expectations of shareholders as in the traditional shareholder theories because 
stakeholder theory emphasises firms’ accountability beyond simple economic or financial 
performance. Stakeholder theory, therefore, offers a platform for identifying key groups 
to whom a firm should direct its social efforts and represents a foundation for discerning 
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the relationship between various indicators of firm performance (Jones 1995). Logdson 
and Wood (2000) argue that a major purpose of the stakeholder theory is to help corporate 
managers understand their stakeholder environments and manage more effectively within 
the nexus of relationships that exists for their companies. According to Mitchell et al. 
(1997), the concept of stakeholder theory is intended to broaden management’s vision of 
its role and responsibilities beyond profit maximisation functions to include interests and 
claims of non-shareholder groups. Management is expected to be accountable to the 
firm’s stakeholders by embarking on activities recognised as important by its 
stakeholders, and by reporting information. Managers should, therefore, balance the 
interests of all stakeholders, and maximising the welfare of all stakeholders requires that 
managers balance and integrate multiple stakeholders’ interests with no prima facie 
priority of one group of stakeholders over another (Freeman et al. 2004). Two main 
branches of the stakeholder theory are evident in the literature and these are the ethical or 
normative branch and the managerial or positive branch (Deegan 2014).  
In the ethical or normative perspective, corporate managers are required to manage the 
business for the benefit of all stakeholders irrespective of whether management of 
stakeholders leads to improved financial performance (Hasnas 1998). Thus, a firm is 
accountable to all its stakeholders rather than only to more powerful or financial 
stakeholders. However, unlike the ethical perspective, in the managerial perspective, a 
firm is expected to be accountable to its economically powerful stakeholders, instead of 
all its stakeholders. The managerial perspective of the stakeholder theory has similar 
views on the agency theory, that managers maximise shareholders’ value, but firms’ 
activities influence on their societies and therefore in maximising shareholders’ value, the 
needs of the society must also be achieved. Therefore, in today’s business operations, the 
normative or ethical perspective of the stakeholder theory is practical and relevant to 
achieving the overall business objectives not only the shareholder wealth maximisation 
as evident in the managerial perspective. 
The stakeholder theory has played a significant role in championing corporate 
responsibility as it has urged firms to take the demands of stakeholders other than 
shareholders seriously as part of their financial and social performances (Fassin 2012). 
Stakeholder governance, with appropriate collaborative communication practices, can 
generate more creativity impacting on new product development, greater efficiency and 
effectiveness in personal and corporate goal attainment, higher levels of mutual 
commitment, and greater product and service customisation (Kooskora 2006). From 
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Kacperczyk (2009), attending to stakeholders’ interests may benefit firms not only in the 
short term but also in the long run. This could be through an increase in customer base 
that will improve the firm’s financial performance and that several theoretical reviews 
contend that firms that satisfy stakeholders’ claims can secure intangible resources that 
enhance firms’ ability to create value in the end to avoid financial distress. For firms to 
be successful and avoid financial distress, they need to achieve good social, 
environmental, and financial performances and to achieve that the different needs of the 
stakeholder group must be fulfilled. It is therefore not surprising that businesses of today 
report on their social, environmental as well as their financial performance.  
However, the main difficulty with the stakeholder theory is that there is no unified concept 
defining the stakeholder (Kooskora 2006). This is because stakeholders include all those 
who can affect or are affected by the firm and that the number of people who benefit from 
the firm is unlimited, but the stakeholder theory gives no criteria as to how appropriate 
individuals or groups should be selected (Sternberg 1997). The stakeholder theory asserts 
that firms run for the benefit of all their stakeholders and that firms are accountable to all 
their stakeholders. However, in that case, the stakeholder theory is incompatible with 
business and all substantive objectives. Again, from the stakeholder theory, the duty of 
corporate managers to create value for their shareholders is undermined and that 
managers’ responsibilities towards shareholders are contradictory to their responsibilities 
under the agency theory. Thus, while the stakeholder theory expects managers to fulfil 
the needs of all stakeholders of their firms, the agency theory regards managers as agents 
who have been appointed by the shareholders to look after their interests and maximise 
shareholder value. The stakeholder theory, therefore, requires that managers violate the 
prior duties or responsibilities to shareholders that they undertook in accepting their jobs 
(Sternberg 1997). According to Sternberg (1997) therefore, despite the sincere hopes 
which are so often attached to stakeholder theory; it is not likely to improve corporate 
performance. 
4.6 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The conceptual framework developed in figure 1 underpins the study. Based on Standard 
and Poor’s (2002) corporate governance score, this study categorised corporate 
governance under disclosure and transparency (directors’ remuneration, presence of 
senior independent director, disclosure of proxy voting arrangements in the annual 
reports, disclosure of notice of annual general meeting in the annual reports), ownership 
structure (directors’ ownership, institutional ownership, concentrated ownership), and 
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board composition and structure (board size, proportion of independent directors, board 
gender diversity, board activity, board member qualification, board member financial 
expertise, audit committee independence, audit committee size, a firm’s chairperson on 
the audit committee, remuneration committee size, a firm’s chairperson on the 
remuneration committee) to determine their influence on firms’ financial distress. Taking 
the multi-theoretic approach which combines all the four theories, the influence of each 
corporate governance mechanisms on financial distress is determined. Zona et al. (2013) 
encourage researchers to discover and debate multi-theoretical approaches to the study of 
corporate governance instead of adopting a single theoretical perspective. Daily et al. 
(2003) also have concurred that taking a multi-theoretic approach to corporate 
governance is essential to observe and understand the interrelated mechanisms and 
structures that potentially enhance firm performance and reduce financial distress. The 
four theories in figure 1 below give credence to different functions of the board and other 
governance mechanisms. The agency theory concerns itself with the conflict of interests 
between principals and agents and therefore focusses on the monitoring and the control 
function of the board. The stakeholder theory explores the dilemma regarding the interests 
of different groups of stakeholders and views boards as representatives of different 
stakeholder groups. The stewardship theory regards managers as stewards and thus limits 
the role of the board to managerial empowerment and advice, while the resource 
dependency theory underscores the importance of the board as a resource and envisages 
a role of not only providing advice to the managers but also helping the firm secure access 
to resources (Mason-Jones and Towill 1999). It is therefore important from the conceptual 
framework that the multi-theoretic approach is used to understand the effects of each 
corporate governance on financial distress. 
With regards to the corrporate governance mechanisms, each theory regards the role of 
each corporate governance mechanism differently. For instance, in terms of board size, 
the agency theory argues that for monitoring purposes, a smaller board may be needed. 
The resource dependent theory, however, argues for a larger board size since they bring 
in more and varied resources to the firm and may also have access to significant resources 
that are required by the firm and hence, the more directors a firm has, the more resources 
they bring to the firm. Likewise, the stakeholder theory calls for a larger board size in 
order to represent the different stakeholder group but the stewardship theory argues that 
the appointment of the board of directors as a monitoring body over management is 
irrelevant since managers are seen as stewards to take care of firms’ resources. This means 
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that in developing the research hypotheses, it is important to recognise the arguments 
coming from each theoretical perspective regarding the role of each corporate governance 
mechanism.  
The framework also shows that aside the corporate governance mechanisms, the company 
specific factors which are firm size, firm age, and industry are controlled to capture the 
full impact of corporate governance mechanisms on financial distress of UK listed 
companies. Further, the framework shows that the moderating factors which include 
environmental complexity, environmental dynamisms, environmental munificence, 
tangible resource, intangible resource, and technological capability interact with the 
corporate governance mechanisms to observe their moderating influence on the 
relationship between the corporate governance mechanisms and financial distress.  
FIGURE 1: THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY 
 
 (Conceptual framework of the study developed by the author) 
4.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The chapter discussed the agency, the resource dependence, the stakeholder and the 
stewardship theories in relation to corporate governance mechanisms and how they 
impact on firms’ financial distress.  In the discussions, while agency theory argues for 
boards monitoring role, the resource dependence theory regards boards as a resource that 
adds value to the firm and that board of directors’ role brings more varied resources and 
competences which help to build more different and numerous relationships with external 
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sources of resources, and as a result give firms a wider range of possible solutions for 
their survival and development (Goodstein et al. 1994; Pearce and Zahra 1992). The 
chapter also considered the stakeholder theory, which argues that firms should focus on 
all the stakeholder groups not only the providers of capital. From the perspectives of the 
stewardship theory, the discussion ascertained that inside directors spend their working 
lives in the firm they govern, they, therefore, understand the firm better and as such can 
make a superior corporate decision. It regards managers as stewards who want to achieve 
higher corporate performance but not the self-interested rational economic man as 
claimed by the agency theory (Muth and Donaldson 1998). The conceptual framework 
which is the basis of this study was also explained. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter brings together the work covered in the four preceding chapters which 
highlight: (i) the motivation and research problem of the study; (ii) the corporate 
governance environment in the UK; (iii) the review of the extant literature on corporate 
governance and financial distress; and (iv) the underlying theories to motivate hypotheses 
about corporate governance and the occurrence of firm financial distress. The main 
purpose of this chapter is to use a multi–theoretical approach to develop the research 
hypotheses to deepen our understanding of the relationship between corporate governance 
and financial distress phenomenon. Specifically, the study uses an integration of agency 
theory, stewardship theory, resource dependence theory, and stakeholder theory to 
develop the research hypotheses linking corporate governance mechanisms to firms’ 
financial distress. In addition, the moderating role of the firms’ environment, resource, 
and technological capability on the relationship between corporate governance and 
financial distress are also discussed.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.1 gives a summary of the motivation for 
developing the hypotheses from a multi-theoretical approach. Section 5.2 discusses the 
research hypotheses, while section 5.3 presents the chapter summary. 
5.2 THE MOTIVATION FOR DEVELOPING THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESES FROM 
A MULTI-THEORETICAL APPROACH  
Agency theory which has been developed to respond to the problems resulting from the 
separation of ownership and control of companies has dominated corporate governance 
research (Jensen and Meckling 1997; Daily et al. 2003). However, given the complex 
nature of corporate governance, different and competing theories including the resource 
dependence, stewardship, and stakeholder theories have also emerged from the 
management and strategic literature (Lajili and Zeghal 2010).  
The agency theory regards the primary duty of boards as acting as an effective monitor 
of corporate management to ensure that management serves the best interests of the 
company’s shareholders (Fama and Jensen 1983). Thus, according to Fama and Jensen 
(1983), directors perform a monitoring role, which refers to the extent to which the 
directors control managerial decisions on behalf of the shareholders so as to reduce top 
managers’ opportunistic behaviours. Directors on the board can be executive directors, 
affiliate directors, or independent directors (Dalton et al. 1999) but according to the 
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agency theory, only independent directors who do not have any relationship with the firms 
except being part of the board, are truly effective in monitoring the decisions of the firms’ 
management (Ashwin et al. 2016). Agency theory, therefore, regards boards of directors, 
particularly independent directors as those who prevent management from opportunism 
and their self-serving motives through effective monitoring. Monitoring by the board of 
directors lowers the agency problems, thereby limiting firms’ likelihood of financial 
distress (Hillman and Dalziel 2003).  
From the resource dependence theory, a firm’s survival is dependent on its ability to 
establish control over its critical resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Where a firm 
lacks critical resources, it becomes reliant on the external environment, and this 
dependence creates uncertainty that is harmful because it obscures the firm’s control of 
resources and choice of strategies obstructing everyday functioning thereby affecting the 
firm’s performance and its likelihood of financial distress (Rivas 2012). When a firm can 
cope effectively with uncertainty, it leads to power (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) and an 
increase in its survival likelihood. The resource dependence theorists suggest that one 
important function of the board of directors is its resource dependence role in providing 
resources and examine how board capital leads to the provision of resources for the firm 
which enhances its survival. According to the resource dependence theory, directors are 
expected to give advice and counsel, bring legitimacy and access to significant 
constituents outside the firm, serve as channels for communicating information between 
external companies and the firms, and help in strategic development (Haynes and Hillman 
2010). Thus, from the resource dependence theory (Pfeffer 1973; Kiel and Nicholson 
2003), the board of directors links their companies to the external environment, which 
reduces uncertainties and facilitates securing critical resources including finance, 
information, and reputation (Ntim et al. 2015). 
The stakeholder theory considers the interests of all stakeholders in the governance of 
firms. Even though companies’ boards of directors are responsible and accountable only 
to their shareholders, such accountability exists only in a strict and narrow sense. With 
the mounting, public pressure due to the recent corporate scandals and environmental 
concerns, the concept of the responsibilities of firms has changed and broader corporate 
governance guidelines have emerged and this has resulted in a broader interpretation of 
the directors’ role and responsibilities (Pande and Ansari 2014). According to Gaur et al. 
(2015), to serve the interests of all the stakeholder groups, as the theory suggests, it is 
important to have representatives from the stakeholder group on the board, though 
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identifying all stakeholder group is very difficult and an unrealistic work for managers. 
Although it is not totally clear how relevant the stakeholder theory is, in analysing board 
composition and its performance results at the very basic level, stakeholder theory also 
points to a positive linkage between board size, board competence, and firm performance, 
with the assumption that a larger and more competent board may be better able to protect 
the interests of different stakeholder groups (Gaur et al. 2015).  
The stewardship theory takes a completely different view from the agency theory by 
suggesting that managers are necessarily trustworthy and good stewards of the resources 
entrusted to them, which makes monitoring under agency theory unnecessary (Davis et 
al. 1997). The stewardship theory regards managers as stewards of firms’ resources and 
sees the board of directors as the body that inspires and advises management. Proponents 
of stewardship theory assert that superior corporate performance is linked to a board that 
has many inside directors. This is because inside directors have a better understanding of 
the business, and view processes and decisions from a better location than outside 
directors who according to the stewardship theorists lack the knowledge, time and 
resources to monitor management effectively and this can affect firms’ financial 
performance and survival (Donaldson 1990).  
The agency, resource dependence, stakeholder, and stewardship theories prescribe 
different board functions. For instance, the agency theory focuses on the monitoring and 
control role of the board, while resource dependence theory regards board role as not only 
giving advice to management but also assisting the firm secure access to significant 
resources. The stakeholder theory regards boards as representatives of the different 
stakeholder group, and the stewardship theory limits boards role to managerial 
empowerment and advice (Gaur et al. 2015). Given that the above theories prescribe 
different roles for the board of directors and different functions for other corporate 
governance mechanisms, this study takes a multi-theoretic approach and uses some of the 
prescriptions and assumptions of these theories to develop the research hypotheses.  
Generally, this study focuses on testing some agency, resource dependence, stakeholder, 
and stewardship theories assumptions to help predict the likelihood of firms’ financial 
distress (Lajili and Zéghal 2010). 
5.3 THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
This section discusses the research hypotheses developed for the study. Appiah (2013) 
indicates that prior studies in the prediction of corporate failure employ statistical 
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techniques in a search of predictors, without a clear philosophical base and that the 
literature on corporate failure is dominated by an ad hoc selection of variables approach, 
without any theoretical underpinnings. Also, Ong et al. (2011) agree that there is no 
theoretical approach in selecting variables for ﬁnancial distress prediction models. Scott 
(1981) however, concludes that bankruptcy prediction is both empirically feasible and 
theoretically explainable. Hypotheses based on the components of (i) board composition 
and structure, (ii) ownership structure, and (iii) disclosure and transparency are developed 
for the study. Further hypotheses covering the moderating influences of resource, 
technology, and environment on the relationships between the components of board 
composition and structure, ownership structure, and disclosure and transparency are 
developed. Finally, hypotheses are also developed for the control variables that, based on 
prior studies, are deemed to have an influence on the relationship between corporate 
governance and firms’ financial distress. 
5.3.1 BOARD COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE 
The corporate governance variables used to formulate the hypotheses for board 
composition and structure are; board size, proportion of independent directors, board 
gender diversity, board member education, board member financial expertise, board 
activity, remuneration committee size, the presence of a firm’s chairperson on the 
remuneration committee, audit committee independence, size of the audit committee, and 
the presence of a firm’s chairperson on the audit committee.   
5.3.1.1 BOARD SIZE 
Agency theory regards the primary duty of the board of directors as acting as an effective 
monitor of corporate management to ensure that management serves the best interests of 
the company’s shareholders (Fama and Jensen 1983). Jensen (1993) proposes that a 
smaller board size is more effective at monitoring firms’ management. This is because in 
smaller boards, directors are personally more involved and the decision-taking process is 
more efficient and rapid which guarantees a more effective management monitoring 
activity (Ciampi 2015). This reduces the chances of the firm achieving unstable economic 
and financial situations (Fich and Slezak 2008). However, a smaller board might be easier 
for the CEO to influence (Simpson and Gleason 1999) and therefore a larger board is 
necessary to raise their disciplinary control over the CEO (Brédart 2014). Dalton et al. 
(1999) also argue that larger boards offer better advice to the CEO but Jensen (1993) 
states that large boards result in less effective coordination, communication and decision 
making, and are more likely to be controlled by the CEO. This is supported by Yermack 
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(1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) who find that large boards are associated with lower 
firm value. This is because larger boards generally consume more pecuniary and non-
pecuniary resources in the form of remuneration and perquisites than smaller boards 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976).  
In extending the resource dependence perspective to the context of financial distress and 
bankruptcy, Gales and Kesner (1994) argue that the more directors serving on the board, 
the better connected the firm is to critical resources and the less likelihood of financial 
distress and bankruptcy. The resource dependence theory argues that larger boards have 
a positive effect on firms since they bring more varied resources and competences, help 
to build more different and numerous relationships with external sources of resources and 
thus, give firms a wider range of possible solutions for their survival and development 
(Ciampi 2015). The resource dependence theory, therefore, maintains that larger boards 
offer advantages associated with the firm’s ability to access the resources and information 
held by the directors that might be needed to achieve the company’s objectives (Pearce 
and Zahra 1992). Chaganti et al. (1985) however, indicate that there are some problems 
associated with larger board size. They include greater discretion of board members to 
meet their interests to the detriment of the general interest of the company or lack of 
effectiveness when turbulent economic environments need a change in strategic direction 
to avoid distress and ensure survival (Goodstein et al. 1994). 
Also, while the stakeholder theory calls for a larger board size to allow for the 
representation of different stakeholders of the firm (Gaur et al. 2015), stewardship theory 
limits the role of the board to managerial empowerment and advice and therefore not in 
favour of larger board size.  
Empirical studies by Chaganti et al. (1985) and Gales and Kezner (1994) find that boards 
of companies which filed for a bankruptcy protection chapter are characterised by smaller 
board size. Studies by Manzaneque et al. (2016b) and Brédart (2014) indicate that board 
size is negatively related to firms’ likelihood of financial distress. Other researchers 
including Simpson and Gleason (1999), Lakshan and Wijekoon (2012), and Ciampi 
(2015) however found no evidence between board size and the firm likelihood of financial 
distress. According to Ntim et al. (2015), it is still unclear within the extant literature as 
to whether larger boards also result in poor performance of the resource dependence role. 
However, the monitoring role of the board under the agency theory may demand a smaller 
board size. The resource provision role of the board from the resource dependence 
perspective and the stakeholder representation on the board under the stakeholder 
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perspective all require a larger board size, but the stewardship theory is not supportive of 
the board of directors as a management control mechanism. The impact of board size as 
a corporate control mechanism on firms’ financial distress is however not clear, but the 
strongest arguments indicate that a smaller board would result in closer alignment with 
shareholder interest which would reduce risk taking (Simpson and Gleason 1999) and 
increase firm value. Accordingly, the study proposes the following hypothesis. 
H1a: Board size is negatively related to firms’ likelihood of financial distress. 
5.3.1.2 PROPORTION OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS 
Board independence is determined by the degree to which the board consists of people 
who are not otherwise affiliated with the firm through employment or economic exchange 
relationships (Gordon 2007). A board has a high level of independence if the board has 
more outside members and if the chair of the board is not the same as the CEO of the firm 
(Gaur et al. 2015). According to Dowell et al. (2011), independent boards are generally 
considered advantageous since they are harder for top management to dominate and they 
may be more likely to encourage changes even in the face of management reluctance. 
Agency theory recommends the independence of the board as a way of ensuring adequate 
control over the management (Manzaneque et al. 2016b). Since independent directors do 
not have any relationship with the firm other than being part of the board, they are in a 
better position to monitor and control potential opportunism and avoid selfish behaviours 
of management to ensure that their decisions are consistent with the interests of the 
shareholders (Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen 1993). Fich and Slezak (2008) and Chang 
(2009) assert that having independent directors on the board reduces the possible 
existence of information asymmetries and the agency costs between shareholders and 
management. Although empirical evidence by Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) indicate 
that independent directors represent the interests of the shareholders better, they are 
characterised by a more superficial understanding of the specificities of the firm and that 
many independent directors representing different interests may reduce the economic 
flexibility of a firm resulting in conflicts between the board and top management 
(Chaganti et al. 1985). Nevertheless, the internal directors’ position in the firm and the 
existence of possible inherent contracts as well as their loyalty with the CEO, may affect 
their ability to replace the CEO when necessary, especially when firms are financially 
distressed. It is therefore unlikely that inside directors will be able to perform the 
monitoring role of the board. Hence, from the agency theory perspective, independent 
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directors are more likely to monitor, advise, and challenge managers, especially when the 
firm needs to make changes to survive (Weisbsch 1988). 
From the resource dependence theory perspective, appointing independent directors is 
regarded as a strategy for managing organisations’ environmental relationships (Daily 
and Dalton 1994). Independent directors are considered as a strategic resource since they 
make it possible to widen the organisational knowledge of the company (Cornett et al. 
2008). Independent directors provide resources to deal with external factors including the 
community, buyers, or suppliers but inside directors serve on boards primarily to provide 
firm-specific information (Fama and Jensen 1983). Hence, the resource dependence 
perspective stipulates that having independent directors is a crucial factor for a firm’s 
survival, especially in a state of crisis since it allows greater access to external resources 
and specific competences (Dalton et al. 1998;  Hillman and Dalziel 2003). Resource 
dependence theory, therefore, recognises independent directors as a critical link to the 
external environment (Abdullah 2006) especially the need for a high proportion of 
independent directors on the board when firms are financially distressed. Baysinger and 
Hoskisson (1990) however argue that independent directors do not have in their 
possession enough experience to do their jobs very well. 
The stakeholder theory argues that independent directors, due to their non-affiliation with 
the firm, can articulate the views of all the stakeholder groups. Independent directors are 
also able to protect the interest of different stakeholder groups. The stewardship theory, 
however, argues that the presence of independent directors increases the chances of a 
conflict within the board, making the decision-making process less efficient (Gaur et al. 
2015). 
Meanwhile, the independent directors have advantages from both the agency and the 
resource dependence theories for distressed firms and these advantages include the fact 
that they can challenge the CEO and top management whenever there is a disagreement 
over the correct direction to take in times of distress (Dowell et al. 2011). In addition, 
independent directors are more likely to have the resources that are urgently needed by 
distressed firms, such as access to capital (Hillman and Dalziel 2003). 
The empirical evidence regarding the relationship between independent directors and 
firms’ distress is not unanimous. Elloumi and Gueyie (2001), Daily et al. (2003), and 
Wang and Deng (2006) find that firms with a large proportion of independent directors 
show a smaller probability to file for bankruptcy since they are more efficient in imposing 
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the necessary measures to overcome a possible failure situation. Further, research by Fich 
and Slezak (2008) that links board configuration to financial distress indicates that smaller 
boards with outside directors are more effective at avoiding bankruptcy. Moreover, on 
bankruptcy research, Platt and Platt (2012) find that for companies that do not go 
bankrupt, approximately 66% of directors are independent, which is significantly higher 
than the 60% of independent directors at bankrupt firms and that this finding is consistent 
with prior research (Daily and Dalton 1994a; Fich and Slezak 2008). Meanwhile, 
Chaganti et al. (1985) and Simpson and Gleason (1999) establish no relationship between 
the proportion of independent directors on the board and business failure. Independent 
directors, however, are better equipped to monitor management. This study, therefore, 
proposes the following hypothesis regarding the proportion of independent directors. 
H1b: The proportion of independent directors is negatively related to firms’ likelihood of 
financial distress.  
5.3.1.3 BOARD GENDER DIVERSITY 
In addition to the social and ethical reasons, economic arguments have also stimulated 
the demands for increasing the number of women representation on corporate boards 
(Saeed et al. 2016). “Considering that women bring different professional experiences 
and perspectives compared to men (Hillman et al. 2007; Ward and Forker 2017), it might 
be expected that the presence of women on the board will direct to more informed and 
strategic actions to identify better investment opportunities for the firm” (Poletti-Hughes 
and Briano-Turrent 2019, page 2). The corporate governance code incorporates 
recommendation for gender equality and that the Higgs (2003) report argues that diversity 
could improve board effectiveness and specifically recommends that firms draw more 
actively from professional groups in which women are better represented. Gender 
diversity may allow organisational heads to effectively reach common goals and 
decisions, regardless of whether they share similar meanings or opinions (Perryman et al. 
2015b). According to Ye (2019), board gender diversity can influence board efficiency at 
both individual and team levels and at the individual level, researchers (Adams and 
Ferreira 2009) ascertain that females can differ from males in ways that can improve 
board efficiency. Although according to Carter et al. (2010), no single theory including 
the agency theory and the resource dependence theory predicts directly the link between 
board gender diversity and financial performance, these theories, however, give insight 
into the link and imply the possibility that board gender diversity impacts on firm 
performance and firm value.  
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From the agency theory, the monitoring role of the board plays a highly significant role 
in lessening the principal-agent conflicts, which ultimately influences firm performance 
and financial distress. According to Adams and Ferreira (2009), greater gender diversity 
on corporate boards may provide better monitoring because female director 
representation assists in improving managerial accountability including that of board 
meeting attendance and CEO responsibility. Consequently, agency theory proposes that 
females on corporate boards might make stronger existing control mechanisms over 
managers and executives because board gender diversity enhances board independence 
(Carter et al. 2010). Empirically, Adams and Ferreira (2009) find that female directors 
tend to have better monitoring ability since they think independently and are not 
influenced by the so-called old-boys’ club syndrome and that, prior evidence from 
Burgess and Tharenou (2002) indicates the positive effect of board gender diversity on 
fostering good corporate practice.  
The resource dependence theory proposes that an increase in the size and diversity of the 
board of directors improve the security of firms’ significant resources and the linkage 
between firms and their external environment (Pfeffer 1973). The corporate governance 
literature indicates that more gender-diverse boards may help to extend those firms 
important resources including the human capital of board members such as knowledge 
and skills, advice and counsel, channels of communication, and legitimacy. Diversifying 
the board of directors by including more females would help firms to gain legitimacy, as 
gender equality becomes one of the accepted social norms. Also, increasing the female 
representation on corporate boards may broaden the human capital and channels of 
communication of the board of directors by offering more insight into corporates’ 
strategic issues, more importantly, those that concern female employees, consumers, and 
business partners (Daily et al. 1999). However, according to Goodstein et al. (1994), 
board diversity leads to clashes within groups since others find it hard to identify with 
those of different gender and the greater the diversity of the board of directors, the greater 
the potential that conflict of interests may arise. 
The stakeholder theory expects the board of directors to protect not only the interests of 
the shareholders but also the interests of all the stakeholder groups (Freeman 1984). 
Hillman et al. (2000) indicate that with board gender diversity, firms can understand and 
manage stakeholder relationships, which may guarantee the interests of different 
stakeholder groups. Female on corporate boards might provide a diversity of perspectives 
and opinions to board deliberations and help develop more responsive policies and thus, 
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board gender diversity is assumed to avoid earnings management that may enhance firm 
financial performance and consequently protect the interests of all stakeholder groups. 
The stewardship theory argues that the monitoring mechanisms under the agency theory 
are irrelevant since managers are more motivated and therefore, behave as pro-
organisational, trustworthy, and collectivists (Donaldson and Davis 1994; Davis et al. 
1997). From the perspective of the stewardship theory, instead of the board of directors 
controlling and monitoring management, it must rather empower and facilitate the 
management. Female directors, therefore, behave as the stewards of the interests of 
companies and thus they are more proactive in cooperating with management thereby 
enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of the board of directors. According to (Carter 
et al. 2010), theoretically, no single theory has predicted the link between board gender 
diversity and financial performance, although the resource dependence theory gives the 
most convincing theoretical arguments for a business case for board diversity. Thus, from 
Carter et al. (2003), until a theoretical framework that predicts the nature of the 
relationship is developed, examining the board gender diversity and financial 
performance nexus is an empirical issue.  
Empirically, however, there is no consensus in the literature on the relationship between 
female representation on boards and financial performance (Sila et al. 2016) and the 
question that needs answering is: If there is a relationship between board gender diversity 
and financial performance, does female representation make the difference? Some 
studies, including Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2008) and Carter et al. (2003) argue that 
the association between gender diversity and financial performance is positive. Whereas 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) argue for a negative relationship between board gender 
diversity and financial performance, Carter et al. (2010) find evidence of no significant 
relationship at all. On firms’ risk-taking behaviour, Wilson and Altanlar (2009) find 
insolvency risk to be negatively associated with the proportion of female directors on 
corporate boards. Nonetheless, Nguyen et al. (2015) argue that, even if boards with more 
gender diversity do improve the monitoring function of the board, it does not necessarily 
follow that this improvement will result in a better financial performance because the 
potential impact of gender diversity on firm performance is dependent on the quality of 
firm governance.  Adams and Ferreira (2009) therefore indicate that firms that are weakly 
governed may benefit more from female representation on their boards, enhancing 
additional monitoring, and improving firm value. However, if female directors provide 
greater monitoring expertise, which is more valuable in weak corporate governance 
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environment (Adams and Ferreira 2009) it may be expected that firms with more gender-
diverse boards will enjoy the better financial performance to avoid financial distress 
(Nguyen et al. 2015). The study, therefore, proposes the following hypotheses. 
H1c: Board gender diversity is negatively related to firms’ likelihood of financial distress.  
5.3.1.4 BOARD ACTIVITY 
The level of board meetings has been used as a measure of the board activity and how 
frequently boards meet is topical, controversial, and has policy implications, yet, it is not 
directly covered by the corporate governance codes and the extant literature (Hahn and 
Lasfer 2016). The UK Combined Code on corporate governance (2003), technically, 
recommends that the board should meet sufficiently regularly to discharge its duties 
effectively. Brick and Chidambaran (2010b) assert that much of the regulatory and 
shareholder attention on the board of directors has assumed that board activity can 
increase shareholder value. Vafeas (1999) acknowledges that firm earnings, market 
performance, or investor issues, demand board to act and such actions may either increase 
or decrease board meeting frequency. Vafaes (1999), therefore, argues that the frequency 
of board meetings is a significant board characteristic that can have important 
implications for firm value. Conger et al. (1998) propose that board meeting time is an 
important resource in improving board effectiveness including the fact that directors 
meeting more frequently is more likely to counteract the entrenchment of managers. 
From the agency theory perspective, corporate boards can perform their monitoring 
function if all the members attend board meetings. The frequency of board meetings 
matters when the board of directors wants to monitor closely firm managers to improve 
firm value. To this end, absence at board meetings may hamper board members from 
performing their duties effectively (Lin et al. 2014). This is because directors are expected 
to monitor the managers and assist them in designing value-enhancing long-term 
strategies and as such, any absence at board meeting implies that directors have less time 
to monitor managers and, thus, to discover managerial self-interest motives which impact 
firms’ financial health. Jensen (1993) however has doubts about the effectiveness of board 
meetings in monitoring management since the agenda of the meetings are always set by 
the CEO and board meetings are more reactive than proactive.  
From the resource dependence theory, Conger et al. (1998)  advocate that board meeting 
time is an important resource for improving the effectiveness of the board. Lipton and 
Lorsch (1992) propose that the most widely shared problem faced by directors is a lack 
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of time to perform their duties. Directors spend a little time and sometime do not attend 
board meetings because they take up too many outside directorships. The resource 
dependence theory, however, regards board meeting time as a significant resource 
because directors on boards that meet more frequently are more likely to perform their 
duties in accordance with shareholders’ interests (Vafeas, 1999).  
The stakeholder theory also presumes that when firms’ hold board meetings frequently, 
they address the interest and concerns of all the stakeholder groups. 
Hahn and Lasfer (2016) admit that there is limited research on board activity and financial 
performance. Empirically, Vafeas (1999) and Adams (2005) find support for the inverse 
relationship between a board meeting and prior performance. This happens because poor 
prior performance requires a greater need for monitoring to turnaround the firm, therefore, 
boards may face increased pressure to be regarded as being engaged when the firm is 
performing badly. Brick and Chidambaram (2010), also find a positive relationship 
between board activity and firm value. They, however, assert that the danger of 
disagreement between board members increases when the firms perform badly, and this 
may result in an increase in the board’s meeting frequency since directors may want to 
protect themselves from being blamed for not doing enough when their actions were 
needed. Brédart (2014) however, find no significant relationship between board activity 
and the occurrence of firms’ financial distress. The board of directors of financially 
distressed firms are likely to face increase pressure and are therefore expected to be 
engaged in board meetings to discuss issues that improve the firm’s performance. The 
following hypothesis is therefore proposed. 
H1d: Board activity is negatively related to firms’ likelihood of financial distress.  
5.3.1.5 BOARD MEMBER QUALIFICATION 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the board of directors is the common head of decision 
control system. As such, they are expected to have qualifications relevant to the firm’s 
industry. Adams and Ferreira (2007) classify the board’s major functions into two; the 
monitoring and advisory functions. While the monitoring role of the board requires the 
directors to scrutinise management to prevent harmful behaviour ranging from shirking 
to fraud, the advisory role of the board requires the directors to help management in 
making good decisions about firms’ strategy and actions (Linck et al. 2008). Directors 
are therefore expected to perform the monitoring and advisory roles better if they have 
the right qualification. From Platt and Platt (2012), if CEOs possess transferable 
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knowledge, then companies which have directors who currently serve as CEOs of other 
companies are expected to have a fewer incidence of bankruptcy. However, formal 
qualification, as a board characteristics, has received little attention to date outside 
financial expertise due to limited disclosure (Christy et al. 2013).  
Consistent with the agency theory, board members with the relevant qualifications can 
perform their role of monitoring management to reduce agency costs (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). Thus, board members with the relevant qualifications will be more 
critical of the firm’s financial reporting, emphasising the board monitoring role, and will 
also advise the CEOs on financial communication strategy (Jeanjean and Stolowy 2009).  
From the perspective of the resource dependence theory, board members with the relevant 
qualifications are an important resource for firms’ strategic policies, analysis, and 
development. Board members with qualification is a rich source of innovative ideas to 
develop policy initiatives with analytical depth and rigor necessary for offering unique 
perspectives on strategic issues (Cox and Blake 1991). The presence of board members 
with the relevant qualifications is therefore likely to reassure the potential investors and/or 
creditors, which should make it easier to attract new financial resources (Jeanjean and 
Stolowy 2009). 
The stakeholder theory argues that a more competent board satisfies the interest of many 
stakeholder groups and that board members with the relevant qualifications are in a better 
position to understand the concerns of all groups of stakeholders and assist the firm to 
come up with strategies to deal with different groups of stakeholders, as well as enhance 
the value of the resources and expertise brought by the board (Gaur et al. 2015).  
However, the stewardship theory argues that insider-dominated boards contribute a depth 
of knowledge and expertise to the firm and this facilitates an active strategy role (Muth 
and Donaldson 1998). Proponents of stewardship theory contend that superior corporate 
performance is linked to many inside directors with the relevant qualification who 
naturally work to maximise profit for shareholders. With the right qualification, inside 
directors have a better understanding of the business, and view processes and decisions 
from a better location than outside directors who according to the stewardship theorists, 
lack the knowledge, time and resources to monitor management effectively thereby 
plunging firms into financial distress (Donaldson 1990; Donaldson and Davis 1994). 
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Empirical evidence regarding board member qualifications and financial distress are 
limited. Nonetheless, board members with qualifications are expected to influence firms’ 
financial distress. The following hypothesis is proposed: 
H1e: Board member educational qualification is negatively related to firms’ likelihood 
of financial distress.  
5.3.1.6 BOARD MEMBER FINANCIAL EXPERTISE 
Expertise is the skilfulness by virtue of processing special knowledge and it is evaluated 
based on standards discussing the aptitude to perform a task (Sarwar et al. 2018). Adams 
and Jiang (2017) assert that board members who are professionally qualified financial 
experts are better in providing the supervisory and advisory functions that serve the 
interests of the shareholders. Custódio and Metzger (2014) argue that considering the 
complex financial transactions in modern day business, senior finance expert directors 
can communicate more effectively with capital markets than their non-financial expert 
counterparts. Financial literacy which can be acquired through both formal and self-
guided education (Cohen et al. 2002) assists directors to understand the implications of 
basic financial decisions. Generally, financial literacy helps directors in monitoring 
management. Cohen et al. (2002) also acknowledge that it is significant for committee 
members to have accounting and financial expertise. Financial expertise on the audit 
committee strengthens corporate governance by enhancing the board’s ability to protect 
shareholder interests and reduces the likelihood of financial distress thereby increasing 
shareholder value (Defond et al. 2005). Thus, the Smith Committee (2003) report contains 
the recommendation that at least one member of the audit committee should have 
significant, recent, and relevant financial experience. A board of members with financial 
expertise is a significant resource to the firm and that the financial expertise provides for 
ability and expertise necessary for the effective decision making process (Milliken and 
Martins 1996). Thus, according to the Blue Ribbon Committee Report (1999), in the US, 
a well-balanced and effective board should have directors with an array of talent, 
experience, and expertise that influence different aspects of the firm’s activities; such 
diverse contributions are often made by different directors (Azim 2012). Carcello et al. 
(2015) find that both accounting and certain types of non-accounting financial expertise 
reduce earnings management for firms with weak alternative corporate governance 
mechanisms, but that independent audit committee members with financial expertise are 
most effective in mitigating earnings management. Firms with board members who have 
financial expertise are less likely to experience financial distress due to their ability to 
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foresee financial problems and take decisions to counteract those problems. The 
following hypothesis is therefore proposed. 
H1f: Board member financial expertise is negatively related to firms’ likelihood of 
financial distress. 
5.3.1.7 AUDIT COMMITTEE INDEPENDENCE 
The audit committee is an oversight committee to which the board of directors has 
delegated the responsibility of corporate reporting process (Bedard and Genderon 2010 ). 
According to Bedard and Genderon (2010), the audit committee is regarded as one of the 
significant and influential participants of corporate governance as it helps the board of 
directors in monitoring corporate management disclosure practices and internal control. 
An audit committee with independent directors ensures the quality and transparency of 
the financial reporting process because the independent directors have no economic or 
personal relationship with the management and as such are more likely to work 
independently and objectively from the influence of management (Bedard and Genderon 
2010 ). The Code (2014) requires the board to establish an audit committee of at least 
three, or in the case of smaller companies, two independent non-executive directors.  
From the perspective of the agency theory, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that effective 
monitoring of the behaviour of management is likely to be influenced by independent 
directors. The audit committee is therefore seen as the core monitoring mechanism for 
shareholders especially in the light of the many accounting scandals including that of 
Enron and WorldCom (Aldamen et al. 2012).  
The resource dependence theory recognises the audit committee and its independence as 
a body that adds more resource to the firm. The stakeholder theory also argues that the 
presence and independence of firms’ audit committees are highly significant for all 
stakeholder groups as the committee gives assurances of the firms’ financial reports. The 
role of the audit committee is therefore very important to stakeholders as quality disclosed 
financial reporting improves firms’ market performance to avoid financial distress (Wild 
1996). Thus, when firms do not comply with audit committee recommendations, financial 
irregularities and corporate failure occur, impacting on all stakeholder groups (Mangena 
and Pike 2005).  
Empirically, Miglani et al. (2015b) find that the existence of a separate audit committee 
is associated with lower financial distress likelihood while Carcello and Neal (2003) find 
a significant positive relation between the percentage of affiliated directors on the audit 
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committee and optimistic disclosures for entities experiencing financial distress. Based 
on the theoretical and the empirical perspective, the following hypothesis is proposed for 
the study. 
H1g: Audit committee independence is negatively associated with firms’ likelihood of 
financial distress.  
5.3.1.8 AUDIT COMMITTEE SIZE 
This is represented by the number of members of the audit committee. Larger members 
of the audit committee enhance the internal governance practice and improve the 
resources of internal monitoring (Salloum et al. 2014). Ghosh et al. (2010a) also assert 
that larger audit committees are more efficient in monitoring the financial reporting 
process. However, large- sized audit committees may lose concentration and become less 
participative than the smaller ones since audit committee with a small number of members 
tends to be more participative in comparison to those of a larger size (Salloum et al. 2014). 
Therefore, from the agency theory perspective, Xie et al. (2003) argue that smaller boards 
monitor better than larger ones. But Allegrini and Greco (2011) argue from the 
perspective of the resource dependence theory that larger audit committees are willing to 
devote greater resources and authority to effectively carry out their responsibilities and 
that more directors on audit committee are more likely to bring diversity of views, 
expertise, experiences, and skills to ensure effective monitoring (Bédard and Gendron 
2010). From the standpoint of the stakeholder theory, a large audit committee is 
significant to oversee the financial reporting process that will benefit the different groups 
of stakeholders. 
Empirically, there is limited literature on audit committee size and financial distress, but 
results of prior research on the association of audit committee size and company 
performance are not conclusive (Dalton et al. 1998). Aldamen et al. (2012) reveal that 
smaller audit committees with more experience and ﬁnancial expertise are more likely to 
be associated with positive ﬁrm performance in the market. Also, Pearce and Zahra (1992) 
find a positive relationship between the size of an audit committee and company ﬁnancial 
performance. These results mean that audit committee size directly affect firm 
performance and therefore likely to reduce the likelifood of financial distress. In terms of 
cost, a small audit committee may have a lower cost due to the small number of members 
on the committee. Hence, the following hypothesis is proposed. 
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H1h: Audit committee size is negatively associated with firms’ likelihood of financial 
distress. 
5.3.1.9 REMUNERATION COMMITTEE SIZE 
The size of the remuneration committee represents the number of directors who make up 
the remuneration committee. Since the remuneration committee is an efficient mechanism 
for focusing the firm on appropriate remuneration policies for senior executives (Azim 
2012), it is imperative that the board ensures that the right number of members are on the 
committee to enable it performs its functions. The UK Corporate Governance Code 
(2014) requires the board to establish a remuneration committee of at least three, or in the 
case of smaller companies, two independent non-executive directors. However, the size 
of the board may determine the size of the remuneration committee since firms with large 
board size may have more members on the remuneration committee in comparison with 
firms with small board size. Jensen (1993) advocates that boards and their committees 
must be kept small for their efficient functioning over management but according to Zahra 
and Pearce (1989), smaller board committee may lack the required human resources to 
rigorously monitor the CEOs’ performance which may give the CEOs opportunities to 
pursue strategies in an effort to satisfy their own ambitions at the expense of their ﬁrm’s 
long-term survival (Appiah and Chizema 2015). However, Chan et al. (2015b) state that 
with the small remuneration committee, CEOs may attempt to coerce or influence their 
decision. On the contrary, the resource dependence theory argues for a larger 
remuneration committee to improve the quality of its oversight responsibilities as a result 
of increased resources. 
Empirically, Chan et al. (2015) establish that the size of the remuneration committee 
significantly predicts corporate failure. Appiah and Chizema (2015) however, find no 
significant relationship between remuneration committee size and corporate failure. It is 
expected that a larger remuneration committee is related to more modest levels of 
compensation, and in turn, a lower likelihood of financial distress. The following 
hypothesis is therefore proposed: 
H1i: Remuneration committee size is negatively associated with firms financial distress. 
5.3.1.10 PRESENCE OF A FIRM’S CHAIRPERSON ON THE REMUNERATION 
COMMITTEE 
The Combined Code (2006) allows a company’s chairperson to be a member of, but not 
chair the remuneration committee if he or she was considered independent on 
appointment as chairperson. According to Main et al. (2008), the view of the CEO is 
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necessary for determining whether a particular design is one which promotes the desired 
behavior on the part of the executives.  The input of the executive’s perspective in the 
remuneration process is regarded as essential, though the involvement of executives in 
the remuneration process often goes beyond information gathering (Main et al. 2008). 
Anderson and Bizjak (2003) find that CEOs sitting on their own remuneration committees 
do not earn higher levels of salary or bonus, new grants, or have signiﬁcantly more 
valuable full option portfolios but to the contrary, ﬁnd that the value of new grants and 
the full option portfolio are significantly lower. Their study also ascertains that total 
compensation levels show only a marginal relation to the CEO’s presence on the 
remuneration committee. Given that a CEO on the remuneration committee does not earn 
a higher level of salary or bonus but contribute to the process of determining fair salaries 
for firms survival, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H1j: The presence of a firm’s chairperson on the remuneration committee is negatively 
related to firms’ financial distress likelihood. 
5.3.1.11 PRESENCE OF A FIRM’S CHAIRPERSON ON THE AUDIT COMMITTEE 
Primarily, the role of the audit committee is to monitor management and oversee a firm’s 
financial reporting process. The effectiveness of the audit committee is determined by 
many factors including the level of independence that the committee has which 
subsequently affects the level of monitoring. The presence of a firm’s chairperson on 
audit committee could have effects on monitoring since although the chairperson could 
be independent at the time of appointment, being part of the audit committee would 
generally mean that the level of independence could be compromised because of his/her 
inside knwoledge of the firm’s operation. This could subsequently undermine the 
credibility of financial reporting.  Beasley and Salterio (2001) observed that a board chair 
or CEO on the audit committee reduces the effectiveness of the audit committee. The 
study concludes that the presence of a CEO on the audit committee has a negative impact 
on the independence of the audit committee and leads to less effective monitoring, 
although the study’s findings related to determinants of the audit committee |membership 
and show no empirical link to monitoring effectiveness or performance. Although a firm’s 
chairperson is considered as a valuable resource to the audit committee, his/her 
membership on the committee could raise doubt on the firms’ financial reporting process 
and reduces the level of trust that the stakeholders place on the financial reports and 
ultimately, this could have impacts on performance and consequently, financial distress. 
Empirical evidence linking the presence of a firm’s chairperson on the audit committee 
      
100 
 
is limited but the argument is that the chairperson’s presence on the audit committee 
reduces its independence and subsequntly financial distress. The following hypothesis is 
therefore proposed:  
H1k: The presence of a firms chairperson on audit committee has a positive relationship 
with financial distress.   
5.3.2 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
The corporate governance mechanisms use to formulate the hypotheses under ownership 
structure are the directors’ ownerships, institutional ownerships, and concentrated 
ownership.  
5.3.2.1 DIRECTORS OWNERSHIP 
Directors shareholding is the proportion of shares owned by the directors of a company. 
Jensen (1993) suggests that many problems happen because directors do not normally 
own a substantial proportion of the firms’ shares, which reduces the incentives of the 
directors to pursue the shareholders’ interests, which thereby affect firms’ financial health 
(Simpson and Gleason 1999). Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that firms should use 
share ownership to align the interests of the directors with the firm. Beasley (1996) 
suggests that the more shareholdings belonging to independent directors, the lower the 
possibility of fraud occurring in the company. Agency theory argues that shareholdings 
by directors would bring down agency cost thereby reducing the probability of firms’ 
becoming financially distressed (Jensen and Meckling 1976). This is because when 
directors own shares in a firm, they apply more attention and effort to issues critical to 
the firm’s strategic, operational, and financial well-being (Platt and Platt 2012). When 
directors have considerable holdings in a company’s shares, their decisions impact their 
own wealth and that the impact of their decisions on their wealth is compounded when 
the receipt of shares or options is a component of their compensation package (Booth et 
al. 2002). Thus, when directors’ own shares in their companies, they are more likely to 
embrace the interests of other shareholders and perform their monitoring role effectively 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983). Directors should, therefore, hold 
some amount of ﬁnancial risk as shareholders, which will give them an incentive to act 
in the best interests of the shareholders (Li et al. 2008a). Nahar Abdullah (2006) and 
Elloumi and Gueyié (2001) in their investigation of ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms, indicated 
that director ownership in a ﬁrm reinforces incentives for directors to monitor 
management to prevent ﬁnancial distress. Mehran (1995) reports that when director 
ownership tends to be higher, investors regard the company as a high-quality investment 
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target. However, a director owning a significant number of shares might encourage the 
firm to take an undue level of risk that might affect the financial health of the firm.  
Empirically, Fich and Slezak (2008) report a negative relationship between the proportion 
of shares held by the board and the probability of firm failure. Also, Nahar Abdullah 
(2006) establishes that non-executive directors’ interests are associated negatively with 
financial distress. Platt and Platt (2012) find that non-bankrupt firms’ independent 
directors own fewer shares. However, Beltratti and Stulz (2012) find that banks with a 
higher proportion of board ownership operate worse than banks with less board 
ownership. Simpson and Gleason (1999) however, find no significant relationship 
between ownership by directors and officers and the probability of financial distress. 
Based on agency theory, firms with a higher proportion of directors’ shareholding are less 
likely to be financially distressed. The following hypothesis is therefore proposed. 
H2a: Directors’ ownership is negatively associated with firms’ likelihood of financial 
distress. 
5.3.2.2 CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP 
Firms with concentrated ownership generally have large shareholders that own a 
substantial number of shares and that such large shareholders have a signiﬁcant ﬁnancial 
investment in the ﬁrm and are interested in increasing the value of their shareholdings if 
the need arises (Li et al. 2008). A high degree of ownership concentration creates positive 
effects on firm performance and reduces financial distress because large shareholders are 
incentivised and often have the expertise to monitor managers effectively (Shliefer and 
Vishny 1986). Concentrated ownership is important because the greater dispersion of 
ownership makes it less likely that any owner will have a sufficiently strong economic 
incentive to expend the resources necessary to heavily monitor the firm’s performance 
and of top management (Gillian and Starks 2000). However, according to Lajili and 
Zéghal (2010), concentrated ownership may also create agency costs and information 
asymmetries between dispersed shareholders and the major shareholder group. Also, 
situations in which ownership concentration exceeds certain thresholds, large 
shareholders tend to exercise their control rights to create private benefits, sometimes 
expropriating minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny 1997) since large shareholders 
can use their voting power to make necessary changes more easily than the shareholders 
in widely-held ﬁrms (Li et al. 2008). In healthy firms, the large shareholders have the 
power to expropriate minority shareholders but can also use their private wealth to prop 
up distressed firms. When a firm becomes distressed, large shareholders must face the 
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risk and pressure of bankruptcy from creditors, investors, the government, and other 
related parties (Zheng 2015).  
Empirically, Donker et al. (2009) find that large outside shareholders reduce the 
probability of financial distress. Hu and Zheng (2015) find that ownership concentration 
is negatively related to the degree of corporate financial distress. Deng and Wang (2006) 
also find that ownership concentration has a negative correlation with default likelihood. 
However, Lajili and Zéghal (2010) establish that the cumulative block holding ownership 
structure has a positive but not statistically significant impact on bankruptcy. Given the 
arguments for the impact of concentrated ownership on financial distress likelihood, the 
following hypothesis is proposed: 
H2b: Concentrated ownership has a negative association with firms’ likelihood of 
financial distress. 
5.3.2.3 INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP 
This refers to the ownership of firms’ shares by institutions such as investment advisers, 
investment companies, bank trust departments, insurance companies, foundations, and 
pension funds. In firms where institutions own shares, the ownership structure creates an 
economic incentive for informed behaviour and presents an opportunity for active 
shareholders to inﬂuence corporate policy and performance (Bhattacharya and Graham 
2009). ‘Shareholder activism’, also known as ‘relationship investing’, has evolved to 
become an important characteristic of financial markets and the primary emphasis of 
activist shareholders have been to focus on the poorly performing firms in their portfolio 
and to pressure the management of such firms for improved performance, thereby 
enhancing shareholder value (Gillan and Starks 2000). Hence, the role of institutional 
shareholder activism is to focus on the long-term and helps management to improve its 
long-term performance. However, Romano (2001) reports that the influence of 
institutional shareholder activism on firm performance is doubtful. Agency theory 
suggests that due to their larger ownership stakes, institutional shareholders, as influential 
corporate stakeholders, have extra incentive to closely monitor management  (Fung and 
Tsai 2012). In addition, large institutional shareholders have the opportunity, resources, 
and ability to monitor, discipline and influence managers (Cornett et al. 2007a). This is 
because large institutional shareholding’s shares are less marketable and are thus kept for 
a longer period, which gives the institutional shareholders greater incentive to monitor 
firms’ management. However, according to Cornett et al. (2007), when institutional 
shareholders hold relatively small shares, they can easily liquidate their shares when the 
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firms perform poorly and henceforth gives them less incentive to monitor management. 
Gillan and Starks (2000) argue that institutional investors lack expertise in advising 
management. 
Empirically, Daily and Dalton (1994) establish that institutional shareholdings reduce the 
probability of bankruptcy. Also, Manzaneque et al. (2016) find that directors appointed 
by pressure resistant institutional shareholders, such as investment funds, pension funds, 
venture capital, and holding firms have a negative impact on the likelihood of business 
failure. However, Donker et al. (2009) find no evidence that high levels of institutional 
shareholdings are associated with a lower probability of financial distress. The following 
hypothesis is proposed: 
H3c: Institutional ownership has a negative relationship with firms’ likelihood of 
financial distress. 
5.3.3 DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY 
The corporate governance mechanisms use to formulate the hypotheses under disclosure 
and transparency are directors’ remuneration, senior independent director, the disclosure 
of an arrangement for proxy voting in the annual reports, and disclosure of notice for the 
annual general meeting in the annual reports.  
5.3.3.1 DIRECTORS REMUNERATION 
Executive remuneration is another type of internal control mechanism proposed to 
achieve an alignment of interests between firm owners and managers (Ghosh 2002). The 
Code (2014) requires that the levels of remuneration should be sufficient to attract, retain 
and motivate directors of the quality required to run the company successfully. However, 
a company should avoid paying more than is necessary for this purpose. A significant 
proportion of executive directors’ remuneration should, therefore, be structured so as to 
link rewards to corporate and individual performance (FRC 2014). To ensure this, firms 
must have a formal and transparent procedure for developing policy on executive 
remuneration and for fixing the remuneration packages of individual directors (FRC 
2014). Directors’ remuneration, especially involving executive directors’ remuneration 
packages, are rewarded based on their individual and corporate performance (Nahar 
Abdullah 2006). Therefore, linking directors’ remuneration to firm performance must be 
seen as fair to the shareholders. Afrifa and Tauringana (2015) find a significant 
association between directors’ remuneration and firm performance. Main and Johnston 
(1993) find a positive and signiﬁcant relation between the total board remuneration and 
the ﬁrm’s performance. Also, Conyon and Peck (1998) establish evidence of a positive 
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and signiﬁcant relation between performance and remuneration. However, since 
executive remuneration is a cost to a firm, any excessive payment of executive 
remuneration will plunge the firm into financial distress but a remuneration that is linked 
with financial performance may indirectly influence financial distress. Schultz et al. 
(2017) find a significant relationship between the probability of default and executive 
remuneration. All things being equal, executive remuneration is expected to improve 
performance and reduce the likelihood of firms’ financial distress. Hence, the following 
hypothesis is proposed. 
H3a: Directors remuneration has a negative relationship with firms’ likelihood of 
financial distress. 
 
5.3.3.2 DISCLOSURE OF ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING NOTICE IN THE ANNUAL 
REPORTS 
The Annual general meetings (AGMs) are an essential aspect of corporate governance in 
the UK, although there is a minimal attempt to monitor the process of accountability 
evident on the part of the directors (Apostolides 2010). Even though according to section 
366 of the UK Companies Act 1985 public limited companies are obliged to hold AGMs, 
the straightforward and indeed historic reason for this is founded in the notions of the 
agency theory which argues that AGMs represent opportunities for a shareholder to call 
their director to account. From the agency theory perspective, the AGM offers a platform 
where shareholders are informed, offered avenue to discuss and ask questions, they are 
involved in the decision-making and given the right to vote on matters including directors’ 
remuneration, the appointment of directors and other resolutions, and as such help in 
mitigating the agency problems between shareholders and managers.  
From the perspective of the stakeholder theory, firms’ governance should be effectively 
exercised not just by the majority shareholders but also by all of those with some stake in 
the company. To some stakeholder groups, the AGMs may be important sites for the 
exercise of stakeholder's voice demanding corporate social accountability, even in the 
absence of legal power to directly control decision-making (Apostolides and Boden 
2005).  
The stewardship theory argues that managers are stewards who take responsibility for the 
firm’s resources and accountable to shareholders. Based on these, the monitoring function 
of directors is irrelevant and that if there is the need to hold AGMs, they should serve as 
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important vehicles for the exercise and therefore reaffirmation of managerial power 
(Apostolides and Boden 2005).  
Since the holding of AGMs are significant legal requirements and offer the shareholders 
the opportunity to vote on the firms’ resolutions, it is relevant that firms disclose a notice 
of AGM in their annual reports. Such a disclosure enhances the transparency of the firm’s 
operation and increases the level of trust that other groups of stakeholders have for the 
firm. Firms are therefore expected to have many stakeholder groups rather than only the 
shareholders attending their AGMs if notices of such meetings are disclosed in the annual 
reports that are published online. Firms are therefore in a better position to explain to all 
the stakeholder groups, their activities, and performances and this is likely to increase 
their customer base, which subsequently increases performance and reduce the likelihood 
of financial distress.  
Empirical evidence linking the disclosure of AGM notice in the annual reports to financial 
distress is limited. However, it is expected that firms are likely to increase their 
performance if they can sell their operational activities to the wider stakeholder group 
who attend AGMs after reading the AGM notice in the annual reports. It is therefore 
expected that the disclosure of AGM notice in the annual report may reduce firms’ 
likelihood of financial distress. The following hypothesis is proposed. 
H3b: Disclosure of AGM notice in the annual reports has a negative relationship with 
firms’ likelihood of financial distress.   
5.3.3.3 DISCLOSURE OF PROXY VOTING ARRANGEMENTS IN THE ANNUAL 
REPORTS 
Proxy voting occurs when shareholders who physically cannot be present at AGMs 
delegate their voting power to other individuals and groups including asset managers to 
vote on their behalf on issues such as the election and re-election of directors, mergers 
and acquisitions and proposed changes to the company’s capital structure (Viviers and 
Smit 2015). Easterbrook and Fischel (1983) acknowledge that shareholder voting is 
potentially the most powerful control right that shareholders can use to secure their 
interests in a firm. This is because shareholders have mandatory consent rights in 
significant corporate decisions and they can publicly challenge the legitimacy of 
management and this is made possible through their rights to vote which can be exercised 
through proxy voting. The information regarding proxy voting when disclosed in the 
annual reports enhances transparency and shareholder engagement. Although 
shareholders may not be present at AGMs, information disclosed in the annual reports 
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enable them to allow proxies to take decisions on their behalf which may improve firms’ 
performance thereby reducing the likelihood of financial distress. Also, shareholders may 
wish to become informed about the proposals put to the vote at the shareholder meeting 
(Yermack 2010) since lack of transparency does not allow participants to have the 
information needed to raise questions regarding whether proxy votes were cast solely in 
their interest. 
Empirically, there is no literature that links the disclosure of proxy voting arrangements 
in the annual reports to firms’ financial distress. However, it is expected that the 
disclosure of proxy voting arrangements in the annual reports enables the shareholders to 
be aware of and elect proxies who can take performance-enhancing decisions that are 
likely to reduce the occurrence of financial distress on their behalf. It is therefore proposed 
that: 
H3c: The disclosure of proxy voting arrangements in the annual report is likely to have 
a negative relationship with firms’ financial distress.   
5.3.3.4 PRESENCE OF SENIOR INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR 
The senior independent director is appointed to a firm’s board to ensure a healthy 
relationship among the board members, between the board members and the chairperson 
and provide support for the shareholders. The UK corporate governance code (2014) 
requires a firm’s board to appoint one of the independent non- executive directors to be 
the senior independent director to provide a sounding board for the chairperson and to 
serve as an intermediary for the other directors when necessary. The senior independent 
director should be available to shareholders if they have concerns which contact through 
the normal channels of the chairperson, chief executive, or other executive directors has 
failed to resolve or for which such contact is inappropriate. The primary duties and 
responsibilities of the senior independent director are to ensure that the chairperson, the 
other non-executive directors, and the board, as well as the shareholders, have cordial 
environments to operate. The senior independent director to the best of his/her ability is 
to ensure that any issue that may occur during periods of stress in the company are 
resolved. One cannot, therefore, underestimate the significance of the senior independent 
director in improving the performance and survival of firms. Thus, directors both the 
executive and the non-executives would be in the position to monitor management and 
develop strategies that would increase both financial performance and survival. Likewise, 
as the result of the senior independent director, shareholders could iron out any difference 
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with the directors and may encourage more investments that could enhance performance 
and reduce the likelihood of financial distress.  
As indicated in the literature review section of the study, although the requirement to 
appoint a senior independent director has existed since 2003 and many firms have senior 
independent directors on their board, the academic literature has not paid attention to the 
senior independent director as a corporate governance mechanism and examined its 
influence on firms’ performance and overall survival. Although there is a limited 
literature, considering the role of the senior independent director and the emphasis placed 
on it by the corporate governance code, the study considered it as significant corporate 
governance element that needed to be looked at. Even though there is no empirical 
evidence linking senior independent director to firms’ financial distress and even firms’ 
performance, it is expected that a firm with a senior independent director on its board is 
expected to increase performance and avoid the likelihood of financial distress due to 
improvements in relations among directors and enhanced shareholders’ communication. 
The study, therefore, proposes the following hypothesis: 
H3d: The presence of senior independent director is likely to have a negative relationship 
with firms’ financial distress.     
5.3.4 CONTROL VARIABLES 
Control variables are those variables that may influence the relationship between 
corporate governance and financial distress if they are not controlled. Empirical studies 
(Elloumi and Gueyié 2001; Laitinen 2005; Donker et al. 2009) examining corporate 
governance and financial distress have controlled certain firm characteristics that are 
supposed to impact on the corporate governance and financial distress relationship. Based 
on prior research, the control variables discussed below are identified. 
5.3.4.1 FIRM SIZE 
Firm size plays a significant role in determining the kind of relationship a ﬁrm enjoys 
within and outside its operating environment and that the larger a ﬁrm is, the greater the 
inﬂuence it has on its stakeholders (Ezeoha 2008). The size of a firm can influence its 
financial distress process. This is because, first, large firms may have better management 
and corporate governance to generate more reliable information, to be followed by a large 
number of analysts, and to have greater liquidity on the trading floor (Molina and Preve 
2012). Second, the resource base view of the firm argues that large firms can draw more 
resources (both tangible and intangible) than the small firms can. Third, because large 
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firms are well-established with a large asset base that can be used as collateral, they 
usually have better access to external sources of funds and are also able to avoid financial 
distress by using public equity markets (Polsiri and Sookhanaphibarn 2009). Banks are 
more willing to lend their funds to large firms partly because they are more diversified 
and partly because large firms usually request large amounts of debt capital than smaller 
firms (Eriotis et al. 2007). Thus, large companies have an advantage over small 
companies because they may have a longer history, more entrenched competitive 
positions, better access to credit, a more extensive bundle of assets that can be sold in the 
event of financial difficulty, and better diversification strategy (Kane et al. 2005). Hence, 
the effect of financial distress on trade payables should be less important for large firms 
that have better sources of financing. Due to these benefits enjoy by large firms, they are 
likely to fall into financial distress at a lower rate than small firms are. Thus, all things 
being equal, large firms, due to more resources and experience, tend to handle financial 
distress better than small companies (Pindado and Rodrigues 2005) and that the likelihood 
of financial distress is expected to reduce with increases in firm size. However, according 
to Parker et al. (2002), large firms seem to have greater difficulty in maintaining their 
ongoing operations during periods of financial distress. Laitinen and Suvas (2016) also 
argue that very small firms are flexible and can avoid high failure risk.  
Empirically, Donker et al. (2009) find a statistically significant negative relationship 
between firm size and financial distress but Ciampi (2015) find no association between 
firm size and default. However, Parker et al. (2002) establish that firm size is significantly 
associated with the likelihood of bankruptcy but distressed firms exhibit an opposite 
association with the likelihood of bankruptcy than is expected. Hsu and Wu (2014) also 
find little evidence to show that there is a negative relationship between firm size and 
corporate failure. Given the resource accessibilities for large firms, they are less likely to 
be financially distressed when compared with small firms. The following hypothesis is 
therefore proposed for firm size. 
H4a: Firm size is expected to have a negative relationship with firms’ likelihood of 
financial distress. 
5.2.4.2 FIRM AGE 
From Gaur et al. (2015), firm age is a measure of the longevity of a firm and affects the 
types of decisions that firms make due to path dependency in strategic planning. The age 
of the firm is usually seen as an essential factor affecting the financial distress process 
(Laitinen 2005). This is because firms that are old, due to their long existence, are deemed 
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to have wider access to resources, finance, and link with well-established suppliers, as 
well as having a large customer base that may help them to perform better when compared 
with the young new firms. Also, Laitinen (1992) indicates that the financial distress 
process may be different for young businesses due to the lack of capital and cash flow 
generation. Firm age, together with experience and transparency, therefore, play a 
significant role for firms in gaining access to public equity or long-term debt financing 
(Uyar and Guzelyurt 2015). Hence, young new firms are likely to be distressed financially 
than old firms. According to Laitinen (1992), failure statistics show that over 50% of new 
ventures will fail during the first five years. Åstebro and Winter (2012) are also of the 
view that a standard result in the literature is that with increasing ﬁrm age the probability 
of failure decreases. However, Hsu and Wu (2014) find no significant association 
between firm age and the likelihood of corporate failure. Given that older businesses may 
have good links with suppliers, customers, and providers of finance and as such, are in a 
better position to handle financial difficulties than the new young ones, they are less likely 
to be financially distressed when compared with the new young businesses. The following 
hypothesis is therefore proposed. 
H4b: Firm age is expected to have a negative relationship with firms’ likelihood of 
financial distress. 
5.3.4.3 INDUSTRY EFFECTS 
Industry plays a key role in the financial distress process. Every firm deal with a similar 
set of forces in any industry including the supply-chain forces and the competitive forces 
but each industry is assumed to have a unique set of forces (Arend 2009). The industry in 
which a firm operates determines its success or failure especially when there is a general 
economic and financial downturn. For instance, during the 2007 financial crisis, firms in 
the manufacturing, construction, retail, and financial service industries had the greatest 
impacts. Although the firms’ access to resources and their appropriate usage plays a key 
role in generating returns, firms placed in attractive industries can make even relatively 
more returns. Thus, the industry structure in which a ﬁrm operates is the main driver of 
performance variations (Hawawini et al. 2003) and the cause of some firms financial 
distress. The financial distress process may be different across industries and that El 
Hennawy and Morris (1983) and Platt and Platt (1990) have shown an industry effect 
when predicting firm failure. McGurr and Devaney (1998) apply failure prediction 
models developed on mixed industry samples to the retailing industry and observe low 
classification accuracy due to the industry effect. Laitinen (2005) find that the financial 
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distress process is shown to be affected by firms’ industry. Given that some firms 
successes or otherwise come almost wholly from the industry in which they operate 
(Porter 1991), the following hypothesis is hereafter proposed. 
 H4c: There is a negative relationship between industry and firms’ likelihood of financial 
distress.  
5.3.5 THE MODERATING VARIABLES 
This section discusses the hypotheses proposed regarding the moderating roles of firms’ 
environment,  resource, and technological capability on the relationship between the 
components of board composition and structure, the components of ownership structure, 
and the components of disclosure and transparency, and financial distress. 
5.3.5.1 ENVIRONMENT 
In an uncertain environment, the effectiveness of monitoring by owners of the behavior 
of top managers will be extremely difﬁcult if not impossible which may impact on firms’ 
survival likelihood. The degree of environmental uncertainty could have a moderating 
influence on corporate governance mechanisms and financial distress relationship. Dess 
and Beard (1984) specify three dimensions of the environment to include dynamism, 
complexity, and munificence. The hypotheses regarding the moderating influence of the 
environmental conditions are therefore formulated around these three environmental 
dimensions. 
5.3.5.1.1 ENVIRONMENTAL DYNAMISM 
Priem et al. (1995) explain dynamism as the instability in the environment, the rate of 
change and the unpredictability of the environmental factors. Put simply, environmental 
dynamism refers to the stability of the environment the firm operates in (Atinc and Ocal 
2014). Dess and Beard (1984) note that dynamism should be limited to change that is 
difficult to predict and this increases uncertainty for key organisational members. As 
environmental dynamism is highly uncertain, ﬁrm executives are required to deal with 
constant change by implementing broader ranges of strategic options (Carpenter and 
Westphal 2001). According to Şener et al. (2011), the environment determines the 
composition of the characteristics of board members and as a consequence the firm 
performance. In a dynamic environment, firms are in need of more division of labour in 
top management teams to follow the rapidly changing segments of the environment (Dess 
and Origer 1987) and this requires the board to have the number of members who can 
effectively monitor management. During conditions of environmental uncertainty, firms 
are likely to appoint outsiders to the board, who have easy access to resources (Hillman 
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et al. 2000) and due to their independence, monitor management. Directors may be 
required to meet frequently to advise management to address business issues that may 
arise from an environment that has become dynamic. Under conditions of environmental 
dynamism, the effectiveness of monitoring by owners of the behavior of top managers 
will be extremely difﬁcult if not impossible which may impact on firms’ survival 
likelihood. In terms of firms’ ownership, the institutional and the concentrated owners 
depending on the motives of their shareholding, which can be for short-term or long-term 
benefits in an environment that is dynamic are likely to dispose of their shareholding or 
monitor management. In situations where directors’ own shares, they are motivated to 
increase monitoring in a dynamic environment that requires extraordinary commitment, 
focus, and effort. Zahra and Pearce (1989) establish that environmental uncertainty 
moderates the relationship between board composition and firm performance. 
Environmental dynamism could, therefore, have a moderating influence on corporate 
governance mechanisms and financial distress relationship. The following hypotheses are 
therefore proposed. 
 H5a: The negative relationship between board size and financial distress is moderated 
by environmental dynamism. 
H5b: The negative relationship between the proportion of independent directors and 
financial distress is moderated by environmental dynamism. 
H5c: The negative relationship between gender diversity and financial distress is 
moderated by environmental dynamism. 
H5d: The negative relationship between board activity and financial distress is 
moderated by environmental dynamism. 
H5e: The negative relationship between board member qualification and financial 
distress is moderated by environmental dynamism. 
H5f: The negative relationship between board member financial expertise and financial 
distress is moderated by environmental dynamism. 
H5g: The negative relationship between audit committee independence and financial 
distress is moderated by environmental dynamism. 
H5i: The negative relationship between audit committee size and financial distress is 
moderated by environmental dynamism. 
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H5j: The positive relationship between a firm’s chairperson on the audit committee and 
financial distress is moderated by environmental dynamism. 
H5k: The negative relationship between remuneration committee size and financial 
distress is moderated by environmental dynamism. 
H5l: The negative relationship between a firm’s chairperson on the remuneration 
committee and financial distress is moderated by environmental dynamism. 
H5m: The negative relationship between directors’ ownership and financial distress is 
moderated by environmental dynamism. 
H5n: The negative relationship between concentrated ownership and financial distress is 
moderated by environmental dynamism. 
H5o: The negative relationship between institutional ownership and financial distress is 
moderated by environmental dynamism. 
H5p: The negative relationship between directors remuneration and financial distress is 
moderated by environmental dynamism. 
H5q: The negative relationship between senior independent director and financial 
distress is moderated by environmental dynamism. 
H5r: The negative relationship between disclosure of arrangement of proxy voting in the 
annual report and financial distress is moderated by environmental dynamism. 
H5s: The negative relationship between disclosure of notice of the annual general 
meeting in the annual report and financial distress is moderated by environmental 
dynamism. 
5.3.5.1.2 ENVIRONMENTAL MUNIFICENCE 
Environmental muniﬁcence is the extent to which the environment provides sufficient 
resources to support the established, as well as the new firms and to enable them to grow 
and prosper (Randolph and Dess 1984). In simple terms, environmental munificence is 
the ability of the environment to support sustained growth (Goll and Rasheed 1997). 
Baum and Wally (2003) acknowledge that munificent environments support the growth 
of resources within firms, providing a reserve against competitive and environmental 
threats. In a low munificent environment, firms face numerous challenges and find it 
difficult to function and, in that case, management needs to take strategic decisions to 
deal with external conditions to improve performance. The monitoring responsibility of 
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the board, therefore, becomes more significant. Further, in such an environment, firms 
need outside directors who could acquire the resources that are required for growth. Firms 
operating in a less munificent environment need more inputs from their directors. 
Conversely, in a high munificent environment where there are surplus resources 
(Castrogiovanni 1991), directors might meet to decide on possible options available in 
dealing with the surplus resources. Thus, in both low and high munificent environments, 
directors could advise management on the efficient use of resources to improve 
performance to avoid financial distress. Institutional and concentrated owners in firms 
that operate in the high munificent environment must monitor management to avoid 
taking excessive risks when investing in excess resources. Directors who own shares in 
such an environment could also lose their investment when excessive risk is taken and it 
is highly significant that they advise management on investments that carry greater risks 
since, in munificent environments, executives can use more discretion (Walters et al. 
2010). Though Bantel (1998) find that munificence has a direct effect on firm 
performance, other researchers including McArthur and Nystrom (1991) and Atinc and 
Ocal (2014) have shown the moderating role of environmental munificence and hence it 
is expected that environmental munificence would moderate the corporate governance 
and financial distress relationship. The following hypotheses are therefore proposed.  
H6a: The negative relationship between board size and financial distress is moderated 
by environmental munificence. 
H6b: The negative relationship between the proportion of independent directors and 
financial distress is moderated by environmental munificence. 
H6c: The negative relationship between gender diversity and financial distress is 
moderated by environmental munificence. 
H6d: The negative relationship between board activity and financial distress is 
moderated by environmental munificence. 
H6e: The negative relationship between board member qualification and financial 
distress is moderated by environmental munificence. 
H6f: The negative relationship between board member financial expertise and financial 
distress is moderated by environmental munificence. 
H6g: The negative relationship between audit committee independence and financial 
distress is moderated by environmental munificence. 
      
114 
 
H6i: The negative relationship between audit committee size and financial distress is 
moderated by environmental munificence. 
H6j: The positive relationship between a firm’s chairperson on the audit committee and 
financial distress is moderated by environmental munificence. 
H6k: The negative relationship between remuneration committee size and financial 
distress is moderated by environmental munificence. 
H6l: The negative relationship between a firm’s chairperson on the remuneration 
committee and financial distress is moderated by environmental munificence. 
H6m: The negative relationship between directors’ ownership and financial distress is 
moderated by environmental munificence. 
H6n: The negative relationship between concentrated ownership and financial distress is 
moderated by environmental munificence. 
H6o: The negative relationship between institutional ownership and financial distress is 
moderated by environmental munificence. 
H6p: The negative relationship between directors remuneration and financial distress is 
moderated by environmental munificence. 
H6q: The negative relationship between senior independent director and financial 
distress is moderated by environmental munifence. 
H6r: The negative relationship between disclosure of arrangement of proxy voting in the 
annual report and financial distress is moderated by environmental munificence. 
H6s: The negative relationship between disclosure of notice of the annual general 
meeting in the annual report and financial distress is moderated by the environmental 
munificence 
5.3.5.1.3 ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLEXITY 
Environmental complexity describes the degree of heterogeneity or diversity and the 
dispersion of a firm’s activities (Aldrich 1979; Duncan 1972). Complexity is as a result 
of the multiplicity of inputs (suppliers and materials) and outputs (customers and 
products) (Dess and Beard 1984). Firms in a complex environment find it difficult to 
identify, diagnose and respond to problems due to the interplay of inputs and outputs 
which reduce the firm’s ability to identify, assess, and predict what factors affect its 
operations (Azadegan et al. 2013). Dess and Beard (1984) argue from the resource 
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dependence perspective that firms competing in industries that need many different inputs 
or that produce many different outputs must find resource acquisition or disposal of output 
more complex than firms competing in industries with fewer different inputs and outputs. 
One of the ways to deal with environmental complexity is to include the number of 
directors who can meet regularly to monitor management’s efforts to handle issues posed 
by the complex environment. Also, under the conditions of environmental complexity, 
firms will like to have outside directors who have links for the provision of the resources 
required for the firms’ activities (Şener et al. 2011). The long-term institutional and 
concentrated shareholders could do more in complex environments by increasing their 
advisory and monitoring responsibilities over management who would have to perform 
its environmental scanning duties and to acquire resources from beyond the boundaries 
of the firm (Dess and Beard 1984). McArthur and Nystrom (1991) indicate that 
environmental complexity has a moderating effect on the relationship between strategy 
and firm performance. Although empirical evidence of the moderating influence of 
environmental complexity on the relationship between board size, proportion of 
independent directors, board activity, institutional ownerships, and concentrated 
ownerships and the other corporate governance mechanisms and financial distress is 
limited, the degree of environmental complexity could have a moderating influence on 
the relationships between these corporate governance mechanisms and financial distress. 
The following hypotheses are proposed. 
H7a: The negative relationship between board size and financial distress is moderated 
by environmental complexity. 
H7b: The negative relationship between the proportion of independent directors and 
financial distress is moderated by environmental complexity. 
H7c: The negative relationship between gender diversity and financial distress is 
moderated by environmental complexity. 
H7d: The negative relationship between board activity and financial distress is 
moderated by environmental complexity. 
H7e: The negative relationship between board member qualification and financial 
distress is moderated by environmental complexity. 
H7f: The negative relationship between board member financial expertise and financial 
distress is moderated by environmental complexity. 
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H7g: The negative relationship between audit committee independence and financial 
distress is moderated by environmental complexity. 
H7i: The negative relationship between audit committee size and financial distress is 
moderated by environmental complexity. 
H7j: The negative relationship between a firm’s chairperson on the audit committee and 
financial distress is moderated by environmental complexity. 
H7k: The negative relationship between remuneration committee size and financial 
distress is moderated by environmental complexity. 
H7l: The negative relationship between a firm’s chairperson on the remuneration 
committee and financial distress is moderated by environmental complexity. 
H7m: The negative relationship between directors’ ownership and financial distress is 
moderated by environmental complexity. 
H7n: The negative relationship between concentrated ownership and financial distress is 
moderated by environmental complexity. 
H7o: The negative relationship between institutional ownership and financial distress is 
moderated by environmental complexity. 
H7p: The negative relationship between directors remuneration and financial distress is 
moderated by environmental complexity. 
H7q: The negative relationship between senior independent director and financial 
distress is moderated by environmental complexity. 
H7r: The negative relationship between disclosure of arrangement of proxy voting in the 
annual report and financial distress is moderated by environmental complexity. 
H7s: The negative relationship between disclosure of notice of the annual general 
meeting in the annual report and financial distress is moderated by environmental 
complexity. 
5.3.5.2 TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY 
Technological capability is regarded as one of the most important sources of sustainable 
competitive advantage (Coombs and Bierly 2006). With good corporate governance 
structures, firms are in a better position to invest in technological capability that may 
improve firm performance to reduce the firms’ likelihood of financial distress. Firm 
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managers are expected to take positive net present value decisions on firms’ technological 
investments and directors with their responsibilities are also expected to monitor and 
advise managers on those investments so as to improve performance that may improve 
firms’ financial health. Therefore, effective corporate governance structure ensures good 
scientiﬁc decisions (Sah and Stiglitz 1991) that improve ﬁrm performance to avoid the 
likelihood of financial distress. Also, when managers’ and shareholders’ interests are 
closely aligned, investment in technological innovations is expected to increase (Zahra et 
al. 2000), though, excessive investment can worsen the agency problem (Hitt et al. 1991), 
which would, in turn, affect the relationship between corporate governance and ﬁrm 
financial health. Lee and O’Neill (2003) admit that firm technological innovation is 
vulnerable to managerial opportunism. This is because: (i) technological innovation 
initiatives are highly risky and from the agency theory perspective, executives are 
considered to be risk averse and are therefore unlikely to make technological innovation 
a high priority and (ii) the benefits from technological innovation initiatives emerge only 
in the long run which the current executives may not witness. The influence of corporate 
governance mechanisms on ﬁrms’ financial distress will change as technological 
capability denoted by research and development investment becomes stronger. Zhang et 
al. (2015) examined the moderating effect of technology intensity on the relationship 
between executive compensation dispersion and firm performance and confirm that the 
relationship between the two is sensitive to technology intensity. In another study, Zhang 
et al. (2014) confirm that research and development investment does not moderate the 
relationship between corporate governance and ﬁrm performance. Large boards may find 
it difficult to reach consensus, especially when deciding on risky investments, such as 
research and development (Dalton et al. 1999). It is expected that technology capability 
would moderate the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
financial distress. The following hypotheses are therefore proposed. 
H8a: The negative relationship between board size and financial distress is moderated 
by technological capability. 
H8b: The negative relationship between the proportion of independent directors and 
financial distress is moderated by technological capability. 
H8c: The negative relationship between gender diversity and financial distress is 
moderated by technological capability. 
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H8d: The negative relationship between board activity and financial distress is 
moderated by technological capability. 
H8e: The negative relationship between board member qualification and financial 
distress is moderated by technological capability. 
H8f: The negative relationship between board member financial expertise and financial 
distress is moderated by technological capability. 
H8g: The negative relationship between audit committee independence and financial 
distress is moderated by technological capability. 
H8i: The negative relationship between audit committee size and financial distress is 
moderated by technological capability. 
H8j: The positive relationship between a firm’s chairperson on the audit committee and 
financial distress is moderated by technological capability. 
H8k: The negative relationship between remuneration committee size and financial 
distress is moderated by technological capability. 
H8l: The negative relationship between a firm’s chairperson on the remuneration 
committee and financial distress is moderated by technological capability. 
H8m: The negative relationship between directors’ ownership and financial distress is 
moderated by technological capability. 
H8n: The negative relationship between concentrated ownership and financial distress is 
moderated by technological capability. 
H8o: The negative relationship between institutional ownership and financial distress is 
moderated by technological capability. 
H8p: The negative relationship between directors remuneration and financial distress is 
moderated by technological capability.  
H8q: The negative relationship between senior independent director and financial 
distress is moderated by technological capability. 
H8r: The negative relationship between disclosure of arrangement of proxy voting in the 
annual report and financial distress is moderated by technological capability. 
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H8s: The negative relationship between disclosure of notice of the annual general 
meeting in the annual report and financial distress is moderated by technological 
capability. 
5.3.5.3 RESOURCES 
From the perspective of the resource-based view, firms’ have both tangible and intangible 
resources (Wernerfelt 1984). 
5.3.5.3.1 TANGIBLE RESOURCE 
 According to Lev (2004), tangible resources are those that are physical or financial; these 
resources usually are accounted for on a firm’s balance sheet and include assets such as 
land, buildings, machinery, motor vehicles and cash. Tangible resources can be valued 
and managed with little ambiguity (King 2007) and their ownership can easily be 
transferred which allow a firm to raise capital. Hence, a firm with greater tangible 
resources should have an increased survival likelihood since the firm can fall on the 
revenues that may be raised from the sale of tangible resources. Investment in tangible 
assets which include not only the acquisition of completely new tangible assets but also 
the upgrading of existing ones are important for a firm’s ability to create value for 
customers and also with such investments, firms have an increased likelihood of 
remaining a going concern compared to declaring bankruptcy (Norman et al. 2013). Firms 
with limited tangible resources, however, may find it difficult to invest in systems for 
product improvements and new product development to respond to the challenges created 
by competitors and to ensure continued survival to avoid the likelihood of financial 
distress. Organisational directors are to monitor management to ensure that firms invest 
in the type and quantity of tangible resources that improve firms’ performance since a 
lack of monitoring by the directors on management decision may affect firms’ financial 
health. Also, directors are expected to monitor management to ensure that firms tangible 
resources are secured and are there only to be used for the firms’ benefit. Hence, firms’ 
survival may depend on the number of tangible resources at its disposal and how the 
managers’ decisions on those tangible resources are monitored by the corporate 
governance mechanisms such as the board of directors. It, therefore, stands to reason that 
the components of board composition and structure, ownership structure and, disclosure 
and transparency; and financial distress relationships can be better understood by 
incorporating the firms’ tangible resources. The following hypotheses are proposed. 
H9a: The negative relationship between board size and financial distress is moderated 
by tangible resources. 
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H9b: The negative relationship between the proportion of independent directors and 
financial distress is moderated by tangible resources. 
H9c: The negative relationship between gender diversity and financial distress is 
moderated by tangible resources. 
H9d: The negative relationship between board activity and financial distress is 
moderated by tangible resources. 
H9e: The negative relationship between board member qualification and financial 
distress is moderated by tangible resources. 
H9f: The negative relationship between board member financial expertise and financial 
distress is moderated by tangible resources. 
H9g: The negative relationship between audit committee independence and financial 
distress is moderated by tangible resources. 
H9i: The negative relationship between audit committee size and financial distress is 
moderated by tangible resources. 
H9j: The positive relationship between a firm’s chairperson on the audit committee and 
financial distress is moderated by tangible resources. 
H9k: The negative relationship between remuneration committee size and financial 
distress is moderated by tangible resources. 
H9l: The negative relationship between a firm’s chairperson on the remuneration 
committee and financial distress is moderated by tangible resources. 
H9m: The negative relationship between directors’ ownership and financial distress is 
moderated by tangible resources. 
H9n: The negative relationship between concentrated ownership and financial distress is 
moderated by tangible resources. 
H9o: The negative relationship between institutional ownership and financial distress is 
moderated by tangible resources. 
H9p: The negative relationship between directors remuneration and financial distress is 
moderated by tangible resources.  
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H9q: The negative relationship between senior independent director and financial 
distress is moderated by tangible resources. 
H9r: The negative relationship between disclosure of arrangement of proxy voting in the 
annual report and financial distress is moderated by tangible resources. 
H9s: The negative relationship between disclosure of notice of the annual general 
meeting in the annual report and financial distress is moderated by tangible resources. 
5.3.5.3.2 INTANGIBLE RESOURCE 
Intangible resources are those resources that cannot be touched or easily quantified and 
are rarely accounted for on a firm’s balance sheet (Hall 1992). While some intangible 
resources such as designs, blueprints, brand equity, and in-house software may be 
developed internally, others such as technology licence, patents, copyrights, and 
economic competencies acquired through purchases of management and consulting 
services may be acquired externally (Arrighetti et al. 2014). Firms with intangible 
resources are better positioned to remain a going concern rather than face bankruptcy 
because they usually possess many of the characteristics required to become sources of 
competitive advantage. Intangible resources enhance firms’ ability to create value in the 
long term and this is confirmed by Sandner and Block (2011) who find that intangible 
assets significantly contribute to market value. Knowledge and skills are human resources 
which are significant for the successful running of businesses in the modern-day business 
environment. As such firms need to ensure that in recruiting members to the board 
especially, the outside directors, those who have the potential to improve as well as have 
the access to external resources are given the chance to join the board. Since firms’ 
intangible resources are unique and have the advantage of using it to improve the firms’ 
performance, directors are expected to ensure that management takes the necessary 
actions to protect the intangible resources so that their uniqueness remains with the firm. 
Thus, due to their relevance to long-term survival, all the organisational governance 
structures also need to ensure the firms’ intangible resources are safeguarded. Though 
evidence linking the moderating role of intangible resources on the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and financial distress are limited, Gau (2011) have 
indicated that ﬁrm resources moderate the relationship between some of the sub-
dimensions of market orientation and ﬁrm performance. All things being equal, it is 
expected that intangible resources could have moderating influence on the relationship 
between the components of board composition and structure, components of ownership 
      
122 
 
structure, and components of disclosure and transparency; and financial distress. The 
following hypotheses are therefore proposed. 
H10a: The negative relationship between board size and financial distress is moderated 
by intangible resources. 
H10b: The negative relationship between the proportion of independent directors and 
financial distress is moderated by intangible resources. 
H10c: The negative relationship between gender diversity and financial distress is 
moderated by intangible resources. 
H10d: The negative relationship between board activity and financial distress is 
moderated by intangible resources. 
H10e: The negative relationship between board member qualification and financial 
distress is moderated by intangible resources. 
H10f: The negative relationship between board member financial expertise and financial 
distress is moderated by intangible resources. 
H10g: The positive relationship between audit committee independence and financial 
distress is moderated by intangible resources. 
H10i: The negative relationship between audit committee size and financial distress is 
moderated by intangible resources. 
H10j: The negative relationship between a firm’s chairperson on the audit committee and 
financial distress is moderated by intangible resources. 
H10k: The negative relationship between remuneration committee size and financial 
distress is moderated by intangible resources. 
H10l: The negative relationship between a firm’s chairperson on the remuneration 
committee and financial distress is moderated by intangible resources. 
H10m: The negative relationship between directors’ ownership and financial distress is 
moderated by intangible resources. 
H10n: The negative relationship between concentrated ownership and financial distress 
is moderated by intangible resources. 
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H10o: The negative relationship between institutional ownership and financial distress 
is moderated by intangible resources. 
H10p: The negative relationship between directors remuneration and financial distress 
is moderated by intangible resources.  
H10q: The negative relationship between senior independent director and financial 
distress is moderated by intangible resources. 
H10r: The negative relationship between disclosure of arrangement of proxy voting in 
the annual report and financial distress is moderated by intangible resources. 
H10s: The negative relationship between disclosure of notice of the annual general 
meeting in the annual report and financial distress is moderated by intangible resources. 
5.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY  
The chapter sets out the research hypotheses of the study. Specifically, the chapter 
proposes the hypotheses for the corporate governance mechanisms which are to test their 
influence on financial distress. In doing so, the chapter reviewed prior studies by scholars 
often cited and regarded to have added significantly to the literature on corporate 
governance and firms' financial distress. It also proposed the hypotheses for the control 
variables which prior studies have indicated their influence on corporate governance and 
financial distress. In addition, the moderating role of firms’ environment (dynamism, 
munificence, and complexity), resource (tangible and intangible), and technology on the 
relationship between the components of board composition and structure, ownership 
structure, and disclosure and transparency; and financial distress were also hypothesised, 
though empirical evidence on some of them were limited. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explains the research method used to answer the research hypotheses 
formulated for the study. The chapter gives a detailed explanation of research 
philosophies, research paradigms, research approaches, as well as qualitative and 
quantitative research methods. It also discusses sampling procedure, types and sources of 
data used, financial distress identification, as well as explanations of the variables of the 
study including the control variables. The chapter further discusses the data analysis 
including panel logistic regression analysis.  
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 6.2 describes the research 
methodology and research philosophy. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 discuss research paradigm 
and research approaches, respectively. Selecting a research philosophy is discussed in 
section 6.5. In section 6.6, quantitative and qualitative research methods are described. 
Section 6.7 examines sample and data. Selecting financially distressed and financially 
non-distressed firms is discussed in section 6.8. Section 6.9 examines the variables in the 
study while 6.10 discusses the data analysis. Finally, section 6.11 presents the chapter 
summary. 
6.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY 
From Saunders et al. (2008), research methodology embodies the theory of how research 
should be undertaken, including the theoretical and philosophical assumptions upon 
which research is based and the implications of these for the methods adopted, while 
research philosophy is regarded as the development of knowledge and the nature of that 
knowledge in relation to research. According to Lopes (2015), scientific and academic 
research is traditionally structured around two different dimensions which are the 
ontological dimension and epistemological dimension. Ontology is a system of belief that 
reflects an interpretation of an individual about what constitutes a fact and in simple 
terms, it is associated with a key question of whether social entities need to be perceived 
as objective or subjective and hence form the two main aspects of ontology (Dudovskiy 
2016). Epistemology, on the other hand, is a philosophical approach to theory building 
that investigates the nature, grounds, limits, and validity of human knowledge. Saunders 
(2008) regards epistemology as a branch of philosophy that studies the nature of 
knowledge and what constitutes acceptable knowledge in a field of study. Thus, while the 
ontology dimension is associated with the human beliefs about the natural and social 
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world, epistemology is linked to the search for new knowledge and the way that search is 
pursued. Epistemology has at least four different sources of knowledge and these include 
intuitive, authoritarian, logical and empirical (Dudovskiy 2014). In determining whether 
corporate governance mechanisms predict corporate financial distress in the UK, this 
study applied authoritarian knowledge from books, journals, research papers, as well as 
conference papers from experts; empirical knowledge from objective facts that have been 
established and demonstrated in corporate governance and financial distress; and logical 
knowledge where logical reasoning was applied to the study’s observations to generate 
new research knowledge. However, this study did not apply intuitive knowledge that 
allows human feelings to play a significant role as compared to relying on facts.  
6.3 RESEARCH PARADIGM  
Positivism and interpretivism are the two main research paradigms. As a philosophy, 
positivism adheres to the view that only factual knowledge obtained through observation, 
including measurement, is trustworthy and its principle depends on quantifiable 
observations that lead themselves to statistical analysis (Dudovskiy 2014). Researchers 
warn that if a researcher assumes a positivist approach to a study, then it is the researcher’s 
belief that he or she is independent of his or her research. Ramanathan (2008) summarises 
positivism as having the following characteristics; the observer must be independent, 
human interest should be irrelevant, explanations must demonstrate causality; research 
should progress through hypotheses and deductions, the analysis should be reduced to 
simplest terms, generalisation through statistical probability, and sampling requires large 
numbers selected randomly. However, positivism has been criticised due to its lack of 
regard for the subjective states of individuals. 
Collis and Hussey (2014) regard interpretivism as characterised by qualitative data, uses 
small samples, generates theories, has rich and subjective data, has low reliability but has 
high validity. This current study tested hypotheses on whether corporate governance 
mechanisms predict firms’ financial distress with data from a sample of 200 firms selected 
from the London Stock Exchange from the period 2009 to 2016. Conclusions were 
obtained from logistic regression analysis without the subjective influence of the 
researcher. The study, therefore, adopted the positivism paradigm instead of the 
interpretivism paradigm. 
6.4 RESEARCH APPROACHES  
Research approaches are of two types and these are the deductive and inductive 
approaches. The deductive approach involves the testing of a theoretical proposition by 
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the employment of a research strategy specifically designed for its testing. Deductive 
approach formulates hypotheses and tests them through empirical observations 
(Lancaster 2005). Gill and Johnson (1997) suggest that the process of deductive research 
approach involves theory or hypotheses formulation, and translation of abstract concepts 
into indications or measures that enable observations to be made. When a deductive 
approach is followed in a research study, a set of hypotheses are formulated that need to 
be tested, and then through the implementation of the relevant methodology, the 
formulated hypotheses are proven right or wrong. In the inductive approach, however, 
the researcher develops theories with a view to explaining the empirical observation of 
the real world and it does not require the establishment of a priori theories or hypotheses 
(Lancaster 2005). 
6.5 SELECTING A RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY 
Slevitch (2011) regards scientific investigation as characterised by a set of philosophical 
and meta-theoretical assumptions concerning the nature of reality (ontology) and 
knowledge (epistemology), the principles regulating scientific investigation 
(methodology), as well as by techniques or tools regarding the practical implementation 
of the study (research methods). According to Guba and Lincoln (1994), what we believe 
about reality defines what we construe as legitimate knowledge and how we obtain it, 
which in turn, defines our principles of scientific investigation, which sequentially defines 
the research techniques we apply. By adopting the objectivism ontology, the researcher 
needs to select positivism epistemology, which requires a deductive methodology that 
needs quantitative methods. On the other hand, by following constructivism ontology, the 
researcher needs to select interpretivism epistemology and follow an inductive 
methodology that requires qualitative methods.  
This current study followed the ontological position of objectivism and avoided the 
influence of subjectivism by considering only data from the sampled firms. This led to 
the epistemological position of positivism that required the study to use a deductive 
approach through quantitative data from the annual reports of sampled firms and the 
quantitative techniques through panel logistic regression analysis.  
6.6 QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH METHODS  
Qualitative and quantitative methods are the two main research methods. The qualitative 
method does not pursue objectivity and generalisability because both conditions are 
regarded as unachievable from ontological and epistemological perspectives (Slevitch 
2011). Due to its interpretative nature, qualitative methodology employs such methods 
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as case studies; and techniques such as observations, in-depth and focus group 
interviews, as well as participatory activities. 
In the quantitative research method, however, positivist epistemology postulates that facts 
can be separated from values and therefore researchers can achieve truth to the extent that 
their work corresponds to facts (Slevitch 2011). The quantitative methodology can be 
described as experimental, where questions and hypotheses are proposed, tested, and 
verified while ensuring confounding conditions to prevent outcomes from being 
improperly influenced (Guba and Lincoln 1994). Quantitative methods are efficient with 
time and resources and have limited human interaction. Results from quantitative 
methods may apply to a large population and have the possibility of anonymity in data 
collection. It, however, may require thoughtful planning to be successful.  
Considering these two research methods, the study does not use qualitative research 
because qualitative research is considered as exploratory and focuses mostly on a case 
study. However, given the number of cases and years (1600 observations), as well as 
many variables in the current study, it is significant that the study develops testable 
hypotheses to establish whether there is a relationship between the dependent variable 
(financial distress) and independent variables (corporate governance mechanisms). The 
study, therefore, adopts the quantitative method of research by gathering the data on the 
corporate governance mechanisms, the control variables, and the moderating variables 
from the annual reports of the sampled firms from the London Stock Exchange, which 
would have been extremely difficult if qualitative research was to be adopted.  
6.7 SAMPLE AND DATA 
6.7.1 SAMPLING PROCEDURE 
The population for the study was all listed companies on the London Stock Exchange for 
the period 2009 to 2016. This population was selected because; first, it provided the 
sample of distressed and non-distressed companies required for the study using the 
criteria adopted (see section 6.7). Second, listed companies are required to report on how 
they have applied the principles of the corporate governance code. Third, listed 
companies are required to prepare and publish their annual reports and since this study 
uses secondary data, it makes it possible for the study to obtain the corporate governance 
data, the control variables data and the moderating variables data required for the study. 
Some empirical studies including Li et al. (2008), Donker et al. (2009), Brédart (2014), 
and Shahwan (2015) selected their samples of distressed and non-distressed companies 
from Stock Exchanges in China, Amsterdam, United States, and Egypt respectively. The 
      
128 
 
selection of the study period from 2009 to 2016 is based on two reasons. First, by selecting 
the year 2009, the study ensures that the impact of the 2007 financial crisis is minimised 
since by 2009 many of the firms that were affected during the crisis period were on the 
recovery. Second, by choosing 2016, the study ensures that the results reflect the current 
situations relating to the corporate governance environment, the business environment, 
and the industry characteristics. To arrive at the sample, the study excluded samples of 
companies that were specially regulated and these included banks and other financial 
institutions. These specially regulated companies are subject to different regulatory 
standards, compliance, and institutional requirements. Also, these companies have many 
significant differences in terms of industrial characteristics, as well as accounting 
reporting standards such as income-measuring accounting rules (Hsu and Wu 2014) and 
therefore their financial reporting, ratios, and cash flows are substantially different from 
the non-financial type of firms. This makes analysis and comparison of their data with 
other non-financial companies very difficult and impractical. As of 22nd August 2016, 
there were 1961 listed companies. After eliminating companies in the banking and other 
financial institutions, the number of companies remained was 1386.  
6.7.2 TYPES AND SOURCES OF DATA 
This research study used secondary data which according to Zikmund et al. (2013) are 
data gathered and recorded by someone else prior to the current needs of the researcher 
and that such data are usually historical, already assembled, and do not require access to 
respondents or subjects. The corporate governance data were obtained manually from the 
sampled firms’ annual reports which were obtained from the firms’ websites. The data 
for the control variables and that of the moderating variables were obtained from the 
AMADEUS database, a commercial database providing financial information on over ten 
million public and private firms. AMADEUS database is available at the University of 
Bournemouth library’s website.  
6.8 SELECTING FINANCIALLY DISTRESSED AND FINANCIALLY NON-
DISTRESSED SAMPLES 
Geng et al. (2015) are of the view that financially distressed firms are different from 
failed firms in the sense that the failure of a firm to meet its financial obligations does 
not inevitably lead to a filing for bankruptcy and that bankruptcy is the widely used 
outcome of financial distress. Unlike the bankrupt or the failed firms, the financially 
distressed firms are active and are in continuous business operations. This current study 
neither used the concept of failure nor bankruptcy to identify its sample of financially 
distressed firms. This is because obtaining data for firms that are no more active might 
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be difficult and more so, such data might be outdated and may not be of large numbers. 
This study identified financially distressed and financially non-distressed firms using 
the Altman’s (1983) Z-Score model which he revisited in 2002 in his study of 
‘revisiting credit scoring models in Basel two environments.’ Initially, Altman (1968) 
developed his original Z-Score model, which is stated as follows: 
Z” = 1.2*X1 + 1.4X2 + 3.3*X3 + 0.6*X4 + 1.0*X5 
where, 
Z” = Z-score 
X1 = Working capital/total assets 
X2 = Retained earnings/total assets 
X3 = Earnings before interest and taxes/total assets 
X4 = Market value of equity/book value of total liabilities. 
X5 = Sales/total assets. 
However, in 1983, Altman modified his original Z-score by substituting the firm’s book 
value of equity for the market value in (X4) giving the Z-sore as follows; 
Z” = 0.717*X1 + 0.847X2 + 3.107*X3 + 0.42*X4 + 0.998*X5 
According to Altman et al. (2017) because of the unavailability of private ﬁrm database, 
this Z-score model was not tested on a secondary sample. Altman (1983) again estimated 
the following four-variable Z-score model that excluded the sales/total assets ratio, (X5), 
from the revised model because of a potential industry eﬀect that is more likely to take 
place when this kind of industry-sensitive variable (asset turnover) is included in the 
model. This revised model is intended for both privately held and publicly listed ﬁrms 
and for both manufacturing and non-manufacturing ﬁrms (Altman et al. 2017). The 
Altman (1983) revised model which he also revisited in 2002 is stated as follows; 
Z” = 6.56*X1 + 3.26X2 + 6.72*X3 + 1.05*X4. 
The values for X1, X2, X3, and   X4   measure the short-term liquidity and asset base, asset 
productivity, profitability over time, and the capital structure of the firms under 
consideration. According to Altman (1983, 2002), Z-score values higher than 2.6 are 
considered the “safe zone” and means that the possibility of bankruptcy is very low. Z-
score Values between 1.1 and 2.6 are considered the “grey zone” or zone of ignorance 
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due to the susceptibility to error classification, and Z-score values below 1.10 are 
considered “distress zone”, it means that the possibility of bankruptcy is high. Using the 
Altman (1983, 2002) Z-score, this study computes the Z-Score for all the 1386 firms 
obtained after eliminating all the financial firms from a population of 1961 firms listed 
on the London Stock Exchange for the period 2009 to 2016. Companies with Z-Scores 
below 1.10 for four consecutive periods from 2009 to 2016 were selected as distressed 
companies. This is to ensure that firms have sustained period of financial distress and that 
the study’s sample included firms which for the half of the study period are regarded as 
financial distress. Previous studies (Asquith et al. 1994; Poletti-Hughes and Ozkan 2014) 
included firms whose financial distress condition remained for at least two consecutive 
years. Using the Altman’s (1983, 2002) criteria mentioned above (Z-scores of below 1.1 
for distressed firms and above 2.6 for non-distressed firms), the study identified 113 
financially distressed firms and 207 financially non-distressed firms from the final 
population of 1386 firms. From the 113 financially distressed firms, data for 13 of them 
were not available due to the unavailability of their annual reports for the study period. 
This gave a final sample of 100 financially distressed firms and these were matched with 
the 207 financially non-distressed firms using size, which was measured by total assets 
and obtained 100 financially non-distressed firms. Although Ooghe et al. (1995) argue 
that the estimation samples of distressed and non-distressed firms are not illustrative of 
the overall population of firms if the match sampling technique is used, the matched-pair 
approach, however, provides a systematic method for determining the sample of healthy 
companies and it is used in many studies in this research area (Mangena and Chamisa 
2008; Hsu and Wu 2014). The total final sample for the study, therefore, included 100 
firms in financial distress and 100 firms not in financial distress. 
However, the Altman’s Z-score model has faced criticism as having a poor record as a 
predictor and this is because according to Moyer (1977), statistical models based on 
financial data are likely to describe events but not necessarily good at predicting 
outcomes. Grice and Ingram (2001) find inconsistent outcome when testing the Altman’s 
Z-Score in a more current business climate and that their result shows that the formula 
was not found to be as useful in predicting distress in more contemporary firms as when 
first developed, nor was it as effective in predicting bankruptcy for non-manufacturing as 
for manufacturing firms. On the high level of Type I errors displayed by the bankruptcy 
prediction models derived using multiple discriminant analysis such as the Z-score, Piesse 
and Wood (1992) examining the existing multiple discriminant analysis modules 
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conclude that the matched sample found to be convenient in model estimation, is 
unacceptable in evaluation, and if used, produces an overwhelming bias in favour of 
model acceptance. The models investigated were descriptive of past events to some 
extent, but as predictors, they performed poorly. Also, Letza (1994) concludes that both 
the Altman’s and the DataStream models show that the use of MDA (Multiple 
Discriminant Analysis) models as predictors of bankruptcy can involve major 
understatements of classification errors. 
Notwithstanding the criticisms, the Altman’s Z-score has gained acceptance by auditors, 
management accountants, and database systems and it is one of the best known 
statistically derived predictive models used to forecast a firm’s impending bankruptcy 
(Moyer 2005). It has been the dominant model applied in different countries all over the 
world for different purposes such as healthcare though with some modifications (Balcaen 
and Ooghe 2006b). Carton and Hofer (2006) also admit that the Altman’s Z-score is more 
than a financial distress predictor; it is also efficacious as a performance management tool 
since it is an important multidimensional measure of strategic performance (Chakravarthy 
1986).  
As indicated, this study adopted the Altman’s (1983, 2002) Z-score model to identify its 
sample of financially distressed and financially non-distressed companies. This is because 
it gives more robust results about the identification of firms in financial distress when 
compared with other criteria including net income, interest coverage ratio, operating 
margin, and negative cumulative earnings which are individual variables. The Altman’s 
(1983, 2002) Z-score model was chosen over his original Z-score model of 1968 because 
the Altman’s (1983, 2002) Z-score model represents the private non-manufacturing firms, 
it reduces the potential industry effects by excluding the sale/total assets ratio. In addition, 
it is more modern and therefore takes away some of the criticisms of the 1968 Z-score 
module including the fact that it is outdated and therefore not applicable in modern day 
business climate. The Altman’s (2002) Z-Score has been used by researchers including 
Akhigbe et al. (2014),  and Shahwan (2015) to identify their sample of financially 
distressed and financially non-distressed firms. 
It must be noted that although this study used quantitative data to identify its sample of 
financially distressed and financially non-distressed firms, one should not underestimate 
the importance of qualitative measures in identifying distressed firms as put forward by 
Argenti (1976) who provided the symptoms of firm failure in his research on corporate 
planning and corporate collapse. Considering the 8-year study period and the number of 
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firms in the population sample as well as the duration of the study, it would have been a 
very time-consuming exercise if qualitative data was used to identify firms as distressed. 
Secondly, not all the firms in the population may report the indicators including the 
economic downturn, a sudden price reduction of products, the sudden departure of key 
board members, poor sales growth, and poor-quality products which can show the signs 
of financial distress and this can lead to sample bias. Conversely, quantitative data (which 
are the variables of the Altman’s Z-score) are provided by the firms in their annual 
reports.  
6.9 VARIABLES IN THE STUDY 
6.9.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
A dependent variable is a variable that changes in response to changes in the other 
variable. Empirical studies (Elloumi and Gueyié 2001; Lee and Yeh 2004; Mohid Rahmat 
et al. 2009; Donker et al. 2009; Brédart  2014; Manzaneque et al. 2016a) relating to 
financial distress and corporate governance, have used financial distress as the dependent 
variable. These studies have described financial distress as a dichotomous variable. That 
is a variable containing data that has only two categories. These studies, therefore, used 
dummy variables one and zero where one represented financially distressed firms and 
zero represented financially non-distressed firms, in their studies. 
This current study also used financial distress as a dependent variable with a value of one 
indicating financially distressed firms and zero representing financially non-distressed 
firms. This becomes more appropriate especially when the analytical method for the study 
is logistic regression which uses binary (0, 1) dependent variable. The implication for the 
dependent variable being dichotomous according to Lee and Yeh (2004) is that even 
companies that perform well are likely to get into financial trouble later if corporate 
governance is weakened.  
6.9.2 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
6.9.2.1 BOARD SIZE 
Board size according to Gales and Kesner (1994) is viewed as a measure of the 
organisation’s ability to form environmental linkages and presumably, the more directors 
serving on a board, the better connected the firm is to critical resources. Board size was 
measured as the number of members on the board of directors in studies of (Fich and 
Slézak 2007;  Brédart 2014; Manzaneque et al. (2016a, b). This current study measured 
board size as the number of members who form the board, which is the count of members 
on the board.  
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6.9.2.2 PROPORTION OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS 
One significant feature of the board of directors is its level of freedom from management. 
Board independence according to Gordon (2007), is assessed by the degree to which the 
board comprises people who are not otherwise affiliated with the company through 
employment or economic exchange relationships. Dowell et al. (2011) recognise that 
independent board members are generally considered advantageous because they are 
harder for top management to dominate and they may be more likely to encourage 
changes even in the face of management reluctance. Lajili and Zéghal (2010) and 
Manzaneque et al. (2016a, b) define the proportion of independent directors as the ratio 
of independent directors to the total board of directors. Christy et al. (2013) measure board 
independence as the proportion of the board that comprises independent directors. This 
study measured the proportion of independent directors as the ratio of independent 
directors to the total number of directors serving on a company’s board.  
6.9.2.3 BOARD GENDER DIVERSITY 
Gender diversity in boards has a significant impact on boards’ inputs and that there is 
direct evidence that more diverse boards are more likely to hold CEOs accountable for 
poor performance (Adams and Ferreira 2009). Saeed et al. (2016) measure board gender 
diversity as the number of female directors divided by the total number of board members 
in each year. Sila et al.  (2016) also define the proportion of women on board as the 
number of female board members divided by all board members. However, Hillman et 
al.  (2007) use a proxy for board gender diversity, a binary variable equal to ‘1’, if there 
is at least a woman on the board, otherwise ‘0’and this study measured board gender 
diversity as such. 
6.9.2.4 BOARD ACTIVITY 
Brick and Chidambaran (2010b) claim that board activity is an important dimension of 
board operation. Boards are expected to increase their activity in poorly performing firms 
(Vafaes 1999) because directors may want to protect themselves from being blamed for 
not doing enough when needed. Brédart (2014) measures board activity as the number of 
board meetings held at the latest accounting fiscal year. This study measured board 
activity as in Vafaes (1999) and Chou et al. (2013), which is the number of board meetings 
held by the board of directors for a year.  
6.9.2.5 BOARD MEMBER QUALIFICATION 
Effective board functioning needs individual members with adequate qualifications in 
business management. A board whose members have higher academic qualifications can 
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make effective decisions as well as devise strategies that will benefit divergent groups of 
stakeholders. A lack of expertise and qualification from board members results in a 
deficiency in critical thinking and innovation for firms’ overall development. Board 
members can perform their monitoring function if they have all round business and firm 
knowledge. Chairperson and other non-executives need to become sufﬁciently 
knowledgeable if they are to make a valued contribution (Roberts 2002). Gaur et al. 
(2015) define a professionally qualified director as one who has a specialised degree such 
as an MBA. Jermias and Gani (2014) use criteria such as a professor or government 
officer to proxy for high-quality board members. This study measured board qualification 
as the number of board members who have either a master’s degree, a PhD, a 
professorship or a combination of any of the three. 
6.9.2.6 BOARD MEMBER FINANCIAL EXPERTISE  
Board members with financial expertise are those members with the standards of care, 
skill, and diligence required of accounting personnel such as professional accountants and 
non-accounting personnel including company presidents and CEOs. The effectiveness of 
a board depends not only on composition and structure but also on the will and skill of 
individual members (Roberts 2002). Board member financial expertise is necessary to 
ensure that board committees, including the audit committee, fulﬁl their primary 
obligations of overseeing the ﬁnancial reporting process and ensuring high-quality 
ﬁnancial reporting. Defond et al. (2005) classify financial expert into (i) accounting 
financial expert, which include all directors with experience as a public accountant, 
auditor, principal or chief ﬁnancial ofﬁcer, controller, or principal or chief accounting 
ofﬁcer, and (ii) non-accounting financial expert comprising all directors with experience 
as the CEO or president of corporation. Adams and Jiang (2017) also identify board 
member financial expertise as the number of professionally qualified accountants, 
professionally qualified actuaries, and professionally qualified underwriters on the board 
divided by the board size. This study, however, identified its board member financial 
expertise as the number of board members who have professional qualifications in various 
disciplines such as accounting, banking, finance, insurance, etc. This measure of board 
financial expertise is used to differentiate it from board qualification, which is defined as 
board members with a master’s degree, a PhD and a professorship.  
6.9.2.7 AUDIT COMMITTEE INDEPENDENCE 
The audit committee independence is considered when the domination of non-executive 
directors is considered (Salloum et al. 2014). Although the responsibility for safeguarding 
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the financial health of the firm is borne by the board of directors, the audit committee 
plays a prominent role in ensuring the integrity of firms’ financial reports and that the 
monitoring role that the audit committee plays in firms’ financial status makes this group 
particularly well positioned to protect shareholders’ interest (Daily 1996). Poor financial 
performance may be an indication of ineffective management and therefore, a need for 
greater monitoring of management (Hermalin and Weisbach 1988). According to 
McMullen and Raghunandan (1996), the presence of non-executive directors on an audit 
committee reduces the likelihood of a financial problem. Salloum et al. (2014) measure 
audit committee independence as the ratio of non-executive directors over the entire 
number of directors on the audit committee. This study measured audit committee 
independence as the percentage of the number of independent directors over the total 
number of directors on the audit committee.  
6.9.2.8 AUDIT COMMITTEE SIZE 
The audit committee size represents the number of board members who form the 
committee. The audit committee must have enough members to perform its duties and 
that an audit committee of the right size would allow members to use their experience and 
expertise for the best interest of stakeholders (Mohid Rahmat et al. 2009). Previous 
studies on the audit committee and financial distress (Salloum et al. 2014; Mohid Rahmat 
et al. 2009;  Appiah and Amon 2015) measured the size of the audit committee as the 
number of audit committee members and this study adopted this measure for the audit 
committee size variable. 
6.9.2.9 PRESENCE OF A FIRM’S CHAIRPERSON ON AUDIT COMMITTEE 
The presence of a firm's chairperson on the audit committee represents the situation 
whereby a firm’s chairperson is a member of the audit committee. This study used a 
dummy variable coded ‘1’ when the chairperson is a member of the audit committee and 
‘0’ as otherwise to measure the presence of a firm’s chairperson on the audit committee 
variable as used in Aldamen et al. (2012).   
6.9.2.10 REMUNERATION COMMITTEE SIZE 
The remuneration committee size represents the number of board members forming the 
remuneration committee. A remuneration committee with the right number of members 
will have more resources to construct, evaluate and monitor remuneration and ensure its 
alignment with the goals of the shareholders and the performance of the firm (Nelson et 
al. 2010). Kanapathippillai et al. (2016) measure remuneration committee size using a 
dummy variable and that a value of ‘1’ is given if the number of members in the 
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committee is greater than the median value; ‘0’ otherwise. Also, Appiah and Chizema 
(2015) measure the remuneration committee size as a binary variable with ‘1’ denoting 
membership of at least three independent non-executive directors ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise. 
However, Abeysekera (2012) measures the remuneration committee size as the number 
of independent directors on the remuneration committee. This study also measured the 
remuneration committee size as the number of independent directors on the remuneration 
committee.  
6.9.2.11 PRESENCE OF A FIRM’S CHAIRPERSON ON REMUNERATION 
COMMITTEE 
The presence of a firm’s chairperson on the remuneration committee indicates a situation 
where a firm’s chair is also a member of the remuneration committee and the Combined 
Code (2006) permits this by stating that a company’s chairperson can be a member of, 
but not chair the remuneration committee if he or she was considered independent on 
appointment as chairperson. This study measured the presence of a firm’s chairperson on 
the remuneration committee as a binary variable with a value of ‘1’ when a firm’s 
chairperson is on the remuneration committee and ‘0’ otherwise.  
6.9.2.12 DIRECTORS OWNERSHIP 
Directors’ shareholding represents the proportion of shares owned by a company’s board 
of directors. The participation of the board of directors in shareholding is a powerful 
incentive to achieve the alignment of their interests with those of other shareholders 
(Shleifer and Vishny (1997), which is maximising the value of shares (Ciampi 2015). 
This is also supported by Jensen (1993), who suggests that many problems occur because 
directors do not normally own a substantial proportion of the firm’s equity. This decreases 
their incentives to pursue the shareholders’ interests (Simpson and Gleason 1999). Extant 
literature (Simpson and Gleason 1999; Donker et al. 2009; Manzaneque et al. 2016a,b) 
measure directors’ ownership as the percentage of share owned by the board of a company 
and this study adopted this criterion in measuring directors’ shareholding. 
6.9.2.13 CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP 
Concentrated ownership represents the percentage of shares owned by large shareholders. 
Large shareholders have an opportunity to improve the strategy of the firm by advising 
or pressuring incumbent managers to undertake positive net present value investments 
and discourage managers from consuming perquisites and taking value-reducing 
managerial decisions (Donker et al. 2009). Different researchers use different criteria to 
measure ownership concentration. While Manzaneque et al. (2016a) measure ownership 
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concentration as large shareholders that own three percent or more of shares, Ciampi 
(2015) measures it as the number of owners who hold at least five percent of the shares. 
Elloumi and Gueyié (2001) measured ownership concentration as the cumulative 
percentage of common shares held by shareholders with more than twenty percent of 
shares and who are not affiliated with management. Also, Gaur et al. (2015) measure 
ownership concentration as the percentage of ownership held by the top shareholder. This 
study measured ownership concentration using the Herfindahl Index as found in Li et al. 
(2008) and Schultz et al. (2017). It was measured as the sum of the square of the 
percentage of shares held by the shareholders who hold at least three percent. The three 
percent threshold was selected due to the requirement that companies are to declare 
shareholding of three percent or more in their annual reports as a significant shareholding 
in the UK. 
6.9.2.14 INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP 
Institutional ownership is the ownership of a firm’s shares by institutions such as banks, 
insurance firms, pension funds and mutual or trust funds. Large institutional shareholders 
have the opportunity, resources, and ability to monitor, discipline, and influence 
management  (Cornett et al. 2007a) and due to their shareholding, they have greater 
incentives to monitor managers than board members who may have little or no investment 
in the firm (Shleifer and Vishny 1986). Hutchinson et al. (2015) compute institutional 
investment as the proportion of institutional investors’ shares of total shares outstanding, 
while Cornett et al. (2007a) calculate institutional shareholdings as the proportion of total 
institutional investor ownership in each firm. Mathew et al. (2016) compute institutional 
ownership as the percentage of the total of substantial institutional investors holding of 
more than three percent of shares in the ﬁrm. This study computed its institutional 
ownership variable as a percentage of shares owned by institutions.  
6.9.2.15 DIRECTORS REMUNERATION 
Directors remuneration represents the entire remuneration package that is paid to a firm’s 
board of directors in the firm’s financial year. Jensen and Murphy (1990) propose that 
ensuring executive pay is sensitive to firm performance reduces at least in part, the agency 
conflict within the firm. Greenbury (1995) requires that the disclosure by companies of 
each individual director should cover basic salary, the nature and value of benefits in kind, 
annual bonuses, and long-term incentive schemes including share options. Also included 
as soon as practicable, should be the value of pension and other benefit entitlements 
earned by individual directors during the year less any contributions they have made. 
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Recently, Schultz et al. (2017) consider directors’ remuneration to include the fixed 
component of remuneration which are; salary, superannuation, allowances, fees, non-
monetary benefits and accrued entitlements, and the variable component which includes 
cash bonuses, shares, rights, options and long-term incentive plans. Following Afrifa and 
Tauringana (2015), this study measured directors’ remuneration as the natural logarithm 
of the total remuneration paid to a firm’s directors for each ﬁnancial year.   
6.9.2.16 DISCLOSURE OF NOTICE OF ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING IN THE 
ANNUAL REPORTS 
This is where a firm’s notice of an annual general meeting is published in its annual 
reports. Companies are required to hold an annual general meeting to allow shareholders 
to express their rights on issues concerning the governing and operation of the company. 
Shareholders and other stakeholders need to have information on when and where the 
annual general meeting is held and one way of receiving such information is through the 
publication of notice in the annual reports. This study measured the disclosure of notice 
in the annual reports with a dummy variable with ‘1’ representing the disclosure of notice 
of the annual general meeting in the annual reports and ‘0’ for otherwise.  
6.9.2.17 PRESENCE OF SENIOR INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR 
The review by  Higgs (2003) recommends that a firm appoints a non-executive director 
as a senior independent director who has the resposibility of improving the relaionship 
between a firm’s major shareholders and the board of directors. The senior independent 
director has a dual role which is made clear by the distinction between the role at normal 
times and that of crisis time. For instance, at normal times, the senior independent director 
is expected to meet with the non-executive directors to appraise the chairperson’s 
performance while at crisis times like the absence of a chairperson due to any unexpected 
reason, the senior independent director steps in as a chairperson until there is an 
appointment of another one. This current study used dummy variables to measure the 
presence of the senior independent director. With this, a firm with a senior independent 
director is given the value of ‘1’ and a firm wthout a senior independent director is given 
a value of ‘0’.  
6.9.2.18 DISCLOSURE OF PROXY VOTING ARRANGEMENTS IN THE ANNUAL 
REPORTS 
A proxy voting gives a firm’s shareholders the opportunity to vote at the firm’s annual 
general meeting even though those shareholders cannot be physically present. One way 
of disclosing information on proxy voting arrangements to shareholders is through the 
annual reports. Disclosing such information in the annual reports gives assurances to the 
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shareholders that their proxy votes are as useful as those who physically attend and vote 
at the annual general meeting. The disclosure of proxy voting arrangement in the annual 
report variable is measured with a dummy variable with ‘1’ representing the disclosure 
of proxy voting arrangement in the annual reports and ‘0’ for otherwise.  
6.9.3 CONTROL VARIABLES 
6.9.3.1 FIRM SIZE 
Firm size was used as a control variable in the study because the literature on financial 
distress suggests that firm size is a key factor that affects financial distress prediction. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) show that size is an indicator of complexity and could make 
more monitoring necessary. All things being equal large firms, due to their access to more 
resources, tend to handle financial distress better than small firms (Pindado and Rodrigues 
2005). The most widely used proxies for firm size are the book value of sales, the number 
of employees and book value of total assets. Studies by Parker et al. (2002), Anderson 
and Bizjak (2003), Al-Bassam et al. (2015) and  Bhatt and Bhattacharya (2015) measure 
firm size as the natural logarithm of the book value of a firm’s total assets value. This 
study measured firm size as the natural logarithm of a firm’s total asset value. 
 6.9.3.2 FIRM AGE 
The age of the firm is often regarded as an important variable affecting the financial 
distress process because the financial distress process may be different for young firms 
due to the lack of capital and cash flow generation (Laitinen 2005). In comparison with 
the young firms, old firms due to their long existence, are deemed to have wider access 
to resources which can help them to have good corporate governance structures and this 
may help them perform better to avoid the likelihood of financial distress. Hsu and Wu 
(2014) measure firm age as the period between the incorporation date and failure date.  
Bhatt and Bhattacharya (2015) measure firm age as a firm’s existence since the date of 
incorporation. This study also measured firm age as the period between the date of 
incorporation and the year of analysis in question. 
6.9.3.3 INDUSTRY 
Different industries represent different strategies and approaches to product development  
(Wang and Fang 2012). A firm’s industry may affect its financial vulnerability especially 
when there is an economic or a financial crisis like the one that started in 2007. El 
Hennawy and Morris (1983) and Platt and Plat (1990) have shown an industry effect when 
predicting firm failure. Nguyen et al. (2015) used a dummy variable for each of the eight 
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industries in their study including Basic Materials; Consumer Goods; Consumer Services; 
Health Care; Industrials; Oil & Gas; Technology; and Utilities. This study used dummy 
variables for industry classification. These classifications include primary sector (1), 
other services (2), post and telecommunication (3), education and health (4), metals and 
metal products (5), wholesale and retail (6), printing and publishing (7), construction (8), 
chemical and rubber (9), hotels and restaurants(10), food and tobacco (11), transport (12), 
and machinery and furniture (13). 
6.9.4 MODERATING VARIABLES 
6.9.4.1 ENVIRONMENT 
This study measured the firms’ environment using the three broad dimensions of 
organisational environments specified by Dess and Beard (1984) which are munificence, 
dynamism, and complexity. Environmental muniﬁcence is the extent to which the 
environment provides sufficient resources to support the established as well the new firms 
and to enable them to grow and prosper (Randolph and Dess 1984). Environmental 
dynamism is the instability in the environment, the rate of change and the unpredictability 
of the environmental factors (Priem et al. 1995), while environmental complexity 
according to Dess and Beard (1984) is the diversity in the environment and the intensity 
of the resources. According to Atinc and Ocal (2014), studies including Carpenter and 
Westphal (2001) and Walters et al. (2010) have used many methods to calculate these 
three variables. This study, however, adopted the methods used by Palmer and Wiseman 
(1999), and Atinc and Ocal (2014) to compute environmental munificence, dynamism, 
and complexity. Environmental complexity was calculated by dividing the aggregate 
sales of the four largest firms in each industry by the total sales of that industry where the 
industry was identified by the major sectors. Environmental dynamism was calculated by 
dividing the aggregate of the sales figures reported for the four largest companies in an 
industry divided by the aggregate sales of the industry from the prior 2-year period where 
the industry was determined by the major sectors. Finally, environmental munificence 
was calculated as the average industry sales growth rate during the 8-year period where 
the industry was once again determined by the major sectors.  
6.9.4.2 RESOURCES 
Firms resources include all assets, capabilities, organisational processes, firm attributes, 
information, knowledge, etc. controlled by a firm that enables the firm to conceive of and 
implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness (Barney 1991). Firms 
with enough resources can implement growth strategies, have good corporate governance 
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structures, and operate efficiently to avoid financial distress. Firms have both tangible 
and intangible resources (Wernerfelt 1984). While tangible resources include buildings, 
cash, real estate, stock, plant, and machinery, intangible resources include reputation, 
brands, and knowledge. This study follows Norman et al. (2013) to measure tangible and 
intangible resources. The study used capital asset intensity as a proxy for a firm’s tangible 
resources and this was calculated as a firm’s total assets divided by its sales. For 
intangible resources, the study used market-to-book value as a proxy for a firm’s 
intangible resources. The market-to-book ratio includes the extent to which the firm’s 
value is attributable to intangible assets (Roberts and Dowling 2002), and hence, the 
excess of the market value of a firm’s equity compared to its book value is considered to 
be the value of a firm’s intangibles (Maritan and Schnatterly 2002). 
 6.9.4.3 TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY 
Technological innovation can help a ﬁrm to provide more valuable and differentiable 
products, which creates higher ﬁnancial performance thereby reducing the likelihood of 
financial distress for the ﬁrm (Zahra et al. 2000). Zona et al. (2013) identify technological 
innovation using research and development cost. This current study also determined 
firms’ technology using research and development cost since firms’ expenditures on 
research and development cover their technological developments. 
6.10 DATA ANALYSIS       
Data analysis involves the identification and measurement of variation in a set of 
variables, either among themselves or between a dependent variable and one or more 
independent variables (Hair Jr et al. 2014). It is important that a researcher considers the 
number of variables and the scale of measurement when selecting the data analysis 
method. A researcher must determine the research objectives, the type of data needed, the 
data collection method and the method of analysing the data, and that the type of data 
collected determines not only whether quantitative techniques can be used but often 
determines the specific quantitative techniques to be used (Lancaster 2005). The levels of 
quantitative analysis include descriptive statistics, univariate, bivariate and multivariate 
analyses.  
6.10.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Descriptive statistics describe the basic characteristics of data and summarise the data in 
a straightforward and understandable manner (Zikmund et al. 2013). In situations where 
the data is nominal or ordinal, descriptive statistics will relate to proportions, percentages, 
and ratios, whereas for the interval or ratio data, mean, median and mode can be analysed 
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(Lancaster 2005). This current study presented calculations of the mean, standard 
deviation, minimum, and maximum values of each independent variable and control 
variable as part of its descriptive statistics. 
6.10.2 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
Multivariate analysis refers to all statistical techniques that simultaneously analyse 
multiple measurements on individuals or objects under investigation (Hair Jr et al. 2014). 
Thus, in a research study where three or more variables are involved, multivariate analysis 
becomes the most appropriate statistical technique (Bryman and Bell 2007). The 
corporate governance mechanisms including ownership concentration, proportion of 
independent directors, board activity, board gender diversity, directors’ ownership, board 
size, board member qualification, and audit committee independence, etc., and control 
variables could influence financial distress and to make sure the right results are obtained, 
it is important that these variables were analysed simultaneously through multivariate 
analysis.  
6.10.2.1 PANEL DATA ANALYSIS 
Panel data analysis, which represents a marriage of regression, and time-series analysis 
is an analysis of data sets composed of a cross section of many subjects observes over 
time. Observing a broad cross section of subjects over time allows the researcher to study 
dynamic, as well as cross-sectional aspects of a problem (Frees 2004). The cross-sectional 
dimension and time-series dimension, which form the two dimensions of panel data, 
enabled the researcher to construct complex models and conduct efficient statistical 
inferences, which may not be possible using pure cross-section data or time-series data 
(Hu et al. 2014).  
In this study, the descriptor panel data came from a sample of firms and in this context, a 
“panel” represented 200 firms observed repeatedly over 8 years and this gave a total 
observation of 1600. Panel data set can also be balanced and unbalanced. In a balanced 
data set, all elements are observed in all time frames whereas in an unbalanced data set 
certain data category is not observed. The data for this current study was however 
unbalanced but the Stata statistical software could handle the unbalanced data. Panel data 
offers some benefits, and this includes the fact that it has many large data set with 
increased variability and less collinearity among the variables that leads to many reliable 
estimates (Baltagi 1995). Panel data sets are also able to control for observable and 
unobservable individual heterogeneity by tracking subjects over time to model subjects’ 
behaviour. Moreover, panel data analysis accounts for relationships among a limited 
      
143 
 
number of different subjects (Frees 2004). Therefore, it offers the advantage of studying 
complex issues of dynamic behaviour. Despite these benefits, because the sampling 
structure is more complex, it can also fail in subtle ways. Measurement errors may arise 
due to faulty response, inappropriate informants, misreporting of responses and 
interviewer effects. However, these problems of panel data typical of primary data were 
avoided in the study because the study used secondary data.  
6.10.2.2 LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
Logistic regression is a specialised form of regression that is formulated to predict and 
explain a binary categorical variable rather than a metric dependent measure. It has a 
unique relationship between dependent and independent variables, however, it requires a 
different approach in estimating the variate, assessing goodness-of-fit, and interpreting 
the coefficients when compared to multiple regression (Hair Jr et al. 2014). According to 
Ciampi (2015), over the last 30 years, most academic literature (Platt and Platt 1990; Lee 
and Yeh 2004; Deng and Wang 2006; Altman and Sabato 2007) use the logit analysis in 
predicting default even though multiple discriminant analysis has for many years been 
the prevalent statistical technique applied to company default prediction models. Logistic 
regression was used in this current study based on the following reasons. First, logistic 
regression has the advantage of being less affected than discriminant analysis when the 
basic assumptions particularly normality of the variables, are not met (Hair Jr et al. 2014). 
Second, in logistic regression, the estimated coefficients can be interpreted separately as 
the significance of each of the predictive variables. Third, statistically, logistic regression 
seems to fit well with the features of the distress prediction problem, where the dependent 
variable is binary and with the groups being discrete, non-overlapping and identifiable 
(Ciampi 2015). Fourth, it has straightforward statistical tests, similar approaches to 
incorporating metric and non-metric variables and non-linear effects, and a wide range of 
diagnostics (Hair Jr et al. 2014). Fifth, logistic regression produces reliable results 
because of its ability to produce a nonlinear transformation of the input data that reduces 
the effects of outliers. Therefore, in line with existing literature on firms’ financial distress 
prediction, logistic regression was used in this study.  
Generally, logistic regression may be stated as follows: 
Yit = αi + Xitβ +Uit,   
i = 1……. N and  t = 1……, T                   
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Where Yit is a response variable for the ith individual at the tth time period, αit is a fixed 
constant varying across individuals, Xit is a K-vector of covariates and Uit is an error term 
with zero mean and known variance, β represents the regression coefficient (Rendon 
2013). This general regression model was modified by including the corporate 
governance mechanisms, the control variables, as well as the moderating variables to find 
out the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on financial distress likelihood. 
Hence, the regression models for this current study are specified as follows: (see Table II 
for variables explanation)  
The regression models are;                                                                                                                                                            
FDit= β0 + β1Ait + β2Xit + dt + ηit + μit                                                                                                                                (1)                 
FDit= β0 + β1Bit + β2Xit + dt + ηit + μit                                                                                                                                (2) 
FDit= β0 + β1Cit + β2Xit + dt + ηit + μit                                                                                                                                (3) 
FDit= β0 + β1ABCit + β2Xit +dt + ηit + μit                                                                                                                       (4)                
FDit= β0 + β1Ait + β2Xit +β3YAit dt + ηit + μit                                                                                                                (5)        
FDit= β0 + β1Bit + β2Xit +β3YBit dt + ηit + μit                                                                            (6) 
FDit= β0 + β1Cit + β2Xit +β3YCit dt + ηit + μit                                                                                                                (7) 
FDit= β0 + β1ABCit + β2Xit +β3YABCit dt + ηit + μit                                                                                                (8)   
Where FD represents financial distress which is the dependent variable; “A” represents 
the components of board composition and structure, which are board size (BSZ), 
proportion of independent directors (PID), board gender diversity (BGD), board activity 
(BAC), board member qualification (BMQ), board member financial expertise (BME), 
audit committee independence (ACIND), audit committee size (ACSZ), presence of a 
firm’s chairperson on the audit committee (CACM), remuneration committee size 
(RECSZ), and presence of a firm’s chairperson on the remuneration committee (CREC); 
“B” represents the components of ownership structure, which are directors’ ownership 
(DOWN), institutional ownership (INOWN) and concentrated ownership (CONOWN); 
“C” represents the components of disclosure and transparency, which are directors’ 
remuneration (DREM), presence of senior independent director (SIND), disclosure of  
proxy voting arrangements in the annual reports (PAR), and disclosure of   notice of 
annual general meeting in the annual reports (MN); “ABC” represents all the components 
of board composition and structure, ownership structure, and disclosure and transparency, 
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“X” represents the control variables which are firm age (FAG), firm size (FSZ) and 
industry effects (IND); “Y” represents the moderating factors which are technology 
(TEC), tangible resource (TR), intangible resource(ITR), environmental munificence 
(EM), environmental dynamism(ED), and environmental complexity (EC). “YA” 
represents the interactive term with board composition and structure components (YBSZ; 
YPID; YBGD; YBAC; YBMQ; YBME; YACIND; YCSZ; CACM; YRESZ; YCREC). 
“YB” represents the interactive term with ownership structure components (YDOWN; 
YINOWN; YHEF; YCONOWN); “YC” denotes the interactive term with disclosure and 
transparency components (YDREM; YSIND; YPAR; YMN); “YABC” denotes the 
interactive term with all the components of board composition and structure (A), 
ownership structure components (B) and disclosure and transparency components(C).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
i is the cross-sectional unit (firm, i = 1-200); t is the time period (year, t = 1-8); dt is the 
time effect; ηi represents the individual effect and μit is the random disturbance. 
The first equation (1) above, reports the relationship between the components of board 
composition and structure, and financial distress without any interactive effect, but the 
fifth equation (5) reports the interactive effect on that relationship. The second equation 
(2) reports the relationship between the components of ownership structure and financial 
distress without any interactive effect, while the seventh equation (6) describes the 
interactive effect. Moreover, third equation (3) describes the relationship between the 
components of disclosure and transparency and financial distress without any interactive 
effect, but the seventh equation (7) reports on the interactive effect on that relationship. 
Finally, the fourth equation (4) reports the relationship between all the corporate 
governance variables which include all the components of board composition and 
structure; ownership structure; and disclosure and transparency; and financial distress 
without any interactive effect, while the eighth equation (8) describes the interactive 
effect on that relationship. 
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TABLE II: VARIABLES AND THEIR MEASUREMENTS. 
Variable Acronym Measurement 
Dependent Variable  
Financial Distress 
 
FD 
 
This is the dependent variable coded 1 if a firm is financially distressed and 0 if a firm is not 
financially distressed based on empirical studies of Donker et al. (2009), Elloumi and Gueyié (2002), 
Brédart (2014), Lee and Yeh (2004) and Manzaneque et al. (2016a, b). 
 
Independent Variables: 
Board structure and Composition (A): 
1. Board size 
 
 
 
BSZ 
 
 
This referred to the total number of directors serving on a company’s board of directors. It is the 
count of members on the board. 
 
2. The proportion of independent 
directors 
PIND This referred to the proportion of the total number of directors who are independent during a year.  
3. Board gender diversity BGD This referred to the number of female directors serving on a company’s board. A firm with a female 
board member was represented by ‘1’ and ‘0’ for otherwise. 
 
4. Board activity BAC This referred to the number of meetings held by a company’s board of directors during the year. 
5. Board member financial 
expertise 
BME This referred to the number of board members who had a professional qualification in various 
disciplines such as accounting, banking, finance, insurance, etc. 
6. Board member qualification BMQ This referred to the number of board members who had either a master’s degree, a Ph.D. or a 
professorship. 
7. Audit committee independence ACIND This represented the percentage of the number of independent directors over the total number of 
directors on the audit committee. 
 
8. Audit committee size ACSZ This referred to the number of members on the audit committee. 
 
9. A firm’s chairman on the audit 
committee 
CAC This referred to the presence of a firm’s chairperson on the audit committee. This is giving the value 
of ‘1’ when the chairperson is on the audit committee and ‘0’ when the chairperson is not on the 
audit committee.      
10. Remuneration committee size RCSZ This referred to the count of members of the remuneration committee.                                     
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11. A firm’s chairman on the 
remuneration committee 
CRC This referred to the presence of a firm’s chairperson on the remuneration committee measured with 
the value of ‘1’ when the chairperson is on the remuneration committee and ‘0’ for otherwise. 
 
Ownership Structure (B): 
1. Directors’ ownership 
 
DOWN 
 
This represented the natural logarithm of the percentage of a firm’s shares owned by its directors. 
2. Institutional ownership INOWN This represented the natural logarithm of the total percentage of a firm’s shares owned by 
institutions.   
 
3. Concentrated ownership COWN This measured the largest shareholders who owned at least 3% of a firm’s shares calculated as the 
natural logarithm of the sum of the square of shareholders who owned 3% or more of the firm’s 
shares (Herfindahl index). 
 
 
Disclosure and Transparency (C): 
1. Directors Remuneration 
 
DREM 
 
This represented the natural logarithm of the total remuneration paid to a firm’s directors. 
 
2. Presence of senior independent 
director 
SIND This was measured with a dummy variable with a value of ‘1’ when a firm had a senior independent 
director on the board and ‘0’ for otherwise. 
 
3. Disclosure of Proxy voting 
arrangements in the annual 
report 
PAR This was measured with a dummy variable with a value of ‘1’ when a firm disclosed a proxy voting 
arrangement in its annual reports and ‘0’ for otherwise 
4. Disclosure of notice of the 
annual general meeting in the 
annual reports 
MN This was measured with a dummy variable with a value of ‘1’ when a firm disclosed a notice of the 
annual general meeting in its annual reports and ‘0’ for otherwise.  
Control Variables: 
1. Firm size 
FSZ This was measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. 
2. Firm age FAG This was measured as the difference between the date of incorporation and the year of analysis 
3. Industry IND This was measured by the sectors in which the firms are in with dummy variables. 
 
Moderating Factors: 
1. Tangible resources 
 
TR 
This was represented using capital asset intensity as a proxy for a firm’s tangible resources and it 
was calculated as a firm’s total assets divided by its sales as in Norman et al. (2013). 
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2. Intangible resources ITR This was represented with market-to-book value as a proxy for a firm’s intangible resources as in 
Norman et al. (2013). 
 
3. Technology capability TEC This was measured as the natural logarithm of a firm’s research and development cost.  
 
4. Environmental complexity EC This was calculated by dividing the aggregate sales of the four largest firms in each industry by the 
total sales of that industry where the industry was identified by the major sectors (Atnic and Ocal, 
2014). 
 
5. Environmental dynamism ED This was calculated by dividing the aggregate sales figures reported for the four largest firms in an 
industry by the aggregate sales of the industry from the prior  2-year period where the industry was 
determined by the major sectors 
 (Atnic and Ocal, 2014; Carpenter and Westphal, 2001). 
 
6. Environmental munificence EM This was calculated by the average industry sales growth rate during the 8-year period where the 
industry was determined by the major sectors (Atnic and Ocal, 2014; Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; 
Wierseman & Bantel, 1993). 
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6.11 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The chapter concentrated on the research methodology adopted in the study. The 
philosophical position, the sampling procedure, the sources and the type of data, the 
criterion for selecting financially distressed and financially non-distressed firms and the 
type of statistical data analysis technique were all discussed in the relevant sections and 
the sub-sections of the chapter. The chapter discussed the fact that the study adopts 
objectivism ontology that calls for positivism epistemology that requires deductive 
methodology with the need for quantitative methods. The sources of data, the dependent, 
the independent and the control variables, as well as the moderating variables and their 
measurements,  were all discussed in the chapter. Panel logistic regression is also 
discussed in the chapter.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL DISTRESS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the empirical results on the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and financial distress as examined by most existing studies. The 
objective of the chapter is to ascertain results for the hypotheses stated in chapter five. It 
also includes the control variables found to be necessary by previous studies to influence 
the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and financial distress. 
Overall, the chapter presents the results of eighteen hypotheses relating to the independent 
variables and six hypotheses that relate to the control variables formulated in chapter five 
using the methodological framework presented in chapter six.  
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Sections 7.2 and 7.3 discuss the descriptive 
statistics and the correlation analysis, respectively. The results of multivariate logistic 
regression analyses are presented in section 7.4. In section 7.5, the discussion of key 
findings is presented, while the chapter summary is presented in section 7.6.   
7.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table III describes the summary statistics of the total sample of 200 firms listed on the 
London Stock Exchange for the period 2009-2016. Table IV also presents the summary 
descriptive statistics for both distressed and non-distressed firms respectively. The mean, 
standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values of the dependent and each 
independent variable, as well as each control variable, are provided. The discussion of the 
summary statistics falls under three sub-headings and these are; the dependent variable, 
the independent variables, and the control variables.  
7.2.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The dependent variable in the study is financial distress measured as a binary variable 
with values of ‘1’ representing distressed firms and ‘0’ for non-distressed firms. From the 
overall observation of 1600 in Table III, and due to the binary nature of the dependent 
variable, there is no descriptive statistical difference between the distressed and non-
distressed firms for the dependent variable. 
TABLE III: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR ALL CONTINUOUS VARIABLES  
This table reports the descriptive statistics for all continuous variables adopted in 
estimating the relationship between corporate governance and financial distress on a 
sample of 200 firms listed on the London Stock Exchange for the period 2009 to 2016. It 
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is presented in three sub-sections. The first sub-section presents descriptive statistics of 
the dependent variable of the study which is measured using financial distress. The second 
sub-section presents an analysis of the main explanatory variables. Finally, the last 
subsection reports the control variables which are firm age, and firm size. 
      
Variables N Mean Sd Min Max 
      
FD 1,600 0.500 0.500 0 1 
DREM 1,600 13.55 1.186 8.112 16.73 
SIND 1,600 0.444 0.497 0 1 
PAR 1,600 0.491 0.500 0 1 
MN 1,600 0.707 0.455 0 1 
DOWN 1,600 12.72 14.98 0.00500 84.37 
INOWN 1,600 35.25 15.63 3.520 78.01 
COWN 1,600 48.50 19.30 3 90.35 
BSZ 1,600 6.227 2.571 2 17 
PIND 1,600 0.538 0.160 0.167 1 
BGD 1,600 0.347 0.476 0 1 
BAC 1,600 7.179 2.433 2 16 
BMQ 1,597 2.924 1.701 1 12 
BME 1,578 1.869 1.100 1 7 
ACIND 1,600 92.49 17.94 33.33 100 
ACSZ 1,600 2.823 0.981 1 9 
CAC 1,600 0.347 0.476 0 1 
RCSZ 1,600 2.946 1.075 1 9 
CRC 1,600 0.462 0.499 0 1 
FAG 1,600 26.61 27.55 3 136 
FSZ 1,600 10.88 2.664 2.746 19.97 
      
The acronyms in the table above are explained as follows: Observation (N), standard deviation (sd), 
financial distress (FD), directors remuneration (DREM), presence of senior independent director (SIND) , 
proxy arrangements (PAR), meeting notices (MN), directors’ ownership, (DOWN), institutional ownership 
(INOWN), concentrated ownership (COWN), board size (BSZ), proportion of independent directors 
(PIND), board gender diversity (BGD), board activity (BAC), board member qualification (BMQ), board 
member financial expertise (BME), audit committee independence (ACIND), audit committee size 
(ACSZ), chairman on audit committee (CAC), remuneration committee size (RCSZ), chairman on 
remuneration committee (CRC), firm age (FAG), and firm size (FSZ). 
7.2.2 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The independent variables in the summary statistics are the corporate governance 
variables which are grouped under disclosure and transparency, ownership structure, and 
board composition and structure. For disclosure and transparency variables, the results in 
Table III indicate that 44.4% of firms have senior independent directors on their boards. 
In terms of disclosing information regarding arrangements for proxy voting and notice of 
the annual general meeting, 49.2% of the firms disclose information for an arrangement 
for proxy voting while 70.7% of the firms disclose information on notice of the annual 
general meeting in their annual reports. Regarding the ownership variables, the results in 
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Table III indicate that the concentrated shareholders control 48.5% which is larger than 
the 35.25% and 12.72% of ownerships by institutions and directors respectively. This 
gives a concentrated ownership environment. Though the directors’ ownership is 
comparatively small, it shows the alignment of directors’ interests with that of the 
shareholders. These results are in line with the findings of Manzaneque et al. (2016) who 
recorded a higher mean for concentrated ownership of 46% and a lower mean of 23% for 
directors’ ownership.  
In terms of board composition and structure variables, the results in Table III show that 
the mean proportion of independent directors is 53.8% of total board members, meaning 
more than half of the board members are independent directors. For board size, on the 
average, the firms have 6 members on their boards. The firms also have a minimum of 2 
and a maximum of 17 members on their boards. Considering board gender diversity, the 
firms have an average of 34.8%, giving a higher number of female directors on the firms’ 
boards though this finding is comparatively lower than that of Adams and Ferreira (2009) 
who establish that female directors have a mean of 0.66. In addition, directors on average 
attend board meetings at least 7 times in a year. In terms of board qualification and board 
financial expertise, the results indicate that 29.24% of board members have the relevant 
qualification while 18.69% of the board members have expertise in finance. The results 
further show that the audit committee has an average of 3 members with the level of 
independence being 92.49%. There are also 3 members on the remuneration committee. 
These figures for the size and independence of the audit and remuneration committees 
are close to satisfying the requirements in the codes that at least both the audit and the 
remuneration committees should have at least 3 members who are independent.  
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TABLE IV: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR ALL CONTINUOUS VARIABLES FOR NON-DISTRESSED AND DISTRESSED FIRMS  
This table reports the descriptive statistics for all continuous variables adopted in estimating the relationship between corporate governance 
and financial distress on a sample of 200 firms listed on the London Stock Exchange for the period 2009 to 2016. The variables column 
which shows the dependent variable, independent variables, and the control variables are the same as that of Table III. The number of 
observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values are represented in column A for non-distressed firms and the same 
for column B for distressed firms as well as the mean difference for distress and non-distressed firms. The variables are as explained in Table 
III.   
  A 
Non-
distressed 
firms 
    B 
Distressed 
firms 
    
           Mean diff. 
Variables N mean Sd Min Max N Mean Sd Min Max  
            
FD 800 0 0 0 0 800 1 0 1 1  
DREM 800 13.85 0.993 10.28 15.99 800 13.25 1.285 8.112 16.73 0.597*** 
SIND 800 0.614 0.487 0 1 800 0.275 0.447 0 1 0.340*** 
PAR 800 0.571 0.495 0 1 800 0.412 0.493 0 1 0.157*** 
MN 800 0.802 0.399 0 1 800 0.611 0.488 0 1 0.191*** 
DOWN 800 15.08 17.58 0.00500 84.37 800 10.36 11.36 0.0100 68.15 4.512*** 
INOWN 800 36.30 14.96 4.970 77.08 800 34.21 16.22 3.520 78.01 0.187*** 
COWN 800 47.61 20.13 3 88.55 800 49.38 18.37 7.370 90.35 0.210*** 
BSZ 800 6.558 2.223 2 15 800 5.896 2.841 2 17 0.665*** 
PIND 800 0.528 0.157 0.167 1 800 0.549 0.162 0.200 1 -0.021*** 
BGD 800 0.404 0.491 0 1 800 0.292 0.455 0 1 0.113*** 
BAC 800 7.829 2.520 3 16 800 6.530 2.156 2 14 1.281*** 
BMQ 800 3.064 1.816 1 12 797 2.784 1.566 1 9 0.282*** 
BME 798 1.860 1.047 1 6 780 1.878 1.153 1 7 -0.019 
ACIND 800 94.14 16.03 33.33 100 800 90.84 19.54 33.33 100 3.369*** 
ACSZ 800 2.956 1.055 2 9 800 2.690 0.882 1 6 0.266*** 
CAC 800 0.360 0.480 0 1 800 0.334 0.472 0 1 0.246*** 
RCSZ 800 3.127 1.162 1 9 800 2.764 0.946 1 6 0.364*** 
CRC 800 0.511 0.500 0 1 800 0.412 0.493 0 1 0.098*** 
FAG 800 33.26 30.68 3 136 800 19.96 22.11 3 119 13.259*** 
FSZ 800 11.50 2.155 5.742 18.32 800 10.25 2.962 2.746 19.97 1.261*** 
            
                                 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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For the presence of a firm’s chairperson as a member on the audit and the remuneration 
committees, the results show that 34.7% and 46.2% of the firms’ have their chairpersons 
on the audit and the remuneration committees respectively. 
The results from Table IV show that for disclosure and transparency variables, the results 
indicate that there is not much difference between the non-distressed and distressed firms 
for directors’ remuneration since the non-distressed firms recorded a converted average 
logarithm value of 13.85 and that of the distressed firms of 13.25. There is a big difference 
regarding the mean value for the presence of the senior independent director. The non-
distressed firms had a mean value of 0.614 meaning 61.4% of the non-distressed firms 
have senior independent directors on their boards compared with that of the distressed 
firms of 27.5%. Regarding the disclosure of proxy voting arrangement in the annual 
reports, 57.1% of the non-distressed firms disclose information regarding proxy voting 
compared with that of distressed firms of 41.2%. Further, for disclosure of notice for the 
annual general meeting in the annual reports, 80.2% of the non-distressed firms disclose 
information. In contrast, 61.1% of the distressed firms disclose information on the annual 
general meeting in their annual reports.  
Regarding the ownership variables, directors and institutions own more shares in the non-
distressed firms than the distressed firms do, but for concentrated ownership, the opposite 
is the case. Directors on the average own 15.08% of shares in the non-distressed firms 
with their maximum ownership reaching as high as 84.37% compared with the average 
of 10.36% ownership in the distressed firms and recording maximum ownership of 
68.15%. In addition, institutions on the average own 36.3% shares in the non-distressed 
firms compared with that of the distressed firms of 34.21%. However, for concentrated 
ownership, there is more shareholding for the distressed firms with an average of 49.38% 
compared with that of the non-distressed firms that have a mean value of 47.61.  
In terms of the board composition and structure variables, the results show that the mean 
proportion of the independent directors for non-distressed and distressed firms are 52.8% 
and 54.9% respectively. Meaning, more than half of the board members for both 
distressed and non-distressed firms are independent directors, but the distressed firms 
have more independent directors compared to the non-distressed firms. This result is, 
however, inconsistent with Fich and Slezak (2008), Lajili and Zéghal (2010) and Platt 
and Platt (2012). Platt and Platt (2012) find that non-bankrupt firms have an average of 
66% of independent directors compared with the bankrupt firms which have a mean 
proportion of independent directors of 60%. Further, whereas on the average, there are 
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5.896 board members in distressed firms, the non-distressed firms have 6.558 members 
on their boards. This result is consistent with the findings of Brédart (2014) who 
ascertains that the board is smaller for financially distressed firms (8.07 directors) than 
for the non-distressed counterparts (8.47 directors). For board gender diversity, the non-
distressed firms recorded a mean of 40.4%. Contrarily, the distressed firms recorded a 
mean of 29.2%, meaning there are more females directors on boards of non-distressed 
firms than that of the distressed firms. Further, on the average, 3 directors on the boards 
of non-distressed firms have the relevant qualification compared with that of the 
distressed firms which are 2. However, in terms of board members with financial 
expertise, there is not much difference between the two groups of firms with each group 
recording the mean of at least 1.9. For audit committee independence, the distressed firms 
on the average have 90.84% of the board members on the audit committee being 
independent, while for non-distressed firms, the level of independence for the audit 
committee is 94.14%. On average, there are 2.69 audit committee members, a minimum 
of 1 and a maximum of 6 members on the audit committee for the distressed firms. In 
contrast, there is an average of 2.956 members on the audit committee of non-distressed 
firms with 2 as the minimum and 9 as the maximum. These results are in line with the 
evidence of Salloum et al. (2014) whose findings indicate that non-distressed firms have 
3.58 members compared with the distressed firms which have 3.3 members on their audit 
committee. On the remuneration committee, there is an average of 2.764 members with a 
minimum of 1 and a maximum of 6 members for the distressed firms. Contrarily, the non-
distressed firms have 3.127 members on their remuneration committee with minimum 
and maximum values of 1 and 9, respectively. For the presence of a firm’s chairperson 
on the audit committee, the results in Table IV indicate that 36% of the non-distressed 
firms have their chairpersons as members of the audit committee compared with that of 
the distressed firms which are 33.34%. Lastly, for the presence of a firm’s chairperson as 
a member of the remuneration committee, 51.1% of the non-distressed firms have their 
chairpersons as members of the remuneration committee in comparison to that of the 
distressed of 41.2%. 
Moreover, the column for the mean difference reveals that only board member financial 
expertise shows no significant difference between the means of financially distressed and 
financially non-distressed firms. In addition, the results from the mean difference column 
show that the proportion of independent directors and gearing are significant but are 
negative meaning that the financially distressed firms have higher mean especially, that 
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of gearing, than the financially non-distressed firms. Also, all the remaining independent 
and the control variables in the mean difference column are significant and show positive 
values indicating that the financially non-distressed firms have higher means than the 
financially distressed firms.  
Overall, the results for the independent variables which are the corporate governance 
variables from Tables III and IV describe the statistical difference between the distressed 
and the non-distressed firms, confirming prior studies of Platt and Platt (2012) that 
overall, the non-distressed firms tend to have better corporate governance characteristics 
than the distressed firms.  
7.2.3 CONTROL VARIABLES 
From Table III, the results show that the firms have an average age of 26.61 years with 
the maximum age of the firms being 136 years. On firm size, the results from Table III 
reveal that it has an average value of 10.88 and minimum and maximum values of 2.75 
and 19.97, respectively. From Table IV, the results show that for firms’ age, the non-
distressed firms are comparatively older with the average age of firms of 33.26 years and 
the minimum and maximum values of 3 and 136 years, however, the distressed firms 
recorded the average age of 19.96 with the minimum and maximum values of 3 and 119. 
Also, regarding firm size, the distressed firms are smaller with a mean of 10.25 compared 
with the non-distressed firms which have the mean value of 11.5 and confirms the results 
of Donker et al. (2009) who find that financially distressed firms are smaller.  
7.3 CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
The correlation matrix for all the continuous variables is presented in Table V to identify 
the possible presence of multicollinearity which is considered to be harmful in regression 
analysis (Hsu and Wu 2014). Table VI also presents the variance inflation factors (VIFs) 
for each independent variable to examine further, whether multicollinearity is 
problematic. To be included in the regression analysis, a variable’s coefficient must not 
exceed the threshold of 0.97 as indicated by  Field (2005) and the results from Table V 
show that none of the variable’s coefficients exceeded 0.97. Additionally, results from 
Table VI indicate that all the VIFs are lower than the critical value of 10 as suggested by 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007). Since these results allowed the study to rule out 
multicollinearity, all the variables indicated are included in the regression analyses.  
Firstly, on the relationship between financial distress and the corporate governance 
variables, the following results are obtained. The results from Table V indicate a 
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significant negative correlation between financial distress and directors’ remuneration. 
This is expected and is based on the premise that if directors are remunerated properly, 
they give their maximum efforts in monitoring management to ensure that firms perform 
better to avoid the likelihood of financial distress. However, since remuneration increases 
firms’ costs, rewarding directors with excessive remuneration may plunge firms into 
financial distress, especially where firms are struggling financially as happened in 
Carillion, a UK based construction company which went bankrupt in January 2018. On 
the relationship between financial distress and the presence of the senior independent 
director, the results show a significant negative correlation because the availability of a 
senior independent director improves communication between directors, management 
and shareholders thereby ironing out any problems a firm might face to improve 
performance, which may reduce the likelihood of financial distress. The correlation 
results also find a significant negative correlation between financial distress and 
disclosure of arrangements for proxy voting information in annual reports. Similarly, the 
results indicate a significant negative correlation between financial distress and disclosure 
of notice of annual general meeting (-0.207) in the annual reports. All the disclosure and 
transparency variables in the correlation matrix exhibit significant negative correlations 
between them and financial distress implying that when firms become open in disclosing 
essential information in their annual reports, all the stakeholders gain trust and confidence 
in dealing with them, thereby improving performance to reduce financial distress 
likelihood. The results further show a negative correlation between financial distress and 
directors’ ownership (-0.161) and this may result from the fact that when directors’ own 
shares, their decisions impact on their investment, especially when the receipt of shares 
is based on their performance as argued by Booth et al. (2002). Consequently, directors 
are willing to take decisions and monitor management for efficient performance to reduce 
financial distress if they hold a significant number of shares. Again, there is a negative 
correlation between institutional ownership and financial distress (-0.0609), meaning the 
more institutions own shares the less likelihood firms become financially distressed since 
institutional owners have the resources and the ability to monitor, discipline and influence 
management (Cornett et al. 2007a). Also, on concentrated ownership and financial 
distress, the results show a negative correlation between the two. Further, the results show 
a significant and negative correlation between board size and financial distress. There is, 
however, a significant but positive correlation between the proportion of independent 
directors and financial distress from the correlation matrix. Regarding board gender 
diversity, the results from Table V show a significant negative correlation between board 
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gender diversity and financial distress (-0.113), meaning the more female directors a firm 
has, the less likelihood that the firm is financially distressed. This is because the presence 
of female directors on boards help to improve accountability and punctuality. Similarly, 
the result shows that board activity has a significant negative (-0.272) correlation with 
financial distress. Board meetings are held to take strategic decisions and especially in a 
fast-moving business environment, the more meetings the board hold the more likely they 
identify all types of risks and manage them to improve performance to avoid the 
likelihood of financial distress. This supports Vafeas (1999) argument that the frequency 
of board meeting can have significant implications on firm value. To sum up the 
correlation analysis from the correlation table, apart from board member expertise and a 
firm’s chairperson on audit committee which have no significant correlations with 
financial distress, all the remaining corporate governance mechanisms have a significant 
and negative correlation with financial distress.  
Although the correlation analyses indicate a bivariate relationship between financial 
distress and corporate governance variables, it does not consider each variable’s 
correlation with the other independent variables, hence, it is important to do an in-depth 
multivariate analysis through panel logistic regression analysis. 
Table V on the next page reports the correlation coefficients for all continuous variables 
adopted in estimating the relationship between corporate governance and financial 
distress. Variables are defined as follows: financial distress (FD), directors remuneration 
(DREM), presence of senior independent director (SIND), proxy arrangements (PAR), 
meeting notices (MN), directors’ ownership, (DOWN), institutional ownership 
(INOWN), concentrated ownership (COWN), board size (BSZ), proportion of 
independent directors (PIND), board gender diversity (BGD), board activity (BAC), 
board member qualification (BMQ), board member financial expertise (BME), audit 
committee independence (ACIND), audit committee size (ACSZ), chairperson on audit 
committee (CAC), remuneration committee size (RCSZ), chairperson on remuneration 
committee (CRC), firm age (FAG), firm size (FSZ), and industry (IND). 
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TABLE V: CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
1.FD 1                      
2.DREM -0.242
***
 1                     
3. SIND -0.336
***
 0.521
***
 1                    
4.PAR -0.159
***
 -0.0430 -0.0721
**
 1                   
5.MN -0.207
***
 -0.0695
**
 -0.102
***
 0.628
***
 1                  
6.DOWN -0.161
***
 -0.130
***
 -0.132
***
 -0.0498
*
 0.0120 1                 
7.INOWN -0.0609
*
 0.105
***
 0.174
***
 0.0784
**
 0.0655
**
 -0.0961
***
 1                
8.COWN -0.127
***
 -0.112
***
 -0.0545
*
 0.130
***
 0.122
***
 0.154
***
 0.229
***
 1               
9.BSZ -0.118
***
 0.759
***
 0.497
***
 -0.0119 -0.0612
*
 -0.169
***
 0.0894
***
 -0.140
***
 1              
10.PIND 0.0604
*
 0.0773
**
 0.240
***
 -0.108
***
 -0.163
***
 -0.187
***
 0.00302 -0.0566
*
 0.200
***
 1             
11.BGD -0.113
***
 0.380
***
 0.332
***
 0.0140 -0.0732
**
 -0.132
***
 0.0800
**
 -0.101
***
 0.470
***
 0.186
***
 1            
12.BAC -0.272
***
 0.224
***
 0.281
***
 -0.0810
**
 -0.0343 -0.00405 0.0548
*
 -0.0761
**
 0.204
***
 0.103
***
 0.148
***
 1           
13.BMQ -0.0721
**
 0.432
***
 0.382
***
 0.0330 0.0265 -0.150
***
 0.0836
***
 -0.114
***
 0.549
***
 0.150
***
 0.228
***
 0.194
***
 1          
14.BME 0.00887 0.400
***
 0.346
***
 -0.0507
*
 -0.0481 -0.123
***
 0.0668
**
 -0.171
***
 0.477
***
 0.142
***
 0.217
***
 0.151
***
 0.737
***
 1         
15.ACSZ -0.130
***
 0.565
***
 0.510
***
 -0.162
***
 -0.203
***
 -0.182
***
 0.00836 -0.157
***
 0.629
***
 0.336
***
 0.376
***
 0.236
***
 0.403
***
 0.378
***
 1        
16.CAC -0.0295 -0.234
***
 -0.169
***
 0.0205 0.0523
*
 0.0892
***
 0.0377 -0.0557
*
 -0.294
***
 -0.260
***
 -0.137
***
 0.00266 -0.110
***
 -0.130
***
 -0.137
***
 1       
17.RCIND -0.0977
***
 0.327
***
 0.338
***
 0.00326 -0.0106 -0.197
***
 0.0501
*
 0.0225 0.405
***
 0.470
***
 0.229
***
 0.204
***
 0.271
***
 0.221
***
 0.265
***
 -0.445
***
 1      
18.RCSZ -0.162
***
 0.567
***
 0.524
***
 -0.147
***
 -0.162
***
 -0.188
***
 0.00780 -0.155
***
 0.622
***
 0.354
***
 0.361
***
 0.223
***
 0.428
***
 0.391
***
 0.878
***
 -0.179
***
 0.285
***
 1     
19.CRC -0.0990
***
 -0.0966
***
 0.00871 0.0367 0.102
***
 0.0274 0.0128 -0.137
***
 -0.145
***
 -0.188
***
 -0.0761
**
 0.0293 0.00811 -0.0358 -0.0310 0.692
***
 -0.343
***
 0.0630
*
 1    
20.FAG -0.237
***
 0.171
***
 0.120
***
 -0.0810
**
 -0.0396 0.000552 -0.0402 0.0684
**
 0.173
***
 0.0178 0.122
***
 0.00486 -0.00212 0.0547
*
 0.284
***
 -0.127
***
 0.0506
*
 0.238
***
 -0.0169 1   
21.FSZ -0.226
***
 0.799
***
 0.564
***
 -0.0950
***
 -0.154
***
 -0.165
***
 0.0712
**
 -0.133
***
 0.736
***
 0.193
***
 0.446
***
 0.255
***
 0.443
***
 0.431
***
 0.637
***
 -0.279
***
 0.327
***
 0.614
***
 -0.119
***
 0.232
***
 1  
22.IND -0.346
***
 0.139
***
 0.254
***
 0.0808
**
 -0.00239 -0.0646
*
 -0.0204 -0.0138 0.0869
***
 -0.0534
*
 0.116
***
 0.152
***
 -0.0111 0.00809 0.124
***
 -0.00106 0.166
***
 0.119
***
 0.0428 0.178
***
 0.185
***
 1 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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Table VI below reports the variance inflation factor for all continuous variables used in 
estimating the relationship between corporate governance and financial distress. 
Variables are defined as in Table V above. For a variable to be included in the regression 
analysis to avoid multicollnearity, its VIF according to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), 
must be lower than 10 and the results suggest that none of the variables has a value of 10. 
The highest value according to the results from this table is 5.77, which means that 
multicollinearity is avoided. 
TABLE VI: VARIANCE INFLATION FACTOR (VIF) 
Variable       VIF      1/VIF   
RCSZ   5.77 0.173232 
ACSZ   5.60 0.178655 
FSZ   3.70 0.270004 
DREM   3.43 0.291489 
BSZ   3.29 0.304199 
BMQ   2.68 0.373619 
CRC   2.36 0.423705 
CAC   2.32 0.430176 
BME   2.30 0.434684 
ACIND   1.81 0.552831 
MN   1.80 0.556248 
PAR   1.76 0.568599 
SIND   1.70 0.588454 
PIND   1.65 0.604231 
BGD   1.38 0.724632 
COWN   1.32 0.759802 
INOWN  1.26 0.794171 
FAG   1.20 0.833632 
DOWN   1.18 0.845643 
BAC   1.14 0.876203 
Mean VIF  2.22
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7.4 MULTIVARIATE LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS 
The study reports the results following prior studies by Donker et al. (2009), Hsu and Wu 
(2014), and Manzaneque et al. (2016). The motive is to explore the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and firms’ financial distress. In doing so, the study, 
without any moderating variables develops five models and the results are presented in 
Table VII. First, model 1a, which is the baseline model, considers only the control 
variables. Second, all the four disclosure and transparency variables, in addition to the 
control variables are considered in model 1b. Third, in model 1c, the three ownership 
variables and the control variables are included. Fourth, model 1d deals with all the eleven 
variables of board composition and structure as well as the control variables. Finally, in 
model 1e, all the components of disclosure and transparency, components of ownership 
structure, components of board composition and structure, and the control variables are 
dealt with. With STATA 13.0 and an unbalanced panel data, the results of the logistic 
regression are reported in Table VII.  
7.4.1 CONTROL VARIABLES (THE BASELINE MODEL, MODEL 1a) 
For the variable firm age, the study results from model 1a indicate a significant and a 
negative relationship between firm age and financial distress (b = -0.0135, p < 0.01), 
supporting H4b which states that firm age is expected to have a negative relationship with 
financial distress. This finding is consistent with the results of Akbar et al. (2017) but 
inconsistent with Hsu and Wu (2014) who find no significant relationship between the 
age of the firm and the likelihood of corporate failure. This result means that firms’ 
longevity may be associated with wider access to resources, finance, link with well-
established suppliers as well as having a large customer base which may help them to 
perform better thereby avoiding the likelihood of financial distress. Hence, older firms 
are less likely to be financially distressed than in newly established ones. Regarding firm 
size, H4a, which states that firm size is expected to have a negative relationship with 
firms’ financial distress, is supported. This is because, from the results in model 1a, there 
is a significant and negative relationship (b = -0.130, p < 0.01) between firm size and 
financial distress. This result is inconsistent with that of Shahwan (2015) and Ciampi 
(2015) but consistent with the result of Donker et al. (2009). The result means that large 
firms are less likely to be financially distressed and vice versa. This is because large firms, 
due to their size, are expected to have the resources to recruit better management, have 
good corporate governance structures, disclose reliable information, and in addition have 
access to reliable suppliers and large customer base.  
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The table on the next page presents the results of the following panel data logistic 
regression on the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firms’ 
financial distress: FDit= β0 + β1Ait + β2Xit + dt + ηit + μit , where: FD is financial distress 
and it is the dependent variable; “A” variables include directors remuneration (DREM), 
presence of senior independent director (SIND), disclosure of proxy arrangements in the 
annual reports (PAR), disclosure of meeting notice of annual general meeting (MN) in 
the annual reports, directors’ ownership, (DOWN), institutional ownership (INOWN), 
concentrated ownership (COWN), board size (BSZ), proportion of independent directors 
(PIND), board gender diversity (BGD), board activity (BAC), board member 
qualification (BMQ), board member financial expertise (BME), audit committee 
independence (ACIND), audit committee size (ACSZ), presence of a firm’s chairperson 
on audit committee (CAC), remuneration committee size (RCSZ), presence of a firm’s 
chairperson on remuneration committee (CRC). “X” represents the control variables that 
may influence financial distress and include firm age (FAG), firm size (FSZ), and industry 
effects (IND). β1 and β2 are coefficients to be estimated and i is the cross-sectional unit 
(company, i = 1-200); t is the time period (year, t = 1-8); dt is the time effect; ηi represents 
the individual effect and μit is the random disturbance. Model 1a is the baseline model; 
model 1b represents the disclosure and transparency model; model 1c is the ownership 
model; model 1d represents board composition and structure model, and model 1e is the 
overall corporate governance model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
163 
 
TABLE VII: LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE RELATION BETWEEN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL DISTRESS 
      
Variables Model 1a model 1b model 1c model 1d model 1e 
      
FAG -0.0135*** -0.0165*** -0.0105*** -0.0192*** -0.0177*** 
 (0.00219) (0.00302) (0.00228) (0.00241) (0.00306) 
FSZ -0.130*** 0.0313 -0.202*** -0.193*** -0.189*** 
 (0.0231) (0.0392) (0.0255) (0.0361) (0.0521) 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BSZ    0.101** 0.257*** 
    (0.0433) (0.0523) 
PIND    1.787*** 1.105* 
    (0.440) (0.619) 
BGD    -0.126 -0.0858 
    (0.141) (0.156) 
BAC    -0.210*** -0.202*** 
    (0.0292) (0.0330) 
BMQ    -0.232*** -0.185*** 
    (0.0551) (0.0541) 
BME    0.468*** 0.491*** 
    (0.0841) (0.0873) 
ACSZ    0.534*** 0.556*** 
    (0.155) (0.172) 
CAC    -0.357* -0.656*** 
    (0.213) (0.247) 
ACIND    -0.0110** -0.00527 
    (0.00433) (0.00498) 
RCSZ    -0.475*** -0.539*** 
    (0.141) (0.162) 
CRC    -0.185 0.132 
    (0.197) (0.239) 
DREM  -0.216**   -0.438*** 
  (0.0898)   (0.114) 
SIND  -1.319***   -1.509*** 
  (0.153)   (0.181) 
PAR  -0.210   -0.498*** 
  (0.155)   (0.174) 
MN  -1.327***   -1.333*** 
  (0.172)   (0.199) 
DOWN   -0.0369***  -0.0459*** 
   (0.00424)  (0.00495) 
INOWN   -0.863***  -0.427*** 
   (0.126)  (0.136) 
COWN   -0.293***  -0.251*** 
   (0.0699)  (0.0798) 
Constant 2.518*** 5.357*** 8.604*** 4.147*** 14.26*** 
 (0.245) (0.952) (0.694) (0.464) (1.447) 
Log Pseudolikelihood -959.07 -852.67 -882.71 -864.46 -699.23 
Pseudo R-square 0.1325 0.2283 0.2016 0.2066 0.3578 
AIC 1926.14 1721.34 1779.41 1758.92 1442.45 
Observations 1,595 1,594 1,595 1,572 1,571 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Consequently, large firms are expected to generate enough revenue to meet their financial 
obligations when they become due. Hence, larger firms are not expected to be financially 
distressed. Finally, the results show that the industry dummies in model 1a indicate that 
there is a significant negative relationship between industry and financial distress. This 
result is consistent with that of Laitinen (2005) but it is inconsistent with that of Ciampi 
(2015) who find no significant effects of the industry dummy variables on firms’ default. 
Since according to Hawawini et al. (2003), the industry structure is the main driver of 
performance variations and the main cause of some firms financial distress, firms located 
in certain industries are less likely to be financially distressed. The overall results in model 
1a indicate that all the control variables show significant results and their coefficients 
show the expected directions. This confirms the existing evidence (Beaver 1968; Altman 
1983,2002) that firm characteristics predict firms’ financial distress.  
7.4.2 DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY MODEL (MODEL 1b) 
Model 1b tests the effects of the association between the disclosure and transparency 
variables on firms’ financial distress. In the model, four disclosure and transparency 
variables together with the control variables in the baseline model are tested. First, the 
results indicate that the coefficient of directors remuneration is significantly and 
negatively (b = -0.216, p < 0.05) related to financial distress. This means that H3a, which 
states that directors remuneration has a negative relationship with firms’ financial 
distress, is confirmed. This result on directors remuneration is not in line with the findings 
of Vallascas and Hagendorff (2013) but consistent with Schultz et al. (2017) who find a 
significant relationship between the probability of default and executive pay. This 
significant result indicates that the more directors are remunerated, the less likelihood 
firms become financially distressed. This is because with better remuneration directors 
are expected to devote their time to monitor managent to ensure that firms perform better 
to avoid financial distress. This is in line with agency theory which advocates that 
directors’ remuneration should be based on their performance to avoid agency conflict. 
Second, for the variable the presence of the senior independent director, the results show 
that it has a significant and a negative relationship (b = -1.319, p < 0.01) with financial 
distress. This indicates that H3b which states that the presence of senior independent 
director is negatively associated with firms’ financial distress, is confirmed. The result is 
not consistent with the results of Hsu and Wu (2014). This result means that a firm that 
nominates a senior independent director is not likely to be financially distressed because 
the presence of a senior independent director plays a significant role in monitoring the 
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effectiveness of the chairperson, liaising with the non-executive directors and 
communicating with the major shareholders (Higgs 2003) issues and concerns that impact 
firms’ operation, thereby improving their performance and reducing the likelihood of 
financial distress. Third,  the coefficient of the variable disclosure of proxy voting 
arrangements in the annual reports indicates that it has an insignificant and negative (b = 
-0.210, p > 0.1) association with firms’ financial distress. This means that H3c, which 
states that the disclosure of proxy voting arrangement in the annual reports is negatively 
related to firms’ financial distress, is not supported. Fourth, the coefficient of the variable 
disclosure of notice of the annual general meeting in the annual reports indicates that it 
has a significant and a negative relationship (b = -1.327, p < 0.01) with financial distress. 
This means that H3d, which states that the disclosure of meeting notice in the annual 
reports is negatively related to firms’ financial distress, is supported. This result shows 
that by disclosing such information in the annual reports, the shareholders and the other 
stakeholders get to know when and where as well as the main agenda of the AGM. This 
improves the communication and relationship between the directors and the shareholders 
thereby ensuring continuous investements which improve firms’ financial performance 
and reduce the likelihood of financial distress. Finally, the significance and the directions 
of the coefficients of the control variables in model 1b indicate that firm age and firm size 
show the expected results. However, firm size which was significant in the baseline model 
is, however, insignificant in the disclosure and transparency model.  
In conclusion, the results of model 1b when compared with that of model 1a show that 
with almost similar observations, model 1b has the best fit. This is because its AIC 
arithmetic value of 1721.34 is lower than that of model 1a which is 1926.14. Also, the 
pseudo r-squared and the log pseudolikelihood of the two models indicate that model 1b 
is better than model 1a because, for the pseudo r-square, model 1b has a value of 0.2283 
while that of model 1a is 0.1325. For the log pseudolikelihood, model 1b has a value of -
852.67 compared with that of model 1a which is -959.07. The results of these two models 
(the baseline model and the disclosure and transparency model) show that although firm 
characteristics can predict firms likelihood of financial distress, the results are improved 
when the discloure and transperency variables are included in the model. These results 
add a significant contribution to the literature. That these variables, although are not often 
found in the literature, have significant roles in determining firms’ financial distress and 
as such policy makers must ensure that firms are encouraged to follow the principles in 
the code regarding the presence of a senior independent director, the disclosure of proxy 
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voting arrangements in the annual reports, as well as the disclosure of the AGM notice in 
the annual reports so as to benefit from them. 
7.4.3 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE MODEL (MODEL 1c) 
The results of model 1c show the influence of the three ownership structure variables and 
the control variables on financial distress. First, the results indicate that the coefficient of 
directors’ ownership has a significant and negative relationship (b = -0.0369, p < 0.01) 
with financial distress. This means that H2a, which states that directors’ ownership is 
negatively associated with financial distress, is confirmed. This result is consistent with 
the findings of Nahar Abdullah (2006), Fich and Slezak (2008), Platt and Platt (2012) and 
Manzaneque et al. (2016) but inconsistent with the result of Simpson and Gleason (1999). 
This evidence of the study implies that ownership by directors is an inscentive to monitor 
management to improve performance to avoid financial distress (Elloumi and Gueyié 
2001; Nahar Abdullah 2006). Again, the results support Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
argument that firms must use share ownership to align the interests of the directors with 
that of the shareholders. Hence, the agency theory’s arguments that shareholding by 
directors encourages them to align their interest with that of the shareholders, is confirmed 
by the results. Since directors decision impact on their own wealth when they own shares 
in the firm, it encourages them to take value-maximisung decisions that positvely affect 
the creation of business value thereby avoiding the likelihood of firms’ financial distress. 
Thus, the more directors become firms’ shareholders, the less likelihood those firms 
become financially distressed (Fich and Slezak 2008). Second, on institutional ownership, 
the coefficient from the results indicates a significant and a negative relationship (b = -
0.863, p < 0.01) with financial distress which therefore implies that H2c, which states that 
institutional ownership has a negative relationship with financial distress, is supported. 
This result is in line with that of Daily and Dalton (1994) who find that institutional 
ownership has a significant and a negative relationship with financial distress but not with 
that of Mangena and Chamisa (2008), Donker et al. (2009) and Manzaneque et al. (2016). 
Theoretically, due to their large shareholding, the institutional shareholders as influential 
stakeholders have extra inscentive and the resources to monitor management to improve 
firm performance to avoid financial distress. Also, institutional shareholders focus on the 
long-term because due to their large shareholdings, the shares become less marketable 
and as such prefer to keep them for as long as possible. Hence, they are encouraged to 
monitor mangement to improve its long term performance to avoid the likelihood of 
financial distress. Institutional shareholders are also considered to possess resources in 
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the form of expertise and knowledge to monitor management to improve performance for 
the benefits of all the firms’ stakeholders. Third, from the ownership model, the results 
show that concentrated ownership has a significant and a negative coefficient (b = -0.293, 
p<0.01), which means that concentrated ownership has a significant and a negative 
relationship with financial distress. This result confirms that H2b, which states that 
concentrated ownership has a negative relationship with firms’ financial distress, is 
supported. This outcome is in line with the results of Xiaolan et al. (2006), Donker et al. 
(2009), Ciampi (2015), and Hu and Zheng (2015) but inconsistent with that of Lajili and 
Zéghal (2010), and Manzaneque et al. (2016). Theoretically, concentrated ownership due 
to the large shareholding are incentivised and usually have the expertise and resources to 
effectively monitor management to improve performance (Shliefer and Vishny 1986) and 
reduce financial distress likelihood. Lastly, the significance and the directions of the 
control variables in model 1c did not change from those in the baseline model (model 1a). 
The coefficient of firm size in model 1c indicates a significant and negative relationship 
(b = -0.202, p<0.01) with financial distress. This, therefore, indicates that large firms due 
to their resource capacity and their links with the external providers of finance are less 
likely to be financially distressed and that in firms where there are directors’, institutional 
and concentrated ownership, the size of those firms matter in determining their likelihood 
of financial distress.  
In all, the ownership variables indicate significant and negative coefficients signifying 
their inverse relationships with financial distress. Concurringly, the agency theory’s 
argument for directors to own shares is supported. This shared ownership brings 
alignment of the directors’ interests with that of the firms so that the directors’ actions 
improve the firms’ performance and the appointments of directors by institutional and 
concentrated owners who can monitor management effectively to enhance firms’ 
performance to avoid the likelihood of financial distress. The results show that this model, 
when compared with model 1b, has less fit than model 1b which has the best fit since its 
AIC arithmetic value of 1721.34 is lower than that of model 1c which is 1779.41. 
Similarly, the results for the pseudo r-square and log pseudo likelihood for both models 
provide evidence that model 1b is the one of best fit than model 1c. These mean that the 
disclosure and transparency mechanisms better predict financial distress than the 
ownership mechanisms. However, when model 1c is compared with model 1a, the results 
indicate that model 1c has a better fit than model 1a. This further confirms that corporate 
governance mechanism improves the prediction of financial distress.  
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7.4.4 BOARD COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE MODEL (MODEL 1d) 
Model 1d tests the effects of the relationship between board composition and structure 
variables on firms’ financial distress. In the model, eleven board composition and 
structure variables together with the control variables are tested. First, the results indicate 
that the coefficient of board size is significant but has a positive (b = 0.101, p < 0.05) 
relationship with financial distress which means that the size of the board of directors has 
a direct influence on firms’ financial distress. The results mean that H1a which states that 
board size is negatively related to firms’ financial distress is not supported. This finding 
is consistent with the results of Simpson and Gleason (1999), Lajili and Zéghal (2010) 
Lakshan and Wijekoon (2012) and Ciampi (2015) who establish board size to have a 
direct influence on firms financial distress. The result is, however, not consistent with 
Gales and Kesner (1994), Brédart (2014) and Manzaneque et al. (2016). The result means 
that board size has a direct effect on firms’ financial distress and that the more directors 
a firm has on its board the more likely the firm becomes financially distressed and vice 
versa. The Code (2016) requires the board to be of sufficient size but warns that the size 
must not be so large as to be unmanageable, thus supporting the result that board size 
should not be large. This is because a large board consumes more pecuniary and non-
pecuniary resources in the form of remuneration and perquisites. This significant and 
positive result supports the agency theory that requires the size of the board of directors 
to be of a smaller size for its monitoring role though a small board may be influenced by 
the CEO and may lack the resources to effectively monitor management. Contrarily, both 
the resource dependency theory and the stakeholder theory, which argue for large boards 
because large boards bring more varied resources and competences and allow for the 
representation of different stakeholders of the firm (Gaur et al. 2015), is not supported.  
Second, the coefficient of the proportion of independent directors indicates that it is 
significant but has a positive relationship (b = 1.787, p < 0.01) with financial distress. 
This means that H1b, which states that the proportion of independent directors is 
negatively related to firms’ financial distress, is not supported. The result is consistent 
with Chaganti et al. (1985) and Simpson and Gleason (1999), Lajili and Zéghal (2010) 
and Brédart (2014), who find that the proportion of independent directors is positively 
associated with the likelihood of financial distress. The result, however, is inconsistent 
with that of Elloumi and Gueyié (2001), Daily et al. (2003) and (Xiaolan et al. 2006). 
This result could be attributed to the fact that the firms’ board of directors have included 
more independent directors to respond to the shareholder or regulatory pressures (Lajili 
      
169 
 
and Zéghal 2010). This is because the Code (2016) requires large companies to have at 
least half the board apart from the chairperson to consist of non-executive directors 
determined to be independent by the board. Theoretically, apart from the stewardship 
theory which argues that the presence of independent directors increases the chances of a 
conflict within the board, the agency, resource dependence, and stakeholder theories are 
not supported by the result. For instance, the agency theory argues that more independent 
directors due to their non-affiliation with the firm are in a better position to monitor and 
control potential opportunism and avoid the selfish behaviours of management. However, 
Chaganti et al. (1985) who found the proportion of independent directors to be 
insignificant argue that many independent directors representing different interests may 
reduce the economic flexibility of the firm resulting in conflicts between the board and 
top management. The resource dependence theory regards more independent directors as 
strategic resources who could broaden the firms’ knowledge base, as well as develop links 
with other firms’ directors but this is not supported by the results. From the stakeholder 
theory, large independent directors could serve the interest of many stakeholders which 
could consequently improve performance through improved demand. The results from 
model 1d however, do not support the stakeholder argument.  
Third, on the variable board gender diversity, the coefficient in model 1d indicates that it 
is insignificant (b = -0.126, p > 0.1). This means that H1c, which states that board gender 
diversity is negatively related to firms’ financial distress, is not confirmed. Even though 
the evidence of the effects of board gender diversity on financial distress is lacking, the 
result is consistent with Appiah (2013) who find that board gender diversity does not 
impact on the likelihood of corporate failure. This result from model 1d could be 
attributed to firms not including women on their boards despite the code’s 
recommendation. Theoretically, no single theory predicts the link between female 
directors and financial distress. However, it is expected that the inclusion of female 
directors on firms’ boards would improve their links with other resources outside the firm 
and broaden the resource base, as well as bringing discipline in the boardroom for 
effective monitoring, which could improve performance to reduce the likelihood of 
financial distress for the benefit of all stakeholders. These expected theoretical benefits 
are not supported by the result. The stewardship theory, however, regards the monitoring 
role of the board as unnecessary and that management, including female(s), must be 
empowered to be responsible for the firms’ success to benefit all stakeholder groups, and 
thus, supporting the result.  
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Fourth, the results in model 1d further show that board activity is significantly and 
negatively (b = -0.210, p < 0.01) associated with financial distress. This result confirms 
H1d, which states that board activity is negatively related to firms’ financial distress. The 
result means that the more boards meet to discuss issues, the less likelihood of the firms 
becoming financially distressed. This is because the ever-changing business climate may 
require directors to meet frequently to identify and discuss any risks facing the firm and 
to take strategic decisions to manage those risks to enhance performance that may 
subsequently reduce financial distress. Moreover, directors in poorly performing firms 
are under pressure to turn things around and may subsequently hold more meetings. The 
result of board activity in the models is consistent with the study by Vafeas (1999) who 
find that firms respond to a poor performance by increasing their level of board activity 
which in turn is linked with improved operating performance in subsequent years. 
Theoretically, this result supports the arguments of the agency, resource dependence, and 
stakeholder theories. Directors’ monitoring responsibility is enhanced (agency theory) 
when they give more time which a significant resource is (resource dependence) to attend 
board meetings to discuss firms’ strategic issues for the benefits and interest of all the 
stakeholder groups (stakeholder theory).  
Fifth, board member educational qualification is another variable in model 1d which is 
found to be significantly and negatively (b = -0.232, p < 0.01) related to financial distress. 
This result implies that H1e, which states that board member educational qualification is 
negatively related to firms’ financial distress, is supported. This result means that firms 
are in a good position to avoid financial distress when board members’ have the required 
educational qualification. Due to the limited evidence on the effects of board member 
education on financial distress possibly because of limited disclosure (Christy et al. 2013), 
the result is not supported by studies on financial distress. The result is therefore 
compared with studies relating to firm performance. On that basis, the result is in line 
with that of Christy et al. (2013) who find that professional and formal industry degree 
qualifications on the board are associated with shareholders’ risk assessment. 
Theoretically, the agency theory, which argues that board members with the right 
qualification perform their monitoring and advisory roles better and are critical of firms’ 
financial reporting strategy, is supported. Board members’ qualification serves as a 
significant resource for firms’ strategic policies, analysis, and development such that the 
concerns of different stakeholder groups are dealt with, thus, confirming both the resource 
dependence and the stakeholder theories.  
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Sixth, for board member financial expertise, the results show that it has a significant but 
a positive (b = 0.468, p < 0.01) relationship with financial distress and this means that 
H1f is not supported. This result implies that firms with more financial experts are more 
likely to be financially distressed and vice versa. Financial experts due to their expertise 
in business management, financial accounting, and reporting are expected to monitor and 
advise management on value maximising decisions to ensure improved financial 
performance and avoid the likelihood of financial distress. However, the result in model 
1d means that though financial experts are significant they have a direct influence on 
financial distress and this could be as the results of the fact that financial experts demand 
higher salary and benefits which could have a financial burden on firms’ operational costs 
and influence their likelihood of financial distress.  
Seventh, for the variable audit committee size, the result in model 1d shows that it has a 
significant and positive relationship (b = 0.534, p<0.01) with financial distress. Though 
the result is significant, the positive direction of the coefficient means that H1h, which 
states that audit committee size is negatively associated with firms’ financial distress, is 
not confirmed. This relationship means that firms with large size of the audit committee 
are more likely to be financially distressed and vice versa. The positive association of 
audit committee size is not in line with the negative association of Platt and Platt (2012), 
Appiah (2013), and the significance of the coefficient is also not in line with Salloum et 
al. (2014). This result could be due to the code’s provision that requires large firms to 
have at least three independent directors, giving firms the opportunity to have audit 
committees members as they deemed fit. For instance, from the descriptive statistics, 
some firms have nine members on their audit committees. The large audit committee size 
means that the effectiveness of audit committees in monitoring management could be 
affected since they may lose concentration and become less participative. Secondly, 
meeting the minimum standard does not by itself assure the effectiveness of the audit 
committee to avoid financial distress since factors such as the level of commitment of 
audit committee members, quality of discussions during meetings, and organisational 
work environment may have an influence on audit committee performance (Mohid 
Rahmat et al. 2009). Theoretically, the agency theory is supported since it requires small 
audit committees to fulfil their monitoring role for firms to avoid financial distress. 
However, the resource dependence theory is not supported due to its requirement that 
large audit committee is needed to bring a diversity of views, expertise, experiences, and 
skills to ensure effective monitoring to avoid financial distress. Likewise, the stakeholder 
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theory is not supported because it argues for large audit committees to monitor and 
oversee the financial reporting process for the benefits of all the stakeholder groups.  
Eighth, the coefficient of the variable the presence of a firm’s chairperson on the audit 
committee is significant and has a negative relationship (b = -0.357, p < 0.1) with financial 
distress, meaning firms with their chairpersons being members on the audit committees 
are less likely to be financially distressed. This result means that H1k, which states that 
the presence of a firm’s chairperson on the audit committee is positively associated with 
firms’ financial distress, is not confirmed. The code requires the chairperson to be 
independent at the time of appointment as chairperson but must not chair the audit 
committee if he/she becomes a member of the audit committee. This removes any 
influence and conflict of interest that the chairperson would have on the committee. 
Although, a firm’s chairperson with his/her knowledge of the firm is a valuable resource 
that enhances the monitoring as well as ensuring the quality and transparency of the 
financial reporting process of the audit committee, his/her knowledge of the firm’s 
operation could affect the committee’s performance and consequently affecting financial 
performance. Hence, the direct relationship is not supported by the result.  
Nineth, the result in model 1d further indicates that the remuneration committee size is 
significantly and negatively (b = -0.475, p < 0.01) related to firms’ financial distress. This 
result means that H1i, which states that the remuneration committee size is negatively 
associated with firms’ financial distress is supported. This remuneration committee size 
result is in line with Chan et al. (2016) who find that the size of a remuneration committee 
significantly predicts corporate failure, but inconsistent with the result of  Appiah and 
Chizema (2015). This result means that at least three independent directors on the 
remuneration committee are required to perform its responsibilities of determining the 
appropriate remuneration packages for directors. This result does not support the 
arguments of the agency theory which requires small remuneration committee size to 
have an effective decision on directors remuneration as well as monitor management’s 
operations. However, the resource dependence and the stakeholder theories which argue 
for large remuneration committee size are supported because, with large remuneration 
committee size, firms can have directors with varied qualifications and skills as well as 
establishing the link with external sources of resources. Large remuneration committee 
size provides the number of directors who can stand for the different groups of 
stakeholders.  Tenth, for the coefficient the presence of a firm’s chairperson on the 
remuneration committee in model 1d, the results indicate that it is insignificant but 
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negatively (-0.185, p > 0.1) related to financial distress. This means that H1j, which states 
that the presence of a firm’s chairperson on the remuneration committee is negatively 
related to firms’ financial distress, is not supported. This result could mean that the firm’s 
chairperson is not needed in the remuneration committee to determine executives and 
non-executives remuneration packages since according to Anderson and Bizjak  (2003), 
total compensation levels show only a marginal relation to the CEO’s presence on the 
remuneration committee.   
Eleventh, the coefficient of the variable audit committee independence in model 1d shows 
that it has a significant and negative relationship (b = -0.0110, p < 0.05) with financial 
distress. The result means that H1g, which states that audit committee independence is 
negatively associated with firms’ financial distress, is supported. The result is in line with 
that of Carcello and Neal (2003), Platt and Platt (2012) and Miglani et al. (2015b) but 
inconsistent with Mohid Rahmat et al. (2009) and Salloum et al. (2014) who find that 
audit committee independence is not negatively related to the probability of financial 
distress. This evidence of the study means that the audit committee with its fully 
independent members is a significant resource for effective monitoring, giving assurance 
to financial reports to improve market performance for all the stakeholder groups 
(Bronson et al. 2009). The results of audit committee independence, therefore, support 
the monitoring (agency theory), resource provision (resource dependence theory), and 
stakeholder groups benefits (stakeholder theory). Finally, for the control variables in 
model 1d, the results indicate that the significance and the direction of the control variable 
remain the same as model 1a.  
In conclusion, when model 1d and model 1a are compared, model 1d has the best fit than 
model 1a since the AIC arithmetic value of model 1d of 1758.92 is lower than that of 
model 1a which is 1926.14. Again, the pseudo r-square and the log pseudolikelihood of 
model 1d which are 0.2066 and -864.46 respectively, and that of model 1a which are 
0.1325 and -959.07 show that model 1d predicts financial distress better than model 1a. 
This means that although a model with the financial variables can predict firms’ financial 
distress, the inclusion of the board composition and structure mechanisms improves the 
model which implies that firms must ensure that having those board composition and 
structure variables is not just to follow the principles of the code but acknowledge that 
using them effectively prevent the firms from financial distress.  
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7.4.5 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODEL (MODEL 1e) 
Model 1e in Table VII tests the relationship between all the independent variables, the 
control variables, and financial distress. The independent variables include the 
components of the ownership structure, the components of board composition and 
structure, and the components of disclosure and transparency. Since this model combines 
all the variables in the first four models, the discussion of the model 1e results focuses on 
comparing the results of the variables in model 1e with the results of those variables in 
their respective models and any differences identified. For instance, the results of board 
size in model 1e is compared with the results of board size in model 1d.   
First, for the ownership structure variables, the results in model 1e indicate that directors 
shareholding and concentrated ownership are significantly and negatively (b = -0.0459, p 
< 0.01; b = -0.251, p < 0.01) related to financial distress, confirming H2a and H2b. These 
results are similar to the results found in model 1c in which significance and negative 
relationships with financial distress were recorded for the coefficients of directors 
ownership and concentrated ownership. Also, the results for institutional ownership in 
model 1e is significant and negative, the same as that of model 1c. Hence, H2c is 
supported in model 1e. 
Second, all the disclosure and transparency variables which are directors’ remuneration, 
presence of senior independent director, disclosure of proxy voting arrangements in the 
annual reports, and disclosure of notice of annual general meeting in the annual reports 
have significant and negative relationships (b = -0.438, p < 0.01; b = -1.509, p < 0.01; b 
= -0.498, p < 0.01; b = -1.333, p < 0.01) with financial distress. This means that H3a, 
H3b, H3c, and H3d are confirmed in model 1e. The difference between the results in 
model 1e and that of model 1c is that the disclosure of proxy voting arrangements in the 
annual reports which are not significant in model 1c is now significant in model 1e.  
Third, for board composition and structure, the results in model 1e from Table VII 
indicates that board size has a significant but positive (b = 0.257, p < 0.01) relationship 
with financial distress and this means H1a is not confirmed. This result is similar to that 
of model 1d but the difference is that the level of significance improved from 0.05 to 0.01. 
The results for the proportion of independent directors is significant but the coefficient is 
positive and for board gender diversity in model 1e the results show that it has 
insignificant (b = -0.0858, p > 0.1) relationship with financial distress. These results mean 
that H1b and H1c are not supported. Also, from model 1e, the result shows that board 
activity has a significant and negative (b = -0.202, p < 0.01) relationship with financial 
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distress which means that H1d  is confirmed. This result is similar to the one obtained in 
model 1d where a significant and a negative relationship is recorded. For the variables 
board member educational qualification and board member financial expertise, the results 
in model 1e are the same as those obtained in model 1d. In model 1e, board member 
educational qualification is significant and negatively related to financial distress 
confirming H1e.  Board member financial expertise is also significant but has a positive 
association with financial distress, meaning H1f  is not supported. The result of the audit 
committee independence in model 1e is insignificant unlike that found in model 1d which 
means H1g is not supported. For audit committee size, the results in model 1e show a 
significant but a positive (b = 0.556, p < 0.01) relationship with financial distress as in 
model 1d which has a significant but a positive (b = 0.534, p < 0.01) association with 
financial distress. The results in model 1e mean that H1h is not supported. In terms of a 
firm’s chairperson as an audit committee member, a significant and negative association 
with financial distress is obtained in model 1e as obtained in model 1d. This result in 
model 1e means that H1i is not supported. The results from model 1e further indicate that 
both the remuneration committee size and a firm’s chairperson on the remuneration 
committee have similar results as in model 1d. While the former is significant and has a 
negative relation (b = -0.539, p < 0.01) with financial distress, confirming H1j, the latter 
is insgnificant, indicating that H1k is not supported. The conclusion from model 1e is that 
except the audit committee independece, all the remaining components of board 
composition and structure in model 1e show similar results as in model 1d although the 
variables show minor differences in the coefficient values and the level of significance. 
Finally, regarding the control variables in model 1e, the results do not differ from those 
obtained in model 1a which is the baseline model. All the control variables show 
significant and negative relationships with financial distress.  
Overall, Table VII provides the results for five models, which are the baseline model 
(model 1a), the disclosure and transparency model (model 1b), the ownership structure 
model (model 1c), the board composition and structure model (model 1c) and the 
corporate governance model (model 1e). Using the Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) 
to identify the model of best fit, the results indicate that the corporate governance model 
is the model of best fit because its AIC arithmetic value is lower than those of the other 
models are. This is followed by the disclosure and transparency model, the board structure 
and composition model, and the ownership model.  A similar sequence of models’ 
importance is obtained when the results of the pseudo r-square and the log 
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pseudolikelihood in Table VII are used. The baseline model is the least of the five models 
in predicting financial distress. These results mean that corporate governance 
mechanisms predict firms’ financial distress better when all the governance mechanism 
are combined in a model. The results also provide support for the evidence that though 
firm characteristics predict financial distress, the models become more effective when 
corporate governance mechanisms are added. From here, the study makes a significant 
contribution to the literature by providing evidence that each category of corporate 
governance (disclosure and transparency, ownership structure, board composition, and 
structure) predicts firms’ financial distress. However, the evidence suggests that some of 
the categories predict financial distress better and as such policy should be directed at 
both the more and the less effective ones for firms to enjoy the same benefits of having 
all categories of corporate governance. It is also evidently clear from the results of the 
study that a model with all the categories of corporate governance is the best in predicting 
financial distress and this is a significant contribution to the literature. This evidence will 
guide policy makers to think of corporate governance in its entirety but not only consider 
certain aspects and that firms must not pick and choose which corporate governance 
mechanism to adopt if they would like to avoid financial distress.    
7.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The chapter sought to find evidence of whether the disclosure and transparency variables, 
ownership structure variables, and the board composition and structure variables could 
determine the financial distress of firms. The chapter obtained evidence that some of the 
variables have an influence on financial distress. For instance, directors’ remuneration, 
the presence of the senior independent director, as well as the disclosure of notice of the 
annual general meeting in the annual reports, all in the disclosure and transparency model 
are significant and negatively related to financial distress. In the ownership structure 
model, the directors’ ownership, institutional ownership, and concentrated ownership are 
also significantly and negatively related to financial distress. For the board composition 
and structure model, board activity, board member qualification, audit committee 
independence, and the presence of a firm’s chairperson on the audit committee and the 
remuneration committee size are all found to be significantly and negatively related to 
financial distress. In the same model, the board size, the proportion of independent 
directors and board member financial expertise are significant but positively related to 
financial distress. There is also evidence that a model that is composed of all the corporate 
governance mechanisms because of its best fit is comparatively better than the models 
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representing the components of board composition and structure, ownership structure, 
and disclosure and transparency. More importantly, the chapter established that each of 
these models is better than a model that is consisted of only the firm characteristics. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS AND FINANCIAL DISTRESS: THE 
MODERATING ROLE OF ENVIRONMENT, RESOURCES, AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
CAPABILITY 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the empirical findings on the moderating role of environment, 
resources, and technology on the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms 
and financial distress. The objective of the chapter is to determine the extent to which 
firms’ environment, resources, and technological capability moderate the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and financial distress. As mentioned in the 
methodology section, the three dimensions of environment adopted in this study are 
environmental complexity, environmental dynamism, and environmental munificence 
(Dess and Beard 1984). Also, the study follows Norman et al. (2013) to categorise 
resources into tangible and intangible resources.  
The rest of the chapter is as follows. Section 8.2 discusses the moderating influence of 
environment, resource, and technology on the relationship between board composition 
and structure variables and financial distress. In section 8.3, the moderating role of 
environment, resource, and technology on the relationship between ownership structure 
variables and financial distress are examined. The moderating influence of the 
environment, resource, and technology on the relationship between disclosure and 
transparency variables and financial distress are discussed in section 8.4. Section 8.5 
examines the moderating influence of environment, resource, and technology on the 
relationship between the overall corporate governance variables and financial distress. 
The discussion of the robustness test is presented in section 8.6 while the chapter 
summary and conclusion is found in section 8.7.   
8.2 BOARD COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE: THE MODERATING ROLE OF 
ENVIRONMENT, RESOURCE, AND TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY 
In this section, each moderating factor interacts with the components of the board 
composition and structure to establish the moderating effects. The evidence on the 
interaction of the moderating factors which include environmental complexity (EC), 
environmental dynamism (ED), environmental munificence (EM), tangible resources 
(TR), intangible resources (ITR), and technology (TEC) on the relationship between the 
components of board composition and structure, and financial distress (FD) is presented 
in models 4b (EC model), 4c (ED model), 4d (EM model), 4e (TR model), 4f (ITR 
model), and 4g (TEC model) in Table VIII. 
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The table on the next page presents the regression results of the interactions between the 
moderating factors and board structure and composition variables. Model 4a is the 
baseline model for board composition and structure. Models 4b to 4g are respectively the 
interaction models for environmental complexity (EC), environmental dynamism (ED), 
environmental munificence (EM), tangible resource (TR), intangible resource (IR) and 
technology (TEC). Model 4b therefore, exhibits the interactions between environmental 
complexity and board composition and structure variables (EC*BSZ; EC*PIND; 
EC*BGD; EC*BAC;  EC*BMQ; EC*BME; EC*ACIND; EC*ACSZ; EC*CAC; 
EC*RCSZ; EC*CRC), model 4c shows the interaction between environmental dynamism 
and board composition and structure variables (ED*BSZ; ED*PIND; ED*BGD; 
ED*BAC;  ED*BMQ; ED*BME; ED*ACIND; ED*ACSZ; ED*CAC; ED*RCSZ; 
ED*CRC), model 4d represents the interaction between environmental munificence and 
board composition and structure variables (EM*BSZ; EM*PIND; EM*BGD; EM*BAC; 
EM*BMQ; EM*BME; EM*ACIND; EM*ACSZ; EM*CAC; EM*RCSZ; EM*CRC), 
model 4e shows the interaction between tangible resources and board composition and 
structure variables (TR*BSZ; TR*PIND; TR*BGD; TR*BAC;  TR*BMQ; TR*BME; 
TR*ACIND; TR*ACSZ; TR*CAC; TR*RCSZ; TR*CRC), model 4f represents the 
interaction between intangible resources and board structure composition variables 
(IR*BSZ; IR*PIND; IR*BGD; IR*BAC;  IR*BMQ; IR*BME; IR*ACIND; IR*ACSZ; 
IR*CAC; IR*RCSZ; IR*CRC), and model 4g is the result of the interaction between 
technology and board composition and structure variables (TEC*BSZ; TEC*PIND; 
TEC*BGD; TEC*BAC;  TEC*BMQ; TEC*BME; TEC*ACIND; TEC*ACSZ; 
TEC*CAC; TEC*RCSZ; TEC*CRC. 
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TABLE VIII: LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE INTERACTION OF THE MODERATING FACTORS AND BOARD COMPOSITION AND 
STRUCTURE VARIABLES 
               
      
                
Variables Model 4a Model 4b EC Model 4c ED Model 4d EM Model 4e TR Model 4f ITR Model 4g TEC   
                
FAG -0.0192*** -0.0167***  -0.0174***  -0.0201***  -0.0189***  -0.0201***  -0.0184***    
 (0.00241) (0.00260)  (0.00271)  (0.00259)  (0.00252)  (0.00255)  (0.00321)    
FSZ -0.193*** -0.202***  -0.181***  -0.202***  -0.182***  -0.167***  -0.135***    
 (0.0361) (0.0389)  (0.0388)  (0.0357)  (0.0381)  (0.0385)  (0.0397)    
Industry effects Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    
BSZ 0.101** 0.466 -0.383 0.456 -0.362 0.110** 0.000267 0.0246 0.0408 -0.125 0.0336** 0.736*** 0.0336**   
 (0.0433) (0.682) (0.735) (0.634) (0.684) (0.0476) (0.000371) (0.0833) (0.0396) (0.102) (0.0141) (0.224) (0.0141)   
PIND 1.787*** -5.645 7.075 -24.68*** 26.98*** 1.959*** -0.00202 0.0951 -0.161 4.268** -0.286 3.517 -0.286   
 (0.440) (9.765) (10.26) (8.405) (8.894) (0.470) (0.00580) (0.795) (0.118) (1.732) (0.246) (2.627) (0.246)   
BGD -0.126 6.906*** -7.585*** 5.334** -5.968** -13.16*** 13.87*** 0.0721 1.200*** -0.321 0.0284 -3.585*** 0.0284   
 (0.141) (2.367) (2.510) (2.231) (2.377) (1.496) (1.585) (0.233) (0.455) (0.509) (0.0701) (0.749) (0.0701)   
BAC -0.210*** -1.487*** 1.375*** -1.202** 1.065** -0.226*** 0.000268 -0.149*** 1.4505 -0.480*** 0.0382** -0.217* 0.0382**   
 (0.0292) (0.477) (0.506) (0.478) (0.508) (0.0309) (0.000267) (0.0483) (0.000209) (0.110) (0.0153) (0.126) (0.0153)   
BMQ -0.232*** 1.590 -2.078* 3.195*** -3.781*** -0.294*** -0.000674 -0.185* -0.0391** -0.403* 0.0193 -0.937** 0.0193   
 (0.0551) (1.012) (1.063) (1.010) (1.060) (0.0601) (0.000546) (0.101) (0.0189) (0.233) (0.0322) (0.377) (0.0322)   
BME 0.468*** -3.897*** 4.837*** -4.977*** 5.989*** 0.548*** 0.00105 0.355** -0.00917 1.328*** -0.119** 1.558*** -0.119**   
 (0.0841) (1.242) (1.323) (1.191) (1.286) (0.0897) (0.00103) (0.142) (0.0410) (0.339) (0.0496) (0.537) (0.0496)   
ACSZ 0.534*** -0.662 1.378 1.257 -0.606 0.526*** -0.00122 0.286 0.0368 1.844*** -0.182*** 2.944*** -0.182***   
 (0.155) (2.377) (2.542) (2.799) (2.982) (0.164) (0.00122) (0.274) (0.0614) (0.483) (0.0690) (0.969) (0.0690)   
CAC -0.357* -4.792 4.249 -1.167 0.339 -0.329 4.5405* -0.0588 0.160 -2.265*** 0.265*** -0.739 0.265***   
 (0.213) (3.400) (3.625) (3.918) (4.169) (0.233) (2.5005) (0.338) (0.130) (0.614) (0.0871) (1.247) (0.0871)   
ACIND -0.0110** -0.0852 0.0811 -0.128** 0.126** -0.0109** -0.000818 -0.0127** -0.252* -0.0147 -2.1305 -0.0618*** -2.1305   
 (0.00433) (0.0535) (0.0564) (0.0563) (0.0597) (0.00450) (0.000789) (0.00634) (0.149) (0.0126) (0.00171) (0.0199) (0.00171)   
RCSZ -0.475*** 1.937 -2.561 2.440 -3.144 -0.420*** -0.00114 0.101 -0.000800 -2.023*** 0.215*** 0.186 0.215***   
 (0.141) (2.289) (2.444) (2.371) (2.554) (0.151) (0.00109) (0.258) (0.00268) (0.526) (0.0733) (0.869) (0.0733)   
CRC -0.185 -0.381 0.368 -1.790 1.949 -0.158 0.330** -0.701** -0.371*** 1.387** -0.236*** -0.202 -0.236***   
 (0.197) (3.056) (3.276) (3.404) (3.649) (0.216) (0.158) (0.341) (0.136) (0.627) (0.0871) (1.153) (0.0871)   
Constant 4.147*** 4.553***  4.563***  4.228***  4.413***  4.102***  3.236***    
 (0.464) (0.523)  (0.539)  (0.475)  (0.480)  (0.508)  (0.574)    
Log Pseudolikelihood -846.46 -708.75  -676.88  -810.04  -844.07  -779.32  -619.73    
Pseudo R-square 0.2066 0.3462  0.3756  0.2489  0.2214  0.2597  0.4066    
AIC 1758.92 1469.49  1405.77  1670.09  1742.14  1610.64  1291.45    
Observations 1,572 1,564  1,564  1,556  1,564  1,521  1,508    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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8.2.1 ENVIRONMENT  
First, for board size (BSZ), the results from the baseline model (model 4a) indicate that it 
has a significant and positive relationship with financial distress. The results in model 4b 
indicate that for the main effect, BSZ is not significant. The results from the interaction 
of environmental complexity (EC) and BSZ (EC*BSZ) is also not significant (b = -0.383, 
p > 0.1) meaning EC does not moderate the relationship between BSZ and FD, hence 
H7a, which states that the negative relationship between BSZ and FD is moderated by 
EC is rejected. In model 4c, the results show that on the main effect, BSZ is not 
significant. The interaction of BSZ and environmental dynamism (ED) exhibits 
insignificant results which mean that ED does not moderate the relationship between BSZ 
and FD, hence, H5a which states that the negative relationship between BSZ and FD is 
moderated by ED is rejected. In model 4d the results reveal that for the main effect, BSZ 
is significant and positively (b = 0.110, p  < 0.05) related to FD. However, the results 
from the interaction of BSZ and environmental munificence (EM) (BSZ*EM) is 
insignificant, meaning EM has no moderating influence on the relationship between BSZ 
and FD, hence, H6a which states that the negative relationship between BSZ and FD is 
moderated by EM, is not supported. Thus, the results indicate that neither EC, ED nor 
EM has a moderating influence on the relationship between BSZ and FD. This means that 
the firms’ environment has no moderating influence on BSZ hence, firms in considering 
their board sizes must not consider the impact of the environment.  
Second, for the proportion of independent directors (PIND), the results in the baseline 
model reveal that it is significantly and positively (b = 1.787, p < 0.01) related to FD. In 
model 4b, the results for the direct effect show that the PIND has no significant 
relationship with FD. The results of the interaction of the PIND and EC (PIND*EC) show 
no significant results which mean that H7b, which states that the negative relationship 
between the PIND and FD is moderated by EC is not supported. The results in model 4c 
also reveal that for the main effect, the PIND is significantly and negatively (b = -24.68 
p < 0.1) related to FD. The interaction of PIND and ED (PIND*ED) show a significant 
result (b = 26.98, p < 0.01) indicating that ED has a more moderating influence on the 
relationship between the PIND and FD meaning H5b, which states that the negative 
relationship between the PIND and FD is moderated by ED is supported. The net effect 
of the main result and the interaction result (-24.68 + 26.98 = 2.3), therefore, shows that 
in a more dynamic environment, firms require more independent directors. In model 4d, 
the results for the main effect show a significant and a positive (b = 1.959, p < 0.01) 
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relationship with FD. However, no significant result is obtained from the interaction of 
PIND and EM (PIND*EM) that means H6b, which states that the negative relationship 
between the PIND and FD is moderated by EM is rejected. These results, therefore, reveal 
that only ED has a moderating influence on the relationship between the PIND and 
financial distress and that the evidence indicates a more moderating influence. Hence, in 
a dynamic environment, firms need more independent directors to assess and deal with 
the constant change that such environment brings. Although the result from the baseline 
model indicates a significant and a direct relationship between the PIND and FD, the net 
result from the ED model means that firms require more independent directors in a 
dynamic environment and this is a significant contribution of the study. 
Third, for board gender diversity (BGD), the result from the baseline model reveals that 
BGD is insignificantly related to FD. In model 4b, the results from the main effect show 
that BGD is significantly and positively ( b = 6.906, p < 0.01) related to FD. This indicates 
that the more female directors there are on a firm’s board, the more likely the firm would 
be financially distressed and vice versa. The interaction of BGD and EC (BGD*EC) 
reveals a significant and negative interaction result (b = -7.585, p < 0.01). This result 
means that EC has a moderating influence on the relationship between BGD and FD. 
However, since the direction of the coefficient of the main effect is positive, it means that 
H7c, which states that the negative relationship between BGD and FD is moderated by 
EC is not confirmed. In all, the results of the net effect of the coefficient of the main effect 
and the interaction effect in model 4b (6.906 + -7.585 = -0.679) indicate a less moderating 
influence. Regarding model 4c, for the main effect, the results indicate that BGD is 
significantly and positively (b = 5.334, p > 0.01) related to FD and the interaction of BGD 
and ED (BGD*ED) shows a significant (b = -5.968, p < 0.05) results. The results of model 
4c, therefore, indicate that H5c, which states that the negative relationship between BGD 
and FD is moderated by ED is not supported since the coefficient of the main result is 
positive. From model 4d, the results show that BGD has a significant and a negative (b = 
-13.16, p < 0.01) relationtionship with financial distress indicating firms with more 
female directors are less likely to be financially distressed. The interaction of BGD and 
EM (BGD*EM) shows a significant and positive result (b = 13.87, p < 0.01) indicating 
that EM has a moderating influence on the relationship between board gender diversity 
and FD, and that the net effect of the results (-13.16 + 13.87 = 0.71) show a more 
moderating influence. These results mean that H6c which states that the negative 
relationship between BGD and FD is moderated by EM is supported. Altogether, the 
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evidence of the interaction results suggests that firms operating in a munificent 
environment need more female directors to avoid FD but firms operating in a complex 
environment must hire less female directors. 
Fourth, for board activity (BAC), the results from the baseline model indicate a significant 
and a negative (b = -0.210, p < 0.01) relationship with FD. In model 4b the results for the 
main effects show that BAC is significantly and negatively (b = -1.487, p < 0.01) related 
to FD. The results from the interaction of BAC and EC (BAC*EC) indicates that the 
interaction term is significant (b = 1.375, p > 0.01) which means that BAC has a 
moderating influence on the relationship between BAC and FD. This result supports H7d, 
which states that the negative relationship between BAC and FD is moderated by EC. In 
model 4c, the results for the main effect indicates that BAC is significantly and negatively 
(b = -1.202 p < 0.05 related to FD and the interaction of BAC and ED (BAC*ED) shows 
that ED has a moderating influence on the relationship between BAC and FD meaning 
H5d is supported. For the same BAC, the results from model 4d reveal that for the main 
effect, BAC is significantly and negatively (b = -0.266, p < 0.01) related to FD. On the 
interaction terms, the results show that the interaction between BAC and EM is 
insignificant, implying that EM does not moderate the relationship between BAC and FD. 
Hence, these results mean that H6d, which states that the negative relationship between 
BAC and FD is moderated by EM is not supported.  
Fifth, for board member qualification (BMQ), the results from the baseline model indicate 
that it has a significant and negative relationship with FD. The results from model 4b 
show that for the main effect, BMQ has no significant relationship with financial distress, 
but the interaction results from the interaction of BMQ and EC (BMQ*EC) shows a 
significant and a negative result, indicating that BMQ has a moderating influence on the 
relationship between BMQ and FD. These results mean that H7e, which states that the 
negative relationship between BMQ and FD is moderated by EC is not supported. In 
model 4c, the direct result indicates that BMQ has a significant and a positive (b = 3.195, 
p < 0.01) relationship with  FD. On the interaction terms, the results from the interaction 
of BMQ and ED (BMQ*ED) indicate a significant and a negative (b = -3.781, p < 0.01) 
result which reveals that ED has a moderating influence on the relationship between BMQ 
and FD but due to the positive direction of the coefficient of the main effect, H5e is not 
supported. However, the net effect of the two results regarding BMQ in model 4c shows 
that ED has a less moderating influence (3.195 + -3.781 = -0.586) on the relationship 
between BMQ and FD. From model 4d, the result for the main effect shows that BMQ 
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has a significant and a negative (b = -0.294, p < 0.01) relationship with FD. However, the 
interaction of board member qualification and environmental munificence (BMQ*EM) 
shows an insignificant result which means that EM does not moderate the relationship 
between BMQ and FD. This result does not support H6e, which states that the negative 
relationship between BMQ and FD is moderated by EM. The evidence suggests that in a 
dynamic environment, firms need fewer board members with the relevant qualifications. 
Sixth, from Table VIII above, the result for board member financial expertise (BME) 
from the baseline model indicate that it has a significant and a positive (b = 0.468, p < 
0.01) relationship with FD. In model 4b, the results for the main effect show a significant 
and a negative (b = -3.897, p < 0.01) relationship between BME and FD. The result of the 
interaction of BME with EC (BME*EC) is significant (b = 4.837, p < 0.01). This means 
that EC has a moderating influence on the relationship between BME and EC and these 
results mean that H7f is supported. From model 4c, the result for the direct effect indicates 
that BME is significantly and negtively (b = -4.977, p < 0.01) related to FD. On the 
interaction of BME and ED, the significant and positve (b = 5.989, p < 0.01) results means 
that ED has a more moderating influence (-4.977 + 5.989 = 1.012) on the relationship 
between BME and FD and this result confirms H5g which states that the negative 
relationship between BME and financial distress is moderated by ED. In model 4d, the 
results from the main effect show that BME is significantly and positively (b = 0.548, p 
< 0.01) related to FD. In terms of the interaction of BME with EM (BME*EM), the 
interaction term reveals an insignificant result which implies that EM does not moderate 
the relationship between BME and FD. These results from model 4d mean that H6f, which 
states that the negative relationship between board member financial expertise and 
financial distress is moderated by environmental munificence is not supported. Thus, the 
results indicate that for BME and its interactions with the environmental dimensions, EC 
and ED have more moderating influences on the relationship bewteen BME and FD 
suggesting that firms need more financial experts in complex and dynamic evironments. 
Seventh, for the audit committee independene (ACIND), the results from the baseline 
model in Table VIII show that it is significantly and negatively related to FD. In model 
4b, the results for the main effect show that it is insignificantly related to FD. On the 
interaction of ACIND and EC (ACIND*EC), the interaction result is insignificant which 
means that EC has no moderating influence on ACIND and FD relationship. This result 
indicates that H7g, which states that the negative relationship between ACIND and FD is 
moderated by EC, is not supported. From model 4c, the results for the main effect show 
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that ACIND is significantly and negatively (b = -0.128, p < 0.05) related to FD. The 
coefficient of the interaction of ACIND and ED (ACIND*ED) is significant (b = 0.126, 
p <0.05) indicating that ED has a moderating influence on the relationship between 
ACIND and FD and hence, H5g is supported. In model 4d, the results for the main effect 
show that ACIND has a significant and negative (b = -0.0109, p < 0.05) relationship with 
FD. Considering the interaction of ACIND with EM (ACIND*EM), the result is 
insignifcant. The results from model 4d  thus, suggest that H6g is not supported. The 
evidence of ACIND and the interactions of the environmental dimensions results, 
therefore, concludes that firms operating in the dynamic environment require less 
independence of the audit committee.  
Eighth, regarding audit committee size, the results from the baseline model in Table VIII 
suggest that audit committee size (ACSZ) is significantly and positively related to FD, 
meaning firms with large ACSZ are more likely to be financially distressed, and vice 
versa. In model 4b the results for the main effect show that ACSZ is insignificantly (b = 
-0.662, p > 0.1) related to FD. The interation of ACSZ and EC (ACSZ*EC) shows an 
insignificant result  (b = 1.378, p > 0.1) implying that EC has no moderating influence on 
the relationship between ACSZ and FD. These results mean that H7i, which states that 
the negative relationship between ACSZ and FD is moderated by EC is not supported. 
For model 4c, the result for the main effect reveals an insignificant relationship between 
ACSZ and FD. On the interaction of ACSZ and ED (ACSZ*ED), the interactive term 
shows an insignificant result indicating that ED does not moderate the ACSZ and FD 
relationship meaning that H5i is not supported. In model 4d, the direct result shows that 
ACSZ is significantly and positively (b = 0.526, p < 0.01) associated with FD, similar to 
the result obtained in the baseline model. For the interaction of ACSZ with EM 
(ACSZ*EM), the result indicates that EM has no moderating influence on the relationship 
between ACSZ and FD since the interactive term is insignificant. The result, therefore, 
means that H6i is not supported. The evidence of the audit committee size suggests that 
none of the environmental dimensions has a moderating influence on the relationship 
between ACSZ and FD. 
Nineth, the results for the variable a firm’s chairperson on the audit committeee (CAC) 
in Table VIII indicate that in the baseline model, it has a significant and a negative  (b = 
-0.357, p < 0.1) relationship with FD. In model 4b the results show that in both the main 
and the interactive effects, the coefficients are insignificant. This means that in model 4b, 
CAC is not significantly related to FD and EC does not moderate the relationship between 
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CAC and FD. The result means that H7j, which states that the negative relationship 
between CAC and FD is moderated by EC is not supported. Similar results of insignificant 
coefficients of the main and the interactive effects are obtained in model 4c which means 
that H7k is not supported. Also, the results of the main effect in model 4d reveals an 
insignificant  (b = -0.329, p > 0.1) relationship between EM and FD. The interaction of 
CAC and ED shows a significant result meaning ED has a moderating influence on the 
relationship between CAC and FD.  
Tenth, for remuneration committee size (RCSZ), the results in Table VIII show that in 
the baseline model, RCSZ is significantly and negatively (b = -0.475, p < 0.01) related to 
FD. In models 4b the results reveal that for the main effects, RCSZ is insignificantly 
related to FD. The results further reveal that the interaction between RCSZ and EC 
(RSZ*EC) is insignificant. Similar insignificant results are found in the main results and 
the interaction of RCSZ and ED. These mean that neither EC nor ED moderates the 
relationship between RCSZ and FD. These results mean that H5k and H6k are not 
supported. In model 4d the results for the main effect indicate that RCSZ is significantly 
and negatively (b = -0.420, p < 0.01) related to FD. Contrarily, the result of the interaction 
between RCSZ and EM (RSZ*EM) show that EM has no moderating influence on the 
association between RCSZ and FD. This result indicates that H6k, which states that the 
negative relationship between remuneration committee size and FD is moderated by 
environmental munificence is rejected. The evidence again suggests that none of the 
environmental dimensions moderates the relationship between RCSZ and FD. 
Finally, for the variable, the presence of a firm chairperson on the remuneration 
committee CRC, the results from Table VIII indicate that neither model 4b, model 4c nor 
model 4d has significant results for the main effect but for the interactive terms, only EM 
is significant. These results mean that H7l, H5l, and H6l  are not supported. 
In conclusion, by comparing the three environmental models using their AIC, pseudo r-
square and the log pseudolikelihood the evidence suggests that model 4c is better than 
model 4b which is also better than model 4d. This means that ED has a more moderating 
influence on the relationship between board composition and structure and FD than EC 
which also has a more moderating influence on the relationship between board 
composition and structure and FD than EM. Also, when these models are compared with 
the baseline model using the same criteria, the evidence suggests that evironment 
moderates the relationship between board composition and structure and  FD. This 
evidence is likely to creat awareness for firms to consider the environmental dimensions 
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in assessing the effect of board composition and structure and FD likelihood and this is a 
significant contribution of the study. Hence, policy makers must consider the 
environment on policies regarding principles involving board composition and structure 
mechanisms.   
8.2.2 RESOURCE 
First, for BSZ, the results from the baseline model show a significant and positive 
relationship with FD. In model 4e for the main effect, the results from Table VIII indicate 
that BSZ is insignificant. The result also shows that the interaction of BSZ and tangible 
resource (TR) (BSZ*TR) is insignificant, meaning TR has no moderating influence on 
the relationship between BSZ and FD and therefore H9a is not supported. For model 4f, 
the main results show that BSZ is not significantly related to FD. On the interaction of 
BSZ and intangible resource (ITR), (BSX*ITR), the results reveal that it is significant. 
This means that ITR has a moderate influence on the relationship between BSZ and FD 
but  H10a, which states that the negative relationship between BSZ and FD is moderated 
by ITR is not supported since the coefficient of the main effect is insignificant.  
Second, for the PIND, the results in the baseline model show that it is significantly and 
positively (b = 1.787, p < 0.01) related to FD. From model 4e, the results for the main 
effect show that the PIND is insignificatly (b = 0.951, p > 0.1) related to FD. On the 
interaction between the PIND and TR (PIND*TR), the results show an insignificant 
interaction effect which indicates that TR has no moderating influence on the relationship 
between the PIND and FD meaning H9b is rejected. In model 4f, the results for the main 
effect reveal that the PIND is significantly and positively related to FD and the interaction 
between the PIND and ITR  (PIND*ITR) also show an insignificant result which means 
that ITR has no moderating influence on the relationship between PIND and FD, 
therefore, H10b is not supported. The evidence, consequently, shows that resource has no 
moderating influence on the relationship between the PIND and FD.  
Third, from the baseline model, the results for BGD reveals an insignificant relationship 
between BGD and FD. In model 4e, the main results show that BGD has an insignificant 
relationship with FD. However, the interaction of  BGD and TR (BGD*TR) has a 
significant result which indicates that TR moderates the BGD and FD relationship but 
H9c is not supported. In model 4f, for the main effect, the results reveal that BGD is 
insignificantly related to FD. The results from the interaction of BGD and ITR 
(BGD*ITR) is insignificant which means ITR has no moderating effect on the 
relationship between BGD and FD, hence, H10c is not supported. These results provide 
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evidence that resource has no moderating influence on the relationship between BGD and 
FD.  
Fourth, regarding BAC, the results from the baseline model reveal a significant and a 
negative (b = -0.210, p < 0.01) relationship with FD. In model 4e, the results for the main 
effect show that BAC is significantly and negatively (b = -0.149, p < 0.01) but the 
interaction results from the interaction of BAC and TR (BAC*TR) indicate that TR does 
not moderate the relationship between BAC and FD. In model 4f the results for the main 
effect indicate that BAC is significantly and negatively (b = -0.480, p < 0.01) related to 
FD. The results of the interaction of BAC and ITR (BAC*ITR) means that ITR moderates 
the relationship between BAC and FD. Hence, the results in model 4d mean that H10d is 
supported. The evidence, therefore, shows that ITR resource moderates the relationship 
between BAC and FD. 
Fifth, for BMQ, the results from the baseline model show that it has a significant and 
negative relationship with FD. In model 4e, the main result shows that BMQ is 
significantly and negatively (b = -0.185, p < 0.1) related to  FD and the interaction terms 
reveal a significant result from the interaction of BMQ and TR (BMQ*TR). The results 
from model 4e, therefore, mean that H9e is confirmed. From model 4f, for the main 
effects, the results are significant but the interaction of ITR and BMQ is insignificant 
which means that ITR has no moderating influence on BMQ and FD relationship. These 
results mean that H10e is not supported.  
Sixth, the result of BME from the baseline model shows that it has a significant and a 
positive (b = 0.468, p < 0.01) relationship with financial distress meaning that the fewer 
the members who have financial expertise, the less likely a firm becomes financially 
distressed. Regarding model 4e, the results for the main effect indicate that BME is 
significantly and positively  (b = 0.355, p < 0.01) related to FD, similar to the results 
obtained from the baseline model. The results from the interaction of BME and TR is, 
however, insignificant which means that TR has no moderating influence on the 
relationship between BME and TR and hence, H9f is not supported. In model 4f, the main 
results for BME indicate that it is significantly and positively (b = 1.328, p < 0.01) related 
to FD. The significant result of the interaction of BME and ITR means that ITR moderates 
BME and FD relationship. These results mean that H10f, which states that the negative 
relationship between BME and FD is moderated by intangible resources, is not supported.   
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Seventh, for ACIND, the results from the baseline model reveal that it is significantly and 
negatively related to FD. In model 4e, the main result indicates that ACIND is 
significantly and negatively (b = -0.0127, p < 0.05) associated with FD which is similar 
to the result obtained from the baseline model. Considering the interaction of ACIND and 
TR (ACIND*TR), the result for the interaction term indicates that TR has a moderating 
impact on the relationship between ACIND and finanial distress, thus, confirming H9g. 
From model 4f, the results indicate that both the main and the interaction effects are not 
significant. This means that audit committee independence is not associated with the 
likelihood of financial distress, and the ITR has no moderating influence on the 
relationship between the ACIND and FD which means that H10g is not supported.  
Eighth, in terms of ACSZ, the results show that in the baseline model, ACSZ is 
significantly and positively related to FD. Considering the main effect of ACSZ on FD in 
model 4e, the results show that it has an insignificant  (b = -0.286, p > 0.1) relationship 
with FD. For the interaction of ACSZ with the TR (ACSZ*TR), the result indicates that 
TR has no moderating influence on ACSZ and FD relationship since the interaction term 
shows an insignificant (b = 0.0368, p > 0.1) result. In model 4f, the results for the main 
effect of ACSZ indicate that it has a significant and a positive (b = 1.844, p < 0.01) 
relationship with FD. The interaction of ACSZ and intangible resource (ACSZ*IR) 
indicates a significant and a negative (b = -0.182, p < 0.01) result which means that 
intangible resource moderates the relationship between audit committee size and financial 
distress. This result means that H10i is not supported due to the direction of the coefficient 
of the main effect.  
Nineth, the results for CAC in the baseline model indicate that it has a significant and a 
negative  (b = -0.357, p < 0.1) relationship with FD. In model 4e the results indicate 
insignificant coefficients for the main and the interaction effects meaning that TR does 
not moderate the relationship between CAC and financial distress. However, in model 4f, 
the results show that for the main effect, the CAC is significantly and negatively (b = -
2.265, p < 0.01) associated with financial distress. The results for the interaction term 
(CAC*ITR) in model 4f  indicates (b = 0.265, p < 0.01) that intangible resource moderates 
the relationship between CAC and FD which means that H10j is supported and the net 
effect (-0.459 + 0.317 = -0.142) shows that the   moderating influence is less.  
Tenth, for RCSZ, the results show that in the baseline model, the remuneration committee 
size is significantly and negatively related to financial distress. Regarding model 4e, the 
result for the main effect reveals that RCSZ has no significant relationship with FD. On 
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the interaction effect, the results show that the interaction of RCSZ and TR (RSZ*TR) 
show that TR has no moderating influence on the RCSZ and FD relationship, hence, H9k 
is not supported. In model 4f, the result for the main effect indicates a significant and a 
negative (b = -2.023, p < 0.01) relationship between RCSZ and FD. The result of the 
interaction term (RSC*ITR) means (b = 0.215, p < 0.01) that ITR  moderates the 
relationship between RCSZ and FD and this means that H10k is supported. The evidence, 
therefore, reveals that ITR has a moderating role of the RCSZ and FD relationship. 
Lastly, for CRC, the results for the baseline model indicate that it has an insignificant 
relationship with FD. The results from Table VIII further indicate significant results for 
the main and the interaction effect. In models 4e meaning that TR has a moderating 
influence on the relationship between CRC and FD. In model 4f, the result for the main 
effect is significantly and positively related FD and the result of the interaction of CRC 
and ITR is significant. However, due to the positive coefficient of the main effect, it 
means that ITR has no koderating influence on the CRC and FD relationship. 
In conclusion, the evidence shows that ITR has a more moderating influence on board 
composition and structure and FD than TR, and both TR model and the ITR model 
compare better than the baseline model using the AIC, the pseudo r-square, and the log 
psuedolikelihood. This means that resource overall, moderates the relationship between 
board composition and structure and FD. However, comparing the resource and the 
environment with the same criteria, the evidence reveals that the environment has a more 
moderating influence on board composition and structure and FD than the resource. This 
gives firms the advantage of knowing where to prioritise their strategies when dealing 
with board composition and structure mechanisms with challenges existing in the 
environment, as well as the resource capability and this is a significant contribution of the 
study to the academic literature.  
8.2.3 TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY 
First, the results in model 4g indicate that for the main effect in model 4g, BSZ is 
significantly and positively (b = 0.736, p < 0.01) related to FD as in the baseline model. 
The result from the interaction of BSZ and technology (TEC) (BSZ*TEC) indicates a 
significant and a positive (b = -0.0336, p < 0.01) result. This means that technology has 
a more (0.736 + -0.0336 = 0.7024) moderating influence on the relationship between BSZ 
and FD. However, H8a which states that the negative relationship between BSZ and FD 
is moderated by TEC is not confirmed since the main effect indicates a positive 
relationship. 
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Second, regarding the PIND in model 4g, the main result shows that it has an insignificant 
(b = 3.517, p > 0.1) relationship with financial distress. There is also an insignificant 
result for the interaction between the PIND and TEC (PIND*TEC). The results in model 
4g mean that H8b, which states that the negative relationship between the PIND and FD 
is moderated by TEC is not supported. 
Third, in model 4g, the results for the main effects show that BGD is significantly and 
negatively (b = -3.585, p < 0.01) related to the likelihood of firms’ FD. On the interaction 
of BGD and TEC (BGD*TEC), the interaction term reveals an insignificant result which 
means that TEC has no moderating effect on the relationship between BGD and FD 
meaning that H8c is not supported.  
Fourth, for BAC the results from model 4g show that for the main effect, BAC is 
significantly and negatively related to FD and on the interaction between BAC and TEC 
(BAC*TEC), the result reveals that TEC has a moderate influence on the relationship 
between BAC and FD which means that H8d is supported. 
Fifth, for BMQ the result for the main effect in model 4g reveals that BMQ is significantly 
and negatively (b = -0.937, p < 0.05) related to FD. The result from the interaction of 
BMQ and TEC (BMQ*TEC) reveals that the interaction term is not significant (b = 
0.0193, p > 0.1) which means that TEC has no moderating influence on the relationship 
between BMQ and FD. These results indicate that H8e, which states that the negative 
relationship between BMQ and FD is moderated by TEC is not supported.  
Sixth, regarding BME, the results from model 4g indicate that for the main effect, BME 
has a significant and a positive (b = 1.558, p < 0.01) relationship with FD. For the 
interaction of BMQ and TEC (BME*TEC), the result ( b = -0.119, p < 0.05) means that 
TEC has a moderating influence on BME and FD but the positive coefficient of the main 
effect means that H8f is not supported.  
Seventh, for ACIND, the results in model 4g reveals that for the main effect ACIND is 
significantly and negatively (b = -0.168, p < 0.01) related to financial distress. The result 
of the interaction of ACIND and TEC reveals that TEC has no moderating influence on 
the ACIND and FD relationship. These results, therefore, mean that H8g is not supported.  
Eighth, for ACSZ in model 4g the result indicates that for the main effect, ACSZ is 
significantly and positively (b = 2.944, p < 0.01) related to FD. On the interactive terms, 
the result of the interaction of ACSZ and TEC (ACSZ*TEC) reveals that TEC has a 
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moderating influence on the relationship between ACSZ and FD. However, this result 
means that H8i is not supported. 
Nineth, for the variables CAC, the results in model 4g reveal that for the main effect, it 
has an insignificant relationship with FD. On the results of the interaction term, it 
showsTEC has a moderating influence on the CAC and FD relationship meaning that H8j 
is not confirmed. Finally, for the variables RCSZ and CRC, the results for the main effects 
show that each of them has an insignificantl relationship with FD. Similarly, the results 
of the interaction effect show that TEC has no moderating influence on the relationship 
between each of these variables and FD though interaction results show significant 
results. These mean that H8k and H8l are not confirmed due to the insignificant of the 
coefficient of the main effects. 
The conclusion drawn from Table VIII is that when all the six moderating factors are 
compared to determine the one that has a more moderating influence on the relationship 
between board composition and structure and FD using the criteria mentioned in the 
previous sections, the evidence suggests that TEC has a more moderating influence and 
this is followed by ED, EC, EM, ITR, and TR. This is a significant contribution that this 
study makes to the academic literature. This will guide firms to know how to implement 
the principles of board composition and structure mechanisms taking into consideration 
their technology, environment, and resource.  
8.3 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE: THE MODERATING ROLE OF ENVIRONMENT, 
RESOURCE, AND TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY  
In this section, each moderating factor interacts with the components of the ownership 
structure. The evidence on the interaction of the moderating factors, which include 
environmental complexity (EC), environmental dynamism (ED), environmental 
munificence (EM), tangible resources (TR), intangible resources (ITR), and technology 
(TEC) on the relationship between the components of ownership structure, and financial 
distress is presented in models 3b (EC model), 3c (ED model), 3d (EM model), 3e (TR 
model), 3f (ITR model), and 3g (TEC model) in Table IX. 
8.3.1 ENVIRONMENT   
First, for directors’ ownership (DOWN), the results from the baseline model indicate that 
it is significantly and negatively (b = -0.0369, p < 0.01) related to FD. The results in 
model 3b show that for the main effect, DOWN is significantly and negatively (b = -
0.352, p < 0.01) related to FD. The results from the interaction of EC and DOWN 
(DOWN*EC) is also significant, meaning EC moderates the relationship between DOWN 
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and FD, hence H7m, which states that the negative relationship between DOWN and FD 
is moderated by EC is confirmed. In model 3c the results show that for the main effect, 
DOWN is significantly and negatively (b = -0.312, p > 0.01) related to FD. The result of 
the interaction of DOWN with ED (DOWN*ED) shows that it is significant meaning that 
ED moderates the relationship between DOWN and FD.  This result means that H5m not 
supported. Considering model 3d where DOWN interacts with EM, the result of the main 
effect indicates that DOWN has a significant and a negative (b = -0.0373, p < 0.01) 
influence on FD. However, the result of the interactive term indicates that EM does not 
have any moderating influence on the relationship between DOWN and FD which thereby 
means that H5m is not confirmed. The evidence of the environmental dimensions, 
therefore, indicate that EC and ED have moderating influences on the relationship 
between DOWN and FD.  
The table on the next page presents the results of the logistic regression of the interactions 
of the moderating factors and ownership structure variables. Model 3a is the baseline 
model for the ownership structure. Models 3b to 3g are respectively, the interaction 
models for environmental complexity (EC), environmental dynamism (ED), 
environmental munificence (EM), tangible resource (TR), intangible resource (IR) and 
technology (TEC). Model 3b therefore, exhibits the interactions between environmental 
complexity and ownership structure variables (EC*DOWN; EC*INOWN; EC*COWN), 
model 3c shows the interaction between environmental dynamism and ownership 
structure variables (ED*DOWN; ED*INOWN; ED*COWN), model 3d represents the 
interaction between environmental munificence and ownership structure variables 
(EM*DOWN; EM*INOWN; EM*COWN), model 3e shows the interaction between 
tangible resources and ownership structure variables (TR*DOWN; TR*INOWN; 
TR*COWN), model 3f represents the interaction between intangible resources and 
ownership structure variables (IR*DOWN; IR*INOWN; IR*COWN), and model 3g is 
the result of the interaction between technology and ownership structure 
variables(TEC*DOWN; 
TEC*INOWN; TEC*COWN). 
      
194 
 
 
TABLE IX: LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE INTERACTIONS OF THE MODERATING FACTORS AND 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE VARIABLES. 
              
Variables Model 3a Model 3b EC Model 3c ED Model 3d EM Model 3e TR Model 3f ITR Model 3g TEC 
              
FAG -0.0105*** -0.00835***  -0.00821***  -0.0106***  -0.0111***  -0.0103***  -0.00598**  
 (0.00228) (0.00229)  (0.00233)  (0.00229)  (0.00235)  (0.00234)  (0.00238)  
FSZ -0.202*** -0.182***  -0.169***  -0.204***  -0.209***  -0.168***  -0.134***  
 (0.0255) (0.0262)  (0.0259)  (0.0256)  (0.0259)  (0.0254)  (0.0276)  
Industry effects Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
DOWN -0.0369*** -0.352*** 0.347*** -0.312*** 0.306*** -0.0373*** 2.1006 -0.0293*** -0.00402 -0.0545*** 0.00282* -0.0614** 0.00343 
 (0.00424) (0.0606) (0.0657) (0.0621) (0.0678) (0.00431) (7.5306) (0.00696) (0.00288) (0.0116) (0.00163) (0.0273) (0.00345) 
INOWN -0.863*** -0.422 -0.410 -1.020 0.247 -0.823*** -0.000255 -0.338** -0.280*** -0.611** -0.0310 0.0164 -0.154*** 
 (0.126) (1.405) (1.488) (1.411) (1.481) (0.129) (0.000396) (0.168) (0.0642) (0.237) (0.0332) (0.462) (0.0594) 
COWN -0.293*** -2.076** 1.840** -2.052** 1.845** -0.296*** 0.000157 -0.588*** 0.147*** -0.601*** 0.0470*** -0.0551 -0.0373 
 (0.0699) (0.816) (0.878) (0.797) (0.854) (0.0717) (0.000237) (0.104) (0.0368) (0.135) (0.0181) (0.278) (0.0327) 
Constant 8.604*** 8.599***  8.262***  8.517***  8.863***  7.976***  8.799***  
 (0.694) (0.754)  (0.747)  (0.695)  (0.719)  (0.720)  (0.823)  
Log Pseudolikelihood -882.71 -750.69  -731.03  -875.84  -867.95  -825.04  -689.46  
Pseudo R-square 0.2016 0.3176  0.3354  0.2038  0.2149  0.2285  0.3501  
AIC 1779.41 1521.37  1482.05  1771.68  1755.89  1670.09  1398.93  
Observations 1,595 1,587  1,587  1,587  1,595  1,544  1,531  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Second, for institutional ownership (INOWN), the results from Table IX indicate that in 
the baseline model, it has a significant and a negative (b = -0.863, p < 0.01) relationship 
with FD. In model 3b, the results reveal that for the main effect, INOWN has no 
significant relationship with FD. Regarding the interaction of INOWN and EC 
(INOWN*EC), the results indicate that EC does not moderate the relationship between 
INOWN and FD. These results mean that H7o is not supported. Similarly, in model 3c 
the results show that on the main effect INOWN has an insignificant (b = -1.020, p > 0.1) 
relationship with FD. On the interaction of INOWN and ED (INOWN*ED), the result 
reveals that ED has no moderating role on the relationship between INOWN and FD and 
this means that H5o, which states that the negative relationship between INOWN and FD 
is moderated by ED is rejected. From model 3d where INOWN interacts with EM, the 
result for the main effect shows that INOWN is significantly and negatively (b = -0.823, 
p < 0.01) related to FD. However, on the interactive terms (INOWN*EM), the result 
indicates that the relationship between INOWN and FD is not moderated by EM which 
means that H6o is not supported. 
Third, on concentrated ownership (COWN), the results from the baseline model in Table 
IX show that it is significantly and negatively (b = -0.293, p < 0.01) related to FD. From 
model 3b, the results show that on the main effect, COWN is significantly and negatively 
(b = -2.076, p < 0.05) related to FD. On the interaction of COWN with EC (COWN*EC), 
the result (b = 1.840, p < 0.05) indicates that EC has a less (-2.871 + 2.659 = -0.236) 
moderating influence on the relationship between COWN and FD. These results mean 
that H7n, which states that the negative relationship between COWN and FD by EC is 
confirmed. In model 3c, the main result show that COWN has a significant and a negative 
(b = -2.052, p < 0.1) relationship with FD. Also, the result of the interactive term 
(COWN*ED) is significant indicating that ED has a moderating influence on the COWN 
and FD relationship, which means that H5n is confirmed. With regards to model 3d, the 
results indicate that on the main effects, COWN is significantly and negatively (b = -
0.296, p < 0.01) associated with FD but on the interaction of COWN and EM 
(COWN*EM), the result reveals that EM has no moderating influence on the relationship 
between COWN and FD. These results mean that H6n, which states that the negative 
relationship between COWN and FD is moderated by EM is not supported. 
In conclusion, the evidence of the environmental dimension models shows that ED has a 
more moderating influence on ownership structure mechanisms and FD and this is 
followed by EC and then EM. The result indicates that each of the environmental 
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dimension models compares better than the baseline model providing further evidence 
that the environment is a significant contextual factor that firms should consider in their 
effort to avoid FD when implementing ownership structure mechanisms.  
8.3.2 RESOURCES 
First, for DOWN in model 3e, the result of the main effect indicates that DOWN is 
significantly and negatively (b = -0.0293, p < 0.1) related to FD as in the baseline model 
but the result of the interactive term (DOWN*TR) indicates that TR has no moderating 
influence on the relationship between DOWN and FD. Hence, H9m is not supported. In 
model 3f, the result shows that DOWN has a significant and a negative (b = -0.0545, p < 
0.01) relationship with FD for the main effect. Also, the interaction of DOWN and ITR 
indicates a significant and a negative (b = 0.00282, p < 0.1) result and this means that ITR 
moderates the relationship between DOWN and FD. These results mean that H10m, 
which states that the negative relationship between directors’ ownership and financial 
distress is moderated by intangible resources, is supported.    
Second, for INOWN in model 3e, the result for the main effect reveals that INOWN has 
a significant and a negative relationship with FD similar to the result of the baseline model 
and for the interactive term (INOWN*TR), the result indicates that TR has a moderating 
role on the relationship between INOWN and FD indicating that H9o is supported. The 
results in model 3f show that for the main effect, INOWN is significantly and negatively 
related to FD. However, for the interactive effects, the coefficient is insignificant which 
means that ITR has no moderating role on the relationship between INOWN and FD 
which means that H10o is not supported.  
Third, in model 3e where COWN interacts with the TR, the results show that COWN for 
the main effect, is significantly and negatively (b = -0.588, p < 0.01) related to FD. There 
is also a significant result of the interactive term (COWN*TR) meaning TR moderates 
COWN and FD relationship thereby supporting H9n. Regarding model 3f, the results 
show that for the main effect, COWN has a significant and a negative (b = -0.601, p < 
0.01) association with FD. Also, on the interaction of COWN with the ITR 
(COWN*ITR), the result indicates that ITR moderates the relationship between COWN 
and FD which means that H10n is confirmed.   
In all, the evidence of the resource models shows that ITR has a more moderating 
influence than the TR when their AICs are compared. The evidence also reveals that when 
the resource models are compared with the evironmental models, the results show that all 
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the environmental models perform better than the resource models. This means that the 
environment has a more moderating influence on the relationship between ownership 
structure mechanisms and FD than the resource and this is a significant contribution that 
the study makes to the academic literature. 
8.3.3 TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY 
Firstly, in model 3g where DOWN interacts with TEC, the result of the main effect 
indicates a significant and a negative (b = -0.0614, p < 0.01) relationship between 
directors’ ownership and financial distress. However, the result of the interactive term 
shows that technology has no moderating influence on DOWN and FD relationship and 
this means that H8m is not supported. 
Secondly, in the same model, INOWN interacts with TEC and the result reveals that for 
the main effect, INOWN is insignificantly  (b = 0.0164, p > 0.1) related to FD. On the 
interaction of INOWN and TEC, the result reveals that TEC has a moderating influence 
on the relationship between INOWN and FD but due to the insignificance of the 
coefficient of the main effect, H8o which states that the negative relationship between 
INOWN and FD is moderated by technology, is not confirmed.  
Finally, for COWN the results in model 3g show that both the coefficients of the main 
and the interaction effects are insignificant. These results mean that on the main effect, 
COWN has no significant influence on FD and the interaction of COWN and TEC 
(COWN*TEC) also reveals that TEC does not moderate the relationship between COWN 
and FD. These insignificant results from models 3g mean that H8n is not confirmed. 
The conclusion that is drawn from the six models obtained as a result of the interaction 
of the six moderating factors with the components of ownership structure is that TEC has 
a more moderating influence on the relationship between the ownership structure 
mechanisms and FD. This is followed by ED, EC, ITR, EM, and TR. Also, all the 
interaction models compared better than the baseline model providing evidence that 
although ownership structure mechanisms significatly relate to FD, such relationship is 
affected by the interaction of these moderating factors which either increase or decrease 
the ownership structure mechanisms' coefficient values, and these are important 
contributions of the study. 
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8.4 DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY: THE MODERATING ROLE OF 
ENVIRONMENT, RESOURCE, AND TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY 
In this section, each moderating factor interacts with the components of disclosure and 
transparency. The evidence of the interaction of the moderating factors which include 
environmental complexity (EC), environmental dynamism (ED), environmental 
munificence (EM), tangible resources (TR), intangible resources (ITR), and technology 
(TEC) on the relationship between the components of disclosure and transparency, and 
financial distress is presented in models 2b (EC model), 2c (ED model), 2d (EM model), 
2e (TR model), 2f (ITR model, and 2g (TEC model) respectively, in Table X. 
8.4.1 ENVIRONMENT 
First, for directors’ remuneration (DREM), the results from the baseline model in Table 
X indicate that it is insignificantly (b = -0.216, p > 0.05) related to FD. In model 2b the 
result for the main effect shows that DREM, like in the baseline model, is significantly 
and negatively (b = -1.183, p < 0.01) related to FD. For the interaction of DREM and EC 
(DREM*EC), the result indicates that the relationship between DREM and FD is 
moderated by EC since the result of the interaction effect is significant (b = 1.069, p < 
0.01). The net effect is that EC has a less (-1.183 + 1.069 = -0.114) moderating influence. 
The result of the interaction term means that H7p, which states that the negative 
relationship between DREM and FD is moderated by EC is supported. Like model 2b, 
the result for the main effect in model 2c shows that DREM has a significant and a 
negative (b = -1.792, p < 0.01) relationship with FD. On the interaction of DREM and 
ED (DREM*ED), the result of the interaction term indicates that ED has a moderating 
influence on the relationship between DREM and FD and this means that H5p is 
confirmed. For model 2d, similar results are obtained for the main effect and interactive 
effect. This means that EM has a moderating role in the relationship between DREM and 
FD which means that H6p is confirmed.  
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The table on the next page presents the results of the logistic regression of the interactions 
of the moderating factors and disclosure and transparency variables. Model 2a is the 
baseline model for disclosure and transparency. Models 2b to 2g are respectively the 
interaction models for environmental complexity (EC), environmental dynamism (ED), 
environmental munificence (EM), tangible resource (TR), intangible resource (IR) and 
technology (TEC). Model 2b therefore, exhibits the interactions between environmental 
complexity and disclosure and transparency variables (EC*DREM; EC*SIND; EC*PAR; 
EC*MN), model 2c shows the interaction between environmental dynamism and 
disclosure and transparency variables (ED*DREM; ED*SIND; ED*PAR; ED*MN), 
model 2d represents the interaction between environmental munificence and disclosure 
and transparency variables (EM*DREM; EM*SIND; EM*PAR; EM*MN), model 2e 
shows the interaction between tangible resources and disclosure and transparency 
variables (TR*DREM; TR*SIND; TR*PAR; IR*MN), model 2f represents the 
interaction between intangible resources and disclosure and transparency variables 
(IR*DREM; IR*SIND; IR*PAR; IR*MN), and model 2g is the result of the interaction 
between technology and disclosure and transparency variables (TEC*DREM; 
TEC*SIND; TEC*PAR; TEC*MN).  
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TABLE X: LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE INTERACTIONS OF THE MODERATING FACTORS AND DISCLOSURE AND 
TRANSPARENCY VARIABLES 
     
              
Variables Model 2a Model 2b EC Model 2c ED Model 2d EM Model 2e TR Model 2f ITR Model 2g TEC 
              
FAG -0.0165*** -0.0112***  -0.0103***  -0.0165***  -0.0175***  -0.0161***  -0.0124***  
 (0.00302) (0.00276)  (0.00284)  (0.00302)  (0.00316)  (0.00294)  (0.00302)  
FSZ 0.0313 0.0221  0.0416  0.0356  0.0482  0.0825**  0.0276  
 (0.0392) (0.0442)  (0.0464)  (0.0396)  (0.0416)  (0.0412)  (0.0531)  
Industry effects Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
DREM -0.216** -1.183*** 1.069*** -1.792*** 1.688*** -0.237*** 0.000101*** -0.256*** 0.00317 -0.334*** 0.00653 0.232* -0.0576*** 
 (0.0898) (0.226) (0.223) (0.184) (0.188) (0.0915) (3.6605) (0.0956) (0.00710) (0.0940) (0.00452) (0.123) (0.00951) 
SIND -1.319*** 5.160** -6.826*** 9.215*** -11.11*** -1.273*** -0.00136*** -0.558** -0.921*** -1.291*** 0.00834 0.182 -0.154 
 (0.153) (2.248) (2.404) (1.949) (2.118) (0.155) (0.000502) (0.235) (0.162) (0.405) (0.0570) (0.906) (0.122) 
PAR -0.210 -2.928 3.344 -3.603* 4.075* -0.241 0.00191*** -0.268* -0.416** -0.691 0.0655 -2.368** 0.272* 
 (0.155) (2.188) (2.353) (2.132) (2.316) (0.157) (0.000665) (0.157) (0.181) (0.442) (0.0665) (1.058) (0.144) 
MN -1.327*** -3.552 2.091 2.596 -4.358* -1.281*** -0.00183*** -1.239*** 0.268 -2.235*** 0.142** -1.048 -0.0365 
 (0.172) (2.750) (2.903) (2.399) (2.560) (0.172) (0.000621) (0.238) (0.168) (0.471) (0.0715) (1.382) (0.184) 
Constant 5.357*** 5.177***  5.290***  5.584***  5.798***  5.692***  4.900***  
 (0.952) (1.074)  (1.086)  (0.971)  (0.992)  (0.960)  (0.966)  
Log Pseudolikelihood -852.67 -719.86  -694.60  -843.16  -831.89  -789.46  -664.41  
Pseudo R-square 0.2283 0.3452  0.3681  0.2330  0.2471  0.2613  0.3733  
AIC 1721.34 1463.71  1413.20  1710.32  1685.79  1605.92  1352.82  
Observations 1,594 1,586  1,586  1,586  1,594  1,543  1,530  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Second, regarding the presence of senior independent director (SIND), the result from the 
baseline model shows that it is significantly and negatively (b = -1.319, p < 0.01) related 
to FD. In model 2b where SIND interacts with EC, the results show that in the main effect, 
the SIND is significant but positively (b = 5.160, p < 0.05) related to FD. Regarding the 
interaction of SIND and EC (SIND*EC), the result shows that EC moderates the 
relationship between SIND and FD but due to the positive coefficient of the main effect, 
H7q is not supported. In model 2c, a similar result as in model 2b is obtained. The result 
shows that for the main effect, the SIND has a significant and a positive relationship with 
FD and for the interactive term (SIND*ED), the significant of the coefficient means that 
ED has a moderating influence on the relationship between SIND and FD, but H5q is not 
confirmed. In model 2d, the results from Table X show that for the main effect, the SIND 
has a significant and a negative (b = -1.273, p < 0.01) relationship with FD. The result of 
the interactive term (SIND*EM) means that EM has a moderating influence on the 
relationship between SIND and FD and these mean that H6q, which states that the 
negative relationship between SIND and FD is moderated by environmental munifence 
is supported. 
Third, for the variable disclosure of proxy voting arrangements in the annual reports 
(PAR), the result from the baseline model in Table X indicates that it is insignificantly (b 
= -0.210, p > 0.1) related to FD. In model 2b the result for the main effect shows that the 
PAR has an insignificant (b = -2.298, p > 0.1) relationship with financial distress. The 
result of the interaction of PAR and EC (PAR*EC) in model 2b indicates that the 
relationship between the PAR and FD is not moderated by EC. The results in model 2b 
mean that H7r, which states that the negative relationship between PAR and FD is 
moderated by EC is not confirmed. From model 2c, the result of the main effect of the 
PAR on FD reveals that it is significantly and negatively (b = -3.603, p < 0.1) related to 
FD. The result of the interactive term (PAR*ED) in model 2c reveals that ED has a 
moderating influenece on the relationship between the PAR and FD which means that 
H5r is confirmed. In model 2d where the PAR interacts with EM, the result for the main 
effect shows that the PAR is insignificantly  (b = -0.241, p > 0.1) related to FD. However, 
the result for the interactive term (PAR*EM) indicates that EM moderates the relationship 
between the PAR and FD, but these results mean that H6r is not supported. 
Finally, for the variable MN, the results from the baseline model in Table X shows that 
the MN  is significantly and negatively related (b = -1.327, p < 0.01) to FD. In model 2b 
the results for the main effect show that the MN is insignificantly (b = -3.552, p > 0.1) 
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related to FD. For the interactive term (MN*EM), the result indicates that the relationship 
between the MN is not moderated by the EC and this means that H7s is not supported. In 
model 2c, the results do not differ from that of model 2b. On the main effect, the results 
of model 2c show that the MN has no significant relationship with FD. From the 
interaction term (MN*ED), the result reveals that ED has a moderating influence on the 
relationship between the MN and FD. These results in model 2c mean that H5s is not 
supported. With regards to model 2d, the result for the main effect indicates that the MN 
is significantly and negatively (b = -1.281, p < 0.01) related to FD. On the interactive 
term (MN*EM), the results mean that EC moderates the relationship between the MN 
and financial distress and these results mean that H6s is supported. 
The evidence obtained from the disclosure and transparency mechanisms’ interactions 
with EC, ED, and EM,  reveals that ED has a more moderating influence followed by EC 
and EM and that these model are better than the baseline model. 
8.4.2 RESOURCE 
Firstly, in model 2e, the result for the main effect shows that DREM has a significant (b 
= -0.256, p < 0.01) and a negative relationship with FD. For the interaction effect 
(DREM*TR), the result indicates that TR has no moderating role of the relationship 
between DREM and FD which means that H9p, which states that the negative relationship 
between DREM and FD is moderated by tangible resources is not supported. Regarding, 
model 2f where directors’ remuneration interacts with the ITR, the result of the main 
effect shows that directors’ remuneration is significantly and negatively (b = -0.334, p < 
0.01) related to FD. However, the result of the interaction of DREM and ITR reveals that 
ITR does not moderate the relationship between DREM and financial distress and this 
means that H10p is not supported. 
Secondly, regarding the SIND, the result for the main effect in model 2e reveals that 
SIND is significantly and negatively associated with FD. The result of the interaction of 
SIND and TR (SIND*TR) is also significant and negative, which means that TR has a 
moderating role on the relationship between SIND and FD and this means that H9q is 
confirmed. For model 2f, the main result indicates that SIND is significantly and 
negatively (b = -1.291, p < 0.01) related to FD but the result of the interaction term 
(SIND*ITR) means that ITR has no moderating influence on the relationship between 
SIND and FD and these results imply that H10q is not supported.   
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Thirdly, regarding PAR, the results in model 2e show that for the main effect the PAR 
has a significant and a negative relationship with financial distress. Also, the interaction 
of the PAR and TR (PAR*TR) indicates a significant and a negative result effect 
meanning H9r, which states that the negative relationship between the PAR and FD is 
moderated by TR is supported. In model 2f, the results for the main effect show that PAR 
has no significant relationship with FD. Similarly, the interactive effect indicates an 
insignificant result which means that ITR has no moderating influence on the relationship 
between the PAR and FD, These suggest that H10r is not supported. 
Finally, for MN, the model 2e result indicate that for the main effect the MN has a 
significant and a negative (b = -1.239, p < 0.01) relationship with FD but the result of the 
interactive term (MN*TR) indicates that TR has no moderating influence on the 
relationship between the MN and FD. These results in model 2e suggest that H9s is not 
confirmed. In model 2f, the result for the main effect shows that the MN is significantly 
and negatively (b = -2.235, p < 0.01) related to FD. On the interactive term (MN*ITR), 
the significant result implies that H10s, which states that the negative relationship 
between the MN and FD is moderated by ITR is confirmed.  
The evidence of the resource models shows that when they are compared with the 
environment models, ED and EC are better than the TR and ITR but they are, however, 
better than EM. The results also show that all the resource models perform better than the 
baseline model. 
8.4.3 TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY 
Firstly, for DREM, the results in model 2g show that for the main effect DREM has a 
significant but a positive (b = 0.232, p < 0.05) relationship with FD. On the interaction of 
DREM and TEC (DREM*TEC), the result indicates that TEC moderates the relationship 
between DREM and FD. This result means that H8p, which states that the negative 
relationship between DREM and FD is moderated by TEC is not supported because the 
direction of the coefficient of the main effect is positive. 
Second, in model 2g, for the main effect, the result indicates that SIND has no significant 
relationship with FD. Also, the interaction term (SIND*TEC) is insignificant implying 
that TEC has no moderating influence on the relationship between SIND and FD, hence, 
H8q which states that the negative relationship between SIND and FD is moderated by 
TEC is not confirmed.  
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Third, in model 2g where PAR interacts with TEC, the result for the main effect shows 
that the PAR is significantly and negatively related to FD. The interaction effect 
(PAR*TEC) also shows a significant result which means that TEC moderates the 
relationship between the PAR and FD, hence, H8r is supported. 
Finally, regarding MN, the results in model 2g indicate that for the main effect, the MN 
is insignificantly (b = -1.048, p > 0.1) associated with FD. On the interaction of the MN 
and TEC, the insignificance (b = 0.0365, p > 0.1) of the results mean that TEC has no 
moderating influence on the relationship between the MN and FD. The results in model 
2g mean that H8s, which states that the negative relationship between the disclosure of 
notice of the annual general meeting in the annual report and financial distress is 
moderated by technology is not supported.   
In drawaing conclusions from Table X the evidence obtained as the result of the 
interaction of the six moderating factors with the components of disclosure and 
transparency is that TEC has more moderating influence on the relationship between the 
disclosure and transparency mechanisms and FD and that all the other interaction models 
are of best fit than the baseline model. This provides further evidence that although 
disclosure and transparency mechanisms significatly relate to FD, such relationship is 
affected by the interaction of these moderating factors which either increase or decrease 
the disclosure and transparency mechanisms' coefficient values and these make 
significant contributions from the study.  
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8.5 THE INTERACTION OF THE MODERATING FACTORS WITH ALL THE 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE VARIABLES  
Under sections 8.2, 8.3, and 8.4, each of the moderating factors interacted with each of 
the components of board composition and structure, each of the components of ownership 
structure, and each of the components of disclosure and transparency. This was to 
determine the moderating influence of each moderating factor on the relationship between 
each component of board structure and composition, each component of ownership 
structure, and each component of disclosure and transparency, and financial distress. 
Thus, the moderating role of each moderating factor on the relationship between each 
corporate governance mechanism (independent variables) and financial distress has 
already been analysed in the preceding sections and sub-sections.  
In this section, however, each of the six moderating factors is interacted with all the 
corporate governance mechanisms in a model to determine the model’s effectiveness in 
predicting the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and financial 
distress. The results are presented in Table XI. First, model 5a presents the results of the 
corporate governance variables and the control variables without any moderating factors. 
Second, model 5b demonstrates the results of the interaction of environmental complexity 
and the corporate governance variables and the control variables. Third, model 5c shows 
the results of the interaction of environmental dynamism and the corporate goveranace 
variables and the control variables. Fourth, model 5d reveals the results of the interaction 
of environmental munificence and the corporate governance variables and the control 
variables. Fifth, model 5e displays the results of the interaction of tangible resources with 
the corporate governance variables and the control variables. Sixth, model 5f unveils the 
results of the interaction of intangible resource with the corporate governance variables 
and the control variables. Lastly, model 5g shows the interaction of technology with 
corporate governance and control variables.  
In comparing the models, Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) is used. According to the 
AIC, a lower arithmetic value indicates a model best fit. First, AIC is used to compare the 
environmental dimension models (models 5b, 5c, and 5d), and the results from Table XI 
shows that model 5c is the model of best fit than models 5b and 5d. For models 5b and 
5d, model 5b is the one of best fit. These translate that for the three environmental 
dimensions, firms should consider their dynamic environment followed by complexity 
and munificence as being significant in their corporate governance to ensure continuous 
survival and avoid the likelihood of financial distress.  
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The table on the next page presents the results of the logistic regression of the interactions 
between the moderating factors and all the corporate governance variables. Model 5a is 
the baseline model for all the corporate governance variables and the control variables. 
Models 5b to 5g are respectively, the interaction models for environmental complexity 
(EC), environmental dynamism (ED), environmental munificence (EM), tangible 
resource (TR), intangible resource (ITR) and technology (TEC). Model 5b therefore, 
exhibits the interactions of environmental complexity and all the corporate governance 
variables (EC*BSZ; EC*PIND; EC*BGD; EC*BAC; EC*BMQ; EC*BME; 
EC*ACIND; EC*ACSZ; EC*CAC; EC*RCSZ; EC*CRC; EC*DOWN; EC*INOWN; 
EC*COWN; EC*DREM; EC*SIND; EC*PAR; EC*MN). Model 5c shows the 
interaction of environmental dynamism and all the corporate governance variables 
(ED*BSZ; ED*PIND; ED*BGD; ED*BAC; ED*BMQ; ED*BME; ED*ACIND; 
ED*ACSZ; ED*CAC; ED*RCSZ; ED*CRC; ED*DOWN; ED*INOWN; ED*COWN; 
ED*DREM; ED*SIND; ED*PAR; ED*MN). Model 5d also represents the interaction 
between environmental munificence and all the corporate governance variables 
(EM*BSZ; EM*PIND; EM*BGD; EM*BAC; EM*BMQ; EM*BME; EM*ACIND; 
EM*ACSZ; EM*CAC; EM*RCSZ; EM*CRC; EM*DOWN; EM*INOWN; 
EM*COWN; EM*DREM; EM*SIND; EM*PAR; EM*MN). Likewise, model 5e shows 
the interaction of tangible resources and all the corporate governance variables (TR*BSZ; 
TR*PIND; TR*BGD; TR*BAC; TR*BMQ; TR*BME; TR*ACIND; TR*ACSZ; 
TR*CAC; TR*RCSZ; TR*CRC; TR*DOWN; TR*INOWN; TR*COWN; TR*DREM; 
TR*SIND; TR*PAR; IR*MN). Model 5f represents the interaction of intangible 
resources and all the corporate governance variables (ITR*BSZ; ITR*PIND; ITR*BGD; 
ITR*BAC; ITR*BMQ; ITR*BME; ITR*ACIND; ITR*ACSZ; ITR*CAC; ITR*RCSZ; 
ITR*CRC; ITR*DOWN; ITR*INOWN; ITR*COWN; ITR*DREM; ITR*SIND; 
ITR*PAR; ITR*MN). Finally, model 5g is the result of the interaction of technology and 
all the corporate governance variables (TEC*BSZ; TEC*PIND; TEC*BGD; TEC*BAC; 
TEC*BMQ; TEC*BME; TEC*ACIND; TEC*ACSZ; TEC*CAC; TEC*RCSZ; 
TEC*CRC; TEC*DOWN; TEC*INOWN; TEC*COWN; TEC*DREM; TEC*SIND; 
TEC*PAR; TEC*MN).
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TABLE XI: LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE MODERATING VARIABLES AND ALL THE 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE VARIABLES. 
Variables Model 5a Model 5b EC Model 5c ED Model 5d EM Model 5e TR Model 5f ITR Model 5g TEC 
              
FAG -0.0177*** -0.0131***  -0.0110***  -0.0178***  -0.0152***  -0.0189***  -0.0177***  
 (0.00306) (0.00289)  (0.00294)  (0.00316)  (0.00357)  (0.00334)  (0.00388)  
FSZ -0.189*** -0.108*  -0.0858  -0.191***  -0.144**  -0.129**  -0.144**  
 (0.0521) (0.0582)  (0.0596)  (0.0552)  (0.0589)  (0.0537)  (0.0721)  
Industry effect Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
DREM -0.438*** -3.881*** 3.430*** -4.526*** 4.077*** -0.458*** 0.00109 -0.546*** -0.0647 0.0313 -0.0918 1.235*** -0.218*** 
 (0.114) (0.893) (0.945) (0.929) (0.990) (0.119) (0.000767) (0.157) (0.0513) (0.529) (0.0682) (0.372) (0.0480) 
SIND -1.509*** -1.952 0.268 -0.137 -1.632 -1.368*** -0.00105 0.699* -1.664*** -2.699*** 0.185 -1.518 0.0183 
 (0.181) (3.348) (3.512) (3.713) (3.906) (0.185) (0.00448) (0.390) (0.273) (0.843) (0.116) (1.097) (0.155) 
PAR -0.498*** -18.00*** 19.22*** -15.78*** 17.00*** -0.489*** 0.00818*** -0.650*** -0.668*** 0.460 -0.124 -0.821 0.00761 
 (0.174) (3.786) (3.941) (3.437) (3.600) (0.188) (0.00308) (0.187) (0.153) (0.855) (0.124) (1.145) (0.155) 
MN -1.333*** 0.873 -2.805 6.497* -8.795** -1.270*** -0.00292 -0.523* -0.0298*** -5.223*** 0.547*** -0.902 -0.0370 
 (0.199) (3.693) (3.847) (3.762) (3.957) (0.201) (0.00392) (0.304) (0.00644) (1.292) (0.173) (1.386) (0.187) 
DOWN -0.0459*** -0.388*** 0.375*** -0.297*** 0.279*** -0.0453*** 2.5905 -0.0109 -0.210 -0.143*** 0.0140*** -0.0782*** 0.00539 
 (0.00495) (0.0836) (0.0894) (0.0806) (0.0876) (0.00522) (0.000246) (0.0103) (0.146) (0.0249) (0.00343) (0.0291) (0.00362) 
INOWN -0.427*** 7.749** -8.340*** 6.462** -6.971** -0.416*** -0.00683** -0.0287 0.254*** -0.513 0.00652 -2.516** 0.230* 
 (0.136) (3.028) (3.171) (3.008) (3.160) (0.138) (0.00344) (0.250) (0.0903) (0.745) (0.101) (0.999) (0.133) 
COWN -0.251*** 0.0583 -0.458 -0.340 -0.0148 -0.276*** 0.00333 -0.669*** 0.217*** -1.396*** 0.152*** -0.881* 0.0693 
 (0.0798) (1.108) (1.165) (1.073) (1.135) (0.0786) (0.00239) (0.166) (0.0516) (0.423) (0.0576) (0.510) (0.0654) 
BSZ 0.257*** 2.841*** -2.769*** 2.529*** -2.410*** 0.261*** 0.000395 0.00222 -0.354* 0.306 0.00539 0.464* -0.0565 
 (0.0523) (0.882) (0.936) (0.823) (0.872) (0.0564) (0.00122) (0.104) (0.205) (0.214) (0.0296) (0.258) (0.0397) 
PIND 1.105* -14.19* 15.82* -21.14** 23.14** 1.110* -0.00120 -4.132*** 4.479*** 4.378 -0.405 2.861 -0.230 
 (0.619) (8.287) (8.737) (8.744) (9.294) (0.650) (0.0213) (1.041) (0.757) (2.822) (0.382) (3.038) (0.422) 
BGD -0.0858 9.076*** -9.786*** 6.623** -7.330*** -9.609*** 12.17*** 0.403 0.000275 -1.618** 0.230** -3.009*** 0.434*** 
 (0.156) (2.729) (2.860) (2.658) (2.804) (1.573) (2.200) (0.308) (0.000337) (0.800) (0.110) (0.899) (0.128) 
BAC -0.202*** -1.891*** 1.778** -1.520** 1.396** -0.216*** -0.000661 -0.200*** -0.0229 -0.506** 0.0432 -0.267* 0.00777 
 (0.0330) (0.662) (0.692) (0.649) (0.683) (0.0350) (0.00125) (0.0652) (0.0300) (0.201) (0.0266) (0.156) (0.0215) 
BMQ -0.185*** 3.292*** -3.824*** 3.579*** -4.168*** -0.238*** 0.000995 -0.0440 -0.0683 -0.776*** 0.0699* -0.795** 0.111** 
 (0.0541) (1.194) (1.237) (1.118) (1.161) (0.0586) (0.00130) (0.127) (0.0630) (0.301) (0.0399) (0.371) (0.0520) 
BME 0.491*** -5.185*** 6.271*** -5.052*** 6.168*** 0.584*** -0.00163 0.504*** -0.0711 2.357*** -0.250*** 1.210* -0.104 
 (0.0873) (1.364) (1.438) (1.303) (1.392) (0.0921) (0.00164) (0.165) (0.0772) (0.456) (0.0614) (0.650) (0.0883) 
ACSZ 0.556*** 2.995 -2.366 6.219** -5.812** 0.535*** 1.5605 0.511 -0.0769 1.504** -0.122 3.247** -0.328* 
 (0.172) (2.767) (2.928) (2.593) (2.763) (0.183) (0.000142) (0.330) (0.169) (0.633) (0.0857) (1.284) (0.173) 
CAC -0.656*** -0.412 -0.911 1.965 -3.494 -0.571** 0.000275 -0.517 -0.132 -1.568 0.116 -1.827 0.164 
 (0.247) (3.415) (3.632) (3.581) (3.805) (0.265) (0.00299) (0.465) (0.279) (1.122) (0.150) (1.268) (0.178) 
ACIND -0.00527 0.130 -0.141 0.137 3.543 -0.00497 0.00319 0.000655 -0.00854 0.00209 -0.00213 -0.129*** 0.0182*** 
 (0.00498) (0.0956) (0.101) (0.0874) (2.523) (0.00519) (0.00520) (0.00999) (0.00563) (0.0226) (0.00321) (0.0276) (0.00402) 
RCSZ -0.539*** -3.344 2.914 -3.923* -0.150 -0.467*** -0.00436* -0.145 -0.252* -1.980*** 0.187* -0.374 -0.0118 
 (0.162) (2.431) (2.589) (2.347) (0.0928) (0.169) (0.00225) (0.300) (0.152) (0.760) (0.102) (1.076) (0.149) 
CRC 0.132 1.270 -0.964 0.901 -0.485 0.0780 -0.00593 -0.0279 0.106 0.979 -0.127 -0.505 0.0498 
 (0.239) (3.304) (3.507) (3.442) (3.664) (0.254) (0.00520) (0.443) (0.262) (1.075) (0.145) (1.228) (0.175) 
Constant 14.26*** 16.38***  16.49***  14.58***  17.14***  16.74***  13.86***  
 (1.447) (1.832)  (1.835)  (1.516)  (1.737)  (1.674)  (1.766)  
Log Pseudolikelihood -699.23 -548.29  -535.86  -659.13  -620.34  -621.13  -493.60  
Pseudo R-square 0.3578 0.4939  0.5054  0.3885  0.4274  0.4096  0.5270  
AIC 1442.45 1176.58  1151.72  1396.26  1320.69  1322.27  1067.21  
Observations 1,571 1,563  1,563  1,555  1,563  1,520  1,507  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The results indicate that firms’ environment plays a key role in the relationship between 
corporate governance and financial distress. This is because the results show that when 
all the environmental dimension models (models 5b, 5c, and 5d) are compared with model 
5a, which is the baseline model, the results show that each of the environmental models 
exhibits an improvement upon the baseline model indicating the significance of a firm’s 
environmemt moderating the relationship between corporate governance and financial 
distress. Hence, the results from models 5a, 5b, 5c, and 5d  suggest that firms operating 
in a dynamic, complex and munificence environments need to respond with appropriate 
corporate governance mechanisms to ensure continued survival.  
Second, in comparing models 5e and 5f using the AIC, the results reveal that model 5e is 
the model of best fit than model 5f. That is, the interaction between tangible resource and 
corporate governance mechanisms have a more moderating influence on financial distress 
than the interaction between intangible resource and corporate governance variables. 
However, when models 5e and 5f are compared with model 5a using the same criterium, 
the results indicate that models 5e and 5f show the best fit than model 5a. The results 
from models 5a, 5e, and 5f  suggest that firms’ tangible and intangible resources are very 
significant in moderating the corporate governance and financial distress relationship. 
Hence, in using corporate governance mechanisms to avoid financial distress, firms 
should not neglect the role of their resources.  
Finally, comparing all the moderating models (models 5b, 5c, 5d, 5e, 5f, and 5g) using 
the AIC, the results from Table XI show that model 5g is comparatively the one with the 
best fit and this is followed by model 5c, then models 5b, 5e, 5f, and model 5d being the 
model with the least fit but even shown to be a better model when compared with the 
baseline model (model 5a). These results suggest that from the six moderating factors, 
firms’ technology has a greater influence on corporate governance and financial distress 
relationship. This is followed by environmental dynamism, environmental complexity, 
tangible resource, intangible resource, and then finally environmental munificence having 
the least influence on the relationship between corporate governance and financial 
distress. It must be noted that when all the moderating models are compared with the 
baseline model, the results show that each of the moderating models performs better than 
tha baseline model. In conclusion, since the models with the moderating factors are better 
than the model without any moderating factor, the study confirms that firms’ 
environment, resource, and technology moderate the relationship between corporate 
governace and financial distress. Hence, these results support the argument that a firm’s 
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contextual factors in the form of environment, resource, and technology play significant 
roles in their efforts to use their corporate governance mechanisms to avoid financial 
distress. 
8.5.1 CONTROL VARIABLES 
The evidence presented in Table XI also shows the results of the control variables 
included in all the models. The results indicate that the control variables do not differ 
much from that of the baseline model when the moderating factors interact with the 
corporate governance mechanisms. From the results in model 5b to model 5g, except for 
firm size which lost its significance in model 5c, the other control variables maintain their 
coefficients’ direction as the results in model 5a. The results from Table XI therefore 
indicate that the interaction of the moderating factors with the corporate governance 
mechanisms did not change the entire directions and significant levels of the control 
variables suggesting that although contextual factors (environment, resource, and 
technology) moderate the corporate governance and financial distress relationship, 
control variables that could influence the relationship between corporate governance and 
financial distress needed to be considered. 
8.6 ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
To enhance the robustness of the results, further analysis of the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and financial distress was estimated. To achieve this, 
the sample of the study which consisted of 100 financially distressed and 100 financially 
non-distressed firms, based on their listing on the LSE was divided into firms listed on 
the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) and firms listed on the Main Market. From the 
100 financially distressed firms in the sample, there were 65 firms in the AIM and 35 
firms in the Main Market. In addition, from the 100 non- financially distressed firms in 
the sample, there were 35 firms in the AIM and 65 firms in the Main Market. This means 
that for firms in the AIM, there were 65 distressed firms and 35 non-distressed firms and 
for firms in the Main Market there were 35 distressed and 65 non-distressed firms.  
8.6.1 MULTIVARIATE LOGISTIC RESULTS OF FIRMS IN THE AIM  
From Table XII, the study reports evidence of the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and financial distress of firms in the AIM in five models. First, 
model 7a, which is the baseline model reports evidence of the control variables only. 
Second, all the four disclosure and transparency variables together, with the control 
variables are reported in model 7b. Third, in model 7c, the three ownership variables and 
the control variables are presented. Fourth, model 7d reports on all the eleven variables 
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of board composition and structure, as well as the control variables. Finally, in model 7e, 
all the variables of disclosure and transparency, ownership structure, board composition 
and structure, and the control variables are presented. Although the relationship of each 
individual variable with financial distress was determined, the priority was to use 
Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) as a decision criterion for the model of best fit. 
The table on the next page presents the results of the following panel data logistic 
regression on the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and financial 
distress of firms on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM): FDit= β0 + β1Ait + β2Xit + 
dt + ηit + μit , where: FD is financial distress and it is the dependent variable measured as 
a binary variable with 1 representing financially distressed firms and 0 representing 
financially non-distressed firms. “A” variables include directors remuneration (DREM), 
presence of senior independent director (SIND) , proxy arrangements (PAR), meeting 
notices (MN), directors’ ownership, (DOWN), institutional ownership (INOWN), 
concentrated ownership (COWN), board size (BSZ), proportion of independent directors 
(PIND), board gender diversity (BGD), board activity (BAC), board member 
qualification (BMQ), board member financial expertise (BME), audit committee 
independence (ACIND), audit committee size (ACSZ), chairperson on audit committee 
(CAC), remuneration committee size (RCSZ), chairperson on remuneration committee 
(CRC). “X” represents the control variables that may influence financial distress and they 
include firm age (FAG), firm size (FSZ), and industry (IND). β1 and β2 are coefficients to 
be estimated and i is the cross-sectional unit (company, i = 1-200); t is the time period 
(year, t = 1-8); dt is the time effect; ηi represents the individual effect and μit is the random 
disturbance. Model 1a is the baseline model; model 1b represents the disclosure and 
transparency model; model 1c is the ownership model; model 1d represents board 
composition and structure model, whereas model 1e is the overall corporate governance 
model.  
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TABLE XII: LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE RELATION 
BETWEENCORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL DISTRESS OF FIRMS LISTED 
ON THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT MARKET (AIM FIRMS). 
Variables Model 7a Model 7b Model 7c Model 7d Model 7e 
FAG -0.0194*** -0.0167** -0.0132*** -0.0369*** -0.0241*** 
 (0.00476) (0.00671) (0.00494) (0.00710) (0.00729) 
FSZ -0.331*** -0.0638 -0.380*** -0.189** -0.246** 
 (0.0563) (0.0727) (0.0684) (0.0815) (0.114) 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BSZ    -0.136 0.261** 
    (0.0855) (0.112) 
PIND    5.821*** 5.227*** 
    (0.881) (1.107) 
BGD    -0.453* -0.218 
    (0.238) (0.240) 
BAC    -0.312*** -0.322*** 
    (0.0455) (0.0523) 
BMQ    -0.0495 -0.000737 
    (0.0958) (0.109) 
BME    0.568*** 0.406** 
    (0.159) (0.179) 
ACSZ    0.320 0.823** 
    (0.301) (0.411) 
CAC    0.685* 0.181 
    (0.380) (0.450) 
ACIND    -0.0322*** -0.0412*** 
    (0.00716) (0.00885) 
RCSZ    -0.0794 -0.348 
    (0.253) (0.292) 
CRC    -0.964*** -0.835* 
    (0.367) (0.456) 
DREM  -0.520***   -0.493** 
  (0.140)   (0.202) 
SIND  -1.157***   -1.504*** 
  (0.253)   (0.305) 
PAR  -0.328   -0.986*** 
  (0.225)   (0.301) 
MN  -2.150***   -1.978*** 
  (0.350)   (0.415) 
DOWN   -0.0473***  -0.0386*** 
   (0.00827)  (0.00984) 
INOWN   -0.978***  -0.793*** 
   (0.180)  (0.211) 
COWN   -0.423***  -0.571*** 
   (0.150)  (0.179) 
Constant 5.161*** 11.56*** 12.35*** 5.847*** 20.79*** 
 (0.555) (1.555) (1.296) (0.914) (3.026) 
Log Pseudolikelihood -412.48 -359.15 -366.05 -328.48 -258.57 
Pseudo R-square 0.2036 0.3052 0.2933 0.3566 0.4925 
AIC 832.96 734.30 746.10 686.97 561.13 
Observations 800 799 800 783 782 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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First, in model 7a which is the baseline model and represents the control variables, the 
evidence indicates that firm age, firm size and industry are all significant and negatively 
related to financial distress and these results are as expected.  
Second, the results in model 7b from Table XII indicate that except for the disclosure of 
proxy voting arrangements in the annual reports, the result demonstrates that directors’ 
remuneration, the presence of senior independent director, as well as the disclosure of 
notice of the annual general meeting in the annual reports, all have significant and 
negative relationships with financial distress. 
Third, the evidence presented in model 7c reveals that directors’ ownership, institutional 
ownership, and concentrated ownership as expected, are all significantly and negatively 
related to financial distress, indicating that the more these group of investors and 
directors’ own shares, the more effective is their monitoring responsibility and this 
improves profitability and reduces the likelihood of financial distress. 
Fourth, from model 7d the result shows that board gender diversity, board activity, audit 
committee independence, and a firm’s chairperson on the remuneration committee as 
expected are significant and have negative relationships with financial distress. Also, 
board member financial expertise and the proportion of independent directors although 
are significant, their positive relationships with financial distress mean that they are not 
in line with expectations. The remaining components of model 7d which are board size, 
board member qualification, audit committee size, a firm’s chairperson on the audit 
committee, and remuneration committee size are insignificantly related to financial 
distress.  
Fifth, the results from model 7e that represent all the corporate governance mechanisms 
and the control variables show that all the components of disclosure and transparency are 
significant and negatively related to financial distress. Further, from model 7e, all the 
ownership structure variables are significant and have negative relationships with 
financial distress as found in model 7c. The results in model 7e additionally demonstrate 
that board size and audit committee size that were insignificant in model 7c are now 
significant but positively related to financial distress. Board gender diversity, 
remuneration committee size, board member education, and a firm’s chairperson on the 
audit committee are insignificant. For the control variables in model 7e, the result 
demonstrates that firm size, firm age and industry are all significant and negatively related 
to financial distress.  
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Finally, in using the AIC to determine which of the models has the best fit, the results 
from Table XII show that model 7e is the model that fits the data since it has a lower 
arithmetic value. This is followed by model 7d, then model 7b, 7c, and 7a. These results, 
therefore, indicate that although the board composition and structure variables, ownership 
structure variables, and disclosure and transparency variables all predict firms’ financial 
distress than the firm characteristics, a model that combines all the corporate governance 
mechanisms is the one that has the best fit and therefore likely to predict financial distress 
better. The results further demonstrate that corporate governance mechanisms do not 
work in isolation and that firms should put all the corporate governance mechanisms 
together to avoid the likelihood of financial distress.   
8.6.2 MULTIVARIATE LOGISTIC RESULTS OF FIRMS IN THE MAIN MARKET 
From Table XIII, the study reports evidence of the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and financial distress of firms in the Main Market in five models. 
First, model 8a, which is the baseline model reports evidence of the control variables. 
Second, all the four disclosure and transparency variables, together with the control 
variables are reported in model 8b. Third, in model 8c, the three ownership variables and 
the control variables are presented. Fourth, model 8d reports on all the eleven variables 
of board composition and structure as well as the control variables. Finally, in model 8e, 
all the components of disclosure and transparency, ownership structure, board 
composition and structure, and the control variables are presented.  
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The table on the next page presents the results of the following panel data logistic 
regression on the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and financial 
distress of firms listed on the Main Market: FDit= β0 + β1Ait + β2Xit + dt + ηit + μit , where: 
FD is in financial distress and it is the dependent variable measured as a binary variable 
with 1 representing financially distressed firms and 0 representing financially non-
distressed firms. “A” variables include directors remuneration (DREM), the presence of 
senior independent director (SIND), proxy arrangements (PAR), meeting notices (MN), 
directors’ ownership, (DOWN), institutional ownership (INOWN), concentrated 
ownership (COWN), board size (BSZ), proportion of independent directors (PIND), 
board gender diversity (BGD), board activity (BAC), board member qualification 
(BMQ), board member financial expertise (BME), audit committee independence 
(ACIND), audit committee size (ACSZ), chairperson on audit committee (CAC), 
remuneration committee size (RCSZ), and chairperson on remuneration committee 
(CRC). “X” represents the control variables that may influence financial distress and 
include firm size (FSZ), firm age  (FAG), and industry (IND). β1 and β2 are coefficients 
to be estimated and i is the cross-sectional unit (company, i = 1-200); t is the time period 
(year, t = 1-8); dt is the time effect; ηi represents the individual effect and μit is the random 
disturbance. Model 1a is the baseline model; model 1b represents the disclosure and 
transparency model; model 1c is the ownership model; model 1d represents board 
composition and structure model, and model 1e is the overall corporate governance 
model.  
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TABLE XIII: LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE RELATION 
BETWEENCORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL DISTRESS OF FIRMS LISTED 
ON THE MAIN MARKET. 
      
Variables Model 8a Model 8b Model 8c Model 8d Model 8e 
      
FAG -0.00718*** -0.0120*** -0.00654** -0.0136*** -0.0151*** 
 (0.00250) (0.00325) (0.00257) (0.00298) (0.00379) 
FSZ 0.0237 0.0442 -0.0373 -0.115*** -0.0729 
 (0.0281) (0.0523) (0.0292) (0.0437) (0.0622) 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BSZ    0.188*** 0.314*** 
    (0.0470) (0.0612) 
PIND    -0.916 -1.683** 
    (0.675) (0.818) 
BGD    0.243 0.369* 
    (0.203) (0.224) 
BAC    -0.0455 -0.0874* 
    (0.0402) (0.0472) 
BMQ    -0.502*** -0.426*** 
    (0.0795) (0.0791) 
BME    0.765*** 0.758*** 
    (0.116) (0.120) 
ACSZ    0.710*** 0.684*** 
    (0.193) (0.215) 
CAC    -0.966*** -1.007*** 
    (0.287) (0.324) 
ACIND    -0.799*** -0.795*** 
    (0.189) (0.199) 
RCSZ    0.0291*** 0.0337*** 
    (0.0103) (0.0101) 
CRC    0.220 0.475* 
    (0.221) (0.274) 
DREM  0.141   -0.419*** 
  (0.131)   (0.154) 
SIND  -1.148***   -1.320*** 
  (0.215)   (0.256) 
PAR  -0.0693   -0.209 
  (0.247)   (0.279) 
MN  -1.302***   -1.481*** 
  (0.228)   (0.284) 
DOWN   -0.0223***  -0.0296*** 
   (0.00514)  (0.00739) 
INOWN   -0.505***  0.214 
   (0.195)  (0.196) 
COWN   -0.223***  -0.199* 
   (0.0818)  (0.113) 
Constant -0.112 -0.612 4.061*** -1.126 6.075*** 
 (0.360) (1.410) (0.921) (1.075) (2.178) 
Pseudolikelihood -489.36 -441.69 -472.69 -413.60 -352.28 
Pseudo R-square 0.0442 0.1373 0.0767 0.1841 0.3051 
AIC 986.73 899.37 959.38 857.19 748.56 
Observations 789 789 789 783 783 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Although the relationship of each individual variable with financial distress was 
determined, the priority was to use Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) as a decision 
criterion to determine the model of best fit.  
Firstly, the results from model 8a in Table XIII indicate that firm age is significantly and 
negatively related to financial distress. There is also a significant industry effect from the 
results. However, firm size is insignificantly related to financial distress.  
Secondly, the evidence from Table XIII demonstrates that from the four variables in the 
disclosure and transparency model in model 8b, the presence of senior independent 
director and disclosure of proxy voting arrangement in the annual reports are significantly 
and negatively related to financial distress. The other two variables, which are directors’ 
remuneration and disclosure of notice of the annual general meeting in the annual reports 
in model 8a, are however insignificantly related to financial distress. 
Thirdly, the result in model 8c shows that concentrated ownership, institutional 
ownership, and directors’ ownership are significantly and negatively related to financial 
distress.  
Fourthly, for board composition and structure variables, the evidence of the study in 
model 8d demonstrates that board gender diversity, board activity, the proportion of 
independent directors, and a firm’s chairperson on the remuneration committee have 
insignificant and influence on financial distress. The result from the model further 
demonstrates that board member qualification, a firm’s chairperson on the audit 
committee have a significant and negative relationship with financial distress. However, 
the board size, audit committee size, and remuneration committee size are significant but 
have a positive relationship with financial distress.  
Fifthly, the results from model 8e, that combines all the corporate governance 
mechanisms demonstrate that only disclosure of proxy voting arrangements in the annual 
reports and institutional ownership is not significantly related to financial distress. 
Further, the results from the model indicate that the proportion of independent directors, 
board activity, board member qualification, a firm’s chairperson on the audit committee, 
remuneration committee size, directors’ remuneration, presence of senior independent 
director, disclosure of meeting notice in the annual reports, directors’ ownership, and 
concentrated ownership are all significant and negatively related to financial distress.   
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Sixthly, using the AIC to compare the models to determine the model that has the best fit, 
the results from Table XIII indicates that model 8e is the one that has the best fit. This 
further confirms that a model that combines all the corporate governance mechanisms 
predicts financial distress better.  
Finally, using the AIC to compare the result in model 7e from Table XII which represents 
firms in the AIM and that of model 8e from Table XIII which also represents firms in the 
Main Market, the evidence indicates that model 7e has lower AIC value (561.13) than the 
AIC value of model 8e which is 748.56 This result indicates that corporate governance 
mechanisms are more effective in predicting financial distress of firms in the AIM than 
firms in the Main Market.  
8.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The chapter concentrates on the moderating influence of firms’ environment (complexity, 
dynamism, and munificence), resource (tangible resource and intangible resource), and 
technology on the relationship between board composition and structure variables, 
ownership structure variables, disclosure and transparency variables, and the overall 
corporate governance variables; and financial distress. The chapter finds that the 
significance or the insignificance of the corporate governance mechanisms change when 
they interact with the moderating variables. The evidence of the chapter reveals that for 
the moderating role of environment, consistently, environmental dynamism has a more 
moderating influence. This is followed by environmental complexity and then the 
environmental munificence. For the moderating role of resource, the evidence of the 
chapter shows that intangible resource has more moderating influence than the tangible 
resource in the interaction of board composition and structure as well as the ownership 
structure variables. However, the chapter finds evidence that in the interaction of resource 
with the disclosure and transparency and the overall corporate governance variables, the 
tangible resource has more moderating influence than the intangible resource. For the 
interaction of the overall corporate governance mechanisms and all the moderating 
variables, technology has more moderating influence and this followed by environmental 
dynamism, environmental complexity, tangible resource, intangible resource and then the 
environmental munificence. The chapter concludes that although the corporate 
governance mechanisms had influences on firms’ financial distress, models incorporating 
the moderating role of technology, the three environmental dimensions, and the tangible 
and intangible resource are found to be of best fit indicating that these contextual factors 
have moderating roles on the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
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financial distress. Also, the chapter concludes with the evidence that corporate 
governance mechanisms are more effective in determining the financial distress of firms 
in the Main market than firms in the AIM. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the summary and conclusion of this study. The chapter also 
discusses some of the policy implications, limitations of the study and possible insight 
for future research.  The subsequent sections of the chapter are structured as follows.  
Section 9.2 gives the research objective, Section 9.3 presents a summary of the 
methodology adopted for the study, whereas Section 9.4 gives a summary of the policy 
implication of the study. In section 9.5, the contribution of the study is summarised, while 
the main limitations of the study are presented under section 9.6. Finally, the 
recommendation for future research and improvements is given in section 9.7.  
9.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The aim of this current study was to enhance the understanding of the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and firms’ financial distress and improve 
upon the understanding of the moderating role of environment, resource, and technology 
on the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and financial distress 
using a panel of 200 UK listed firms. To realise this general objective, the study developed 
four specific and distinct objectives, and these include: 
1. Assessing whether the composition and structure of corporate boards are 
associated with the financial distress of UK firms. 
2. Evaluating whether the different forms of firms’ ownership (directors, 
institutional and concentrated ownerships) have any influence on the financial 
distress of UK firms. 
3. Determining the extent to which disclosure and transparency components of 
corporate governance are related to the financial distress of UK firms. 
4. Determining whether the environment, resources, and technological capability 
moderate the relationship between board composition and structure variables, 
ownership structure variables, and disclosure and transparency variables, and the 
financial distress of UK firms.  
9.3 RESEARCH METHODS AND METHODOLOGY 
The population for the study was all listed companies on the London Stock Exchange for 
the period 2009 to 2016. This population was selected as it provided a good source to 
obtain the sample of distressed and non-distressed firms required for the study because it 
is a requirement for listed firms to report on how they have applied the main principles 
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of the corporate governance code and prepare and publish their annual reports. This 
current study used secondary data and as such, it was possible to obtain the corporate 
governance data: data for the control variables, as well as the data for the moderating 
factors required for the study. To ensure that the results reflected the current corporate 
governance environment, and the reviews and developments in corporate governance, an 
eight-year period from 2009 to 2016 were used.   
In arriving at the sample, the study eliminated samples of banks and other financial 
institutions from the population because this sample of companies is subject to different 
regulatory standards, compliance and institutional requirements. Therefore, to make an 
analysis and comparison uniform across all samples, the study sample only included non-
financial firms. As of 22nd August 2016, there were 1961 listed firms. After eliminating 
firms in the banking and other financial institutions, the number of non-financial firms 
was 1386. Using Altman’s (1983) Z-Score model which he reviewed in 2002 in his study 
of ‘revisiting credit scoring models in Basel two environments, the study selected a 
sample of 100 financially distressed and 100 financially non-distressed listed UK firms. 
9.4 RECOMMENDATIONS/POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The results of the study present many implications. The evidence of this study shows the 
significance of including firms’ contextual factors in determining the impacts of corporate 
governance on firms’ financial distress.  
1. The evidence of the study suggests that the effect of corporate governance on 
financial distress is moderated by firms’ technological capability. This clearly 
shows that as technology continues to develop and drive businesses in areas such 
as product development, production, marketing, and delivery, policy makers need 
to incorporate technology in the design of corporate governance structures to 
ensure that firms consider technology as a significant contextual factor in their 
effort to use corporate governance mechanisms to avoid financial distress since 
the influence of corporate governance on ﬁrms’ financial distress change as 
research and development investment intensity becomes stronger. Hence, the 
study recommends that firms nominate a technical director to oversee the firm’s 
technological needs.  
2. The evidence of the study demonstrates that environmental dynamism has a 
moderating influence on corporate governance and financial distress relationship. 
In an environment which is dynamic, firms need more division of labour at top 
management teams to follow the rapidly changing segments of the environment 
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(Dess and Origer 1987) and this requires the board to have the number of members 
who can effectively monitor management to improve performance to avoid 
financial distress. Also, directors especially, those whose firms are more 
susceptible to the dynamic environment need to have adequate knowledge of the 
dynamic environment to have strategic policies that enable firms to deal with the 
dynamics in the environment to avoid the likelihood of financial distress. It is 
therefore important for policy makers to align their corporate governance strategy 
with the instability of the environment to avoid the negative impacts on 
performance.  
3. The results from the study indicate that environmental complexity has an 
influence on corporate governance and financial distress relationship. In a 
complex environment, firms find it difficult to identify, diagnose and respond to 
problems due to the interplay of inputs and outputs so one of the ways to deal with 
environmental complexity is to include the number of directors who can meet 
regularly to monitor management’s efforts to handle issues posed by the complex 
environment. It is therefore important for policy makers to recognise the impacts 
of a complex environment and align the corporate governance strategy with it to 
improve performance to avoid financial distress.    
4. From the evidence of the study, the models with the interactions of tangible and 
intangible resources are comparatively models of best fit than the model without. 
The availability of these resources increases firms’ financial health, enable the 
firms to compete thereby enhancing their survival because firms with limited 
resources may find it difficult to invest in systems for product improvements and 
new product development to respond to the challenges created by competitors. 
The study recommends that firms’ focus on ensuring that both tangible and 
intangible resources are safeguarded and used accordingly. Hence, due to their 
relevance, firms in designing their corporate governance structure policy to ensure 
continuous survival must focus on aligning such a policy that meets their resource 
capability. 
Moreover, the study finds evidence of the significance of some corporate governance 
mechanisms and these have policy implications.  
1. The evidence of the study indicates an indirect relationship of directors 
remuneration with financial distress. This is important as any excessive payments 
put firms in financial difficulty. Although remunerating directors with high 
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remuneration attract and keep the best qualified directors, policy makers must 
focus on ensuring that policies such as linking remuneration with individual and 
firm performance should be encouraged so that directors would not reward 
themselves exccessively when firms are performing badly. Policy must also be 
put in place to ensure that remuneration is not paid from non-operating income 
source as happened in Carillion Constuction Limited where directors 
remuneration was paid from borrowed money.  
2. The evidence of the study showing the significant and indirect relationship of the 
presence of the senior independent director and financial distress. This confirms 
the benefits that senior independent directors bring to the firm, such as improving 
the communication between the firm, directors and the shareholders. Hence, the 
policy recommendation is that firms should nominate one of their independent 
directors as a senior independent director for them to enjoy the benefits that such 
a director brings to the firms and their shareholders as many firms do not have 
senior independent directors.  
3. The results from the study show that firms that disclose a notice of an annual 
general meeting in their annual reports avoid being financially distressed. This, 
therefore, highlights the significance of the disclosure of such information to the 
shareholders and all the stakeholder groups. Policies should, therefore, aim at 
encouraging many firms to disclose such information clearly in their annual 
reports that are easily recognisable not at the end of the annual reports.  
4. The study finds an indirect relationship between directors’ ownership and 
financial distress. This consequently leads to the recommendation that firms 
should give their directors the opportunity to own shares. Many directors do not 
own shares but when directors become shareholders, any decision they make 
impacts on their investment.  
5. The study also provides evidence of an indirect relationship between concentrated 
ownership and financial distress and recommends concentrated ownership 
because it is beneficial for firms to reduce the likelihood of financial distress since 
large shareholders are incentivised and often have the expertise and resources to 
monitor effectively the behaviour of management.  
6. From the results of this study, board size is significantly and directly related to 
financial distress which then indicates that large board size leads to firms’ 
financial distress. This raises the question of the optimal number of directors a 
firm should have on its board? Hence, this evidence will help policy makers come 
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up with board size that fits a firm’s size since the corporate governance code is 
not specific to the size of a firm’s board.  
7. Resulting from the significant and indirect relationship between board activity and 
financial distress, the study recommends that firms should encourage their board 
members to attend board meetings. However, the study recommends that the code 
establish a cap on the number of directorships a director should engage in. This is 
because some board members take up many directorships and may therefore not 
attend all board meetings during the year. Policy regarding the appointing process 
of directorship of firms should include a cap on directorship such that if someone 
is already engaged as a director of a certain number of firms he/she cannot take 
additional responsibilities in new firms. This will enable directors to attend all 
their meetings during the year. 
8. From the evidence of the study, board member qualification is significantly and 
indirectly related to firms’ financial distress since having directors with the right 
qualifications increase the firms’ resources, improve its access to outside 
resources, as well as enhance monitoring. Policy makers, therefore, need to ensure 
that firms hire and keep directors who have the qualifications that fit their business 
requirements.  
9. The results further show the significance and direct influence of financial 
expertise on financial distress. Although financial experts enhance the quality of 
firms’ financial reports and reporting, financial experts are expensive to have, 
hence firms’ policy must focus on having only the required board members with 
financial expertise.  
10. The audit committee size is evidently shown in the study to have a direct 
relationship with financial distress. Audit committees enhance the internal 
governance practice and improve the resources of internal monitoring. The policy 
recommendation is that for firms to enjoy the benefits of their audit committees 
and avoid financial distress, the size of the audit committee should be kept smaller 
since large- sized audit committees may lose concentration and become less 
participative.  
11. The evidence of the study further indicates that the remuneration committee size 
is significantly and indirectly associated with financial distress. This means that 
having an efficient mechanism such as the remuneration committee to focus the 
firm on appropriate remuneration policies for the executive and the non-executive 
directors enhances the firm survivability. It is therefore important for policy 
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makers to ensure that the right number of board members are on the remuneration 
committee to enable it performs its functions appropriately without incurring 
excessive costs to the firms’ operations. 
Finally, the evidence of the study confirms the effect of specific company characteristics 
such as firm age and firm size on the financial distress of firms. Results of this study 
indicate that all the control variables have been found significant and have negative in 
estimating the relationship between corporate governance and financial distress. As a 
result, the study suggests the need for policy makers to identify the specific firm 
characteristics to work towards improving those areas to improve profitability and avoid 
financial distress. 
9.5 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
The primary contribution of this study to the literature is the provision of evidence, for 
the first time that in the order of significance; technology, environmental dynamism, 
environmemtal complexity, tangible resource, intangible resource, and environmental 
munificence moderate the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
firms’ financial distress. Empirical studies (Fich and Slezak 2008; Chang 2009; Donker 
et al. 2009; Lajili and Zéghal 2010; Platt and Platt 2012; Brédart 2014; Manzaneque et al. 
2016b) have made significant contributions both theoretically and empirically to the 
relationship between various mechanisms of corporate governance and financial distress. 
Although Dedman and Filatotchev (2008) acknowledge that the role of corporate 
governance is likely to change in ways contingent on the firms’ internal and external 
contextual factors, extant studies have not investigated whether the relationship between 
corporate governance and financial distress could be moderated by the firms’ contextual 
factors such as the environment, resource, and technology. This study has provided 
evidence that firms’ financial distress is not only the results of financial variables, firm 
characteristics, and corporate governance mechanisms but also that the relationship is 
moderated by the firms’ technology, environment, and resources. 
Another important contribution of the research is that it demonstrates that the impact of 
certain corporate governance elements on ﬁrms’ financial distress changes under different 
conditions. This is explained by the fact that the significance or the insignificance of some 
corporate governance elements change when they interact with environmental 
complexity, environmental dynamism, environmental munificence, tangible resource, 
intangible resource, and technology. The study finds evidence that although the senior 
independent director is significant, it lost its significance when it interacts with the 
      
225 
 
environmental complexity, environmental dynamism, and technology. Likewise, the 
study finds evidence that concentrated ownership became insignificant when it interacted 
with environmental complexity and environmental dynamism. This suggests that the 
impact of corporate governance mechanisms on ﬁrms’ financial distress needs to be 
understood in the context of firms’ environmental complexity, environmental dynamism, 
environmental munificence, tangible resource, intangible resource, and technological 
capability. This will enable firms’ in compliance with the requirements of the corporate 
governance code design, implement, and monitor their corporate governance structures 
that will fit the needs of their environment, resource, and technological capability. 
Another significant contribution of the study is that it reveals that corporate governance 
mechanisms are relatively more effective in predicting financial distress of firms in the 
AIM than the firms in the Main market. This is because evidence of the study reveals that 
the corporate governance model of firms in the Main market has a higher AIC arithmetic 
value than the corporate governance model of firms in the AIM. This evidence confirms 
that although all listed firms are expected to comply or explain the principles of corporate 
governance, firms in the AIM follow different corporate governance requirements than 
firms in the Main market. 
Moreover, the study makes a significant contribution to existing studies by demonstrating 
that firms’ financial distress can be as a result of the presence of the senior independent 
director and the disclosure of notice of the annual general meeting in the annual reports 
which have been hardly investigated. Empirically, corporate governance variables such 
as board size, the proportion of independent directors, audit committee independence, and 
institutional ownership have been studied to ascertain their impact on financial distress. 
For instance, Lajili and Zéghal (2010) investigated ownership structure, internal turnover, 
board changes, and board composition, while Brédart (2014)  studied board size, the 
proportion of independent directors, and board activity. Results from this current study 
demonstrate that the presence of senior independent director and disclosure of notice of 
the annual general meeting in the annual reports are all significantly and negatively 
related to financial distress. These results, therefore, underline the contribution that these 
variables make in corporate governance and firms’ financial distress studies. 
Furthermore, the study contributes to the limited research evidence on the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and financial distress in the UK where current 
knowledge and understanding is limited. Previous studies (Elloumi and Gueyie 2001; Lee 
and Yeh 2004; Fich and Slezak 2007; Chang 2009; Donker et al. 2009; Lajili and Zeghal 
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2010; Bredart 2014) on corporate governance and financial distress occurred outside the 
UK and the very ones that were studied in the UK (Appiah 2013; Poletti-Hughes and 
Ozkan 2014; Hsu and Wu 2014) focused on failed firms which are characteristically 
different from financially distressed companies. Corporate governance arrangements are 
diverse, showing differences across firms, sectors, and countries (Dedman and 
Filatotchev 2008). Although the UK is often regarded as having similar institutional and 
financial characteristics as the US and other major countries, the necessity for country 
specific models of corporate financial distress prediction is well-established (Taffler and 
Abassi 1984), because of differences in legal, cultural and regulatory systems (Smith and 
Liou 2007). As a result, one cannot simply extrapolate empirical findings from the US 
and the other major countries’ studies to the UK settings, no matter how similar the 
environment may initially appear (Dedman and Filatotchev 2008). The study, therefore, 
adds evidence to the significance of corporate governance mechanisms to UK firms’ 
financial distress by using corporate governance data from UK firms. 
Finally, the study adds evidence to the relevance of using a multi-theoretical approach 
(Lajili and Zeghal 2010) to address different aspects and requirements of corporate 
governance mechanisms including those relating to board size, the proportion of 
independent directors, board activity, board member qualification, board member 
financial expertise, directors’ ownership, institutional ownership, and concentrated 
ownership in the UK where there is a limited evidence. The multi-theoretic approach 
enables each corporate governance mechanism to be understood from a different 
theoretical perspective.  
9.6 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
The study identified some limitations despite the implications discussed above.  
1. The first limitation noted is the criteria used in the sample selection. The study 
used Altman (1983, 2002) Z-score to select its sample of both financially 
distressed and financially non-distressed firms. The Altman’s Z-score has faced 
some criticisms which include the fact that it has a poor record as a predictor since 
statistical models based on financial data are likely to describe events but not 
necessarily good at predicting outcomes. Also, Letza (1994) concludes that 
Altman’s model shows that the use of MDA models as a predictor of bankruptcy 
can involve major understatements of classification errors. Another criticism of 
the Altman’s Z-score especially, the 1968 Z-score is that it is outdated, and it is 
not as effective in predicting bankruptcy for non-manufacturing, as for 
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manufacturing firms. In a response to this criticism, Altman (1983) estimated the 
Z-score model that excluded the variable sales/total assets ratio, due to the 
potential industry eﬀect that is more likely to take place when this kind of 
industry-sensitive variable (asset turnover) is included in the model, and that the 
1983 revised model is intended for both privately held and publicly listed ﬁrms, 
and for both manufacturing and non-manufacturing ﬁrms (Altman et al. 2017). 
Although Altman’s Z-score has been criticised, it has gained acceptance by 
auditors, management accountants, and database systems, and it is one of the best-
known, statistically derived predictive models used to forecast a firm’s impending 
bankruptcy (Moyer 2005). Altman’s Z-score was adopted in this study because it 
considered the multivariate effects of the variables as compared to existing studies 
that used accounting and financial indicators. For instance, as indicated earlier, 
interest coverage ratio was used by Asquith et al. (1994), Claessens et al. (2003), 
Fich and Slezak (2008), Pindado et al. (2008), and Poletti-Hughes and Ozka 
2014). Negative cumulative earning, on the other hand, was adopted by Gilbert et 
al. (1990), whereas operating margin was used by Theodossiou et al. (1996). Net 
income was also used by Ang and Mauck (2011) and Miglani et al. (2015b), while 
market value was adopted by Pindado et al. (2008) and Manzaneque et al. 
(2016a,b).   
2. Another limitation of the study is the use of a matched sample approach. In this 
study, 100 distressed firms were matched with 207 non-distressed firms using size 
measured by total assets. Although both the distressed and the non-distressed 
firms were identified using the Altman’s criteria, matching based on firm size led 
to the selection of those non-distressed firms that matched the distressed firms. 
This approach meant that the remaining 107 non-distressed firms were not 
included in the sample. Thus, those non-distressed firms whose sizes did not 
match that of the distressed firms were dropped. This could mean that the 
estimation samples of the distressed and non-distressed firms were not illustrative 
of the overall population of firms as argue by Ooghe et al. (1995) that the 
estimation samples of distressed and non-distressed firms are not illustrative of 
the overall population of firms if the match sampling technique is used. This study, 
however, used the matched-pair approach because it provides a systematic method 
for determining the sample of healthy companies and is used in many studies in 
this research area (Mangena and Chamisa 2008; Hsu and Wu 2014). 
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3. The relatively small sample size is another limitation identified in the study. 
Although the study identified 1386 firms after excluding the financial firms from 
the firms listed on the London Stock Exchange, the further exclusion of firms 
without full eight years data to compute the Z-score, and the use of four 
consecutive years criterion for identifying whether a firm is distressed or non-
distressed limited the sample of firms to 113 firms and 207 firms for distressed 
and non-distressed firms, respectively. After excluding 13 firms from the 113 
distressed firms due to the unavailability of data for the variables in the study, and 
using the matched pair approach indicated, it meant the study sample was 200 
firms divided equally between distressed and non-distressed firms. The sample of 
200 firms is relatively small and this could impact on the stability of the models 
(Platt and Platt 1990) and this may further imply that the estimated model’s 
predictive accuracy is misleading (Hambrick and D’Aveni 1988). However, in 
comparison with the extant literature (Daily 1996; Elloumi and Gueyié 2001; Lee 
and Yeh 2004; Nahar Abdullah 2006; Bronson et al. 2009), a sample of 200 firms 
in the study was relatively high and that the study’s use of an 8-year panel data 
meant that a total of 1600 observation were analysed.   
4. The source of data is another limitation identified in the study. The data for the 
computation of the Z-score, the data for the control variables as well as that of the 
moderating variables were obtained from AMADEUS database, a commercial 
database providing financial information on over ten million public and private 
firms. The main weakness of using this data source is that any major error 
identified in the data could influence the results of the study. The corporate 
governance data was, however, extracted manually from the firms’ annual reports 
that were downloaded from the firms’ websites. Although this was very time 
consuming, it ensured that the data was not subjected to errors which could have 
occurred at database sources had this data been obtained from those sources. 
However, to reduce the errors that could have happened in obtaining data from 
AMADEUS database, most of the variables were verified when the corporate 
governance data was manually extracted. Notwithstanding the limitation that 
could be associated with obtaining data from the AMADEUS database, 
researchers including Afrifa and Tauringana (2015) and Tingbani (2015) have 
sourced the data for their studies from this source.  
5. Moreover, the study identified that the definition and measurement of some 
independent variables, the control variables, and the moderating factors could 
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undermine the results of the study. For instance, the definition and measure for 
board gender diversity, board member qualification, board member financial 
expertise, firm size, and that of all control variables could produce different 
outcomes if different definitions and measurements are adopted.  
6. In addition, the study is limited by the fact that some of the variables including 
the senior independent director, the presence of a firm’s chairperson on the audit 
committee, the presence of a firm’s chairperson on the remuneration committee, 
and the disclosure of notice of annual general meeting in the annual reports lack 
the empirical background. Although the study found it difficult to obtain the 
empirical literature for these variables, it was significant to bring these variables 
into the corporate governance and financial distress study, in addition to the 
already known variables like board size, the proportion of independent directors 
and audit committee size.  
7. Finally, the study is limited by the fact that the sample was drawn from only one 
source, the LSE. The population of the study was all listed firms on the LSE during 
August 2016. This meant that firms that could be financially distressed but were 
not listed were excluded from the analysis. Although data obtained from listed 
firms is comparatively trusted and reliable due to the high standards of reporting 
expected of listed firms, drawing a sample from only one source limits the results 
to that source. This translates that one should exercise caution when generalising 
the results of the study. Notwithstanding this, studies by Hong-xia et al. (2008), 
Donker et al. (2009), Brédart (2014), and Shahwan (2015) respectively, selected 
their samples of distressed and non-distressed firms from Stock Exchanges in 
China, Amsterdam, United States, and Egypt.  
9.7 FURTHER RESEARCH 
The limitations of the study discussed above open several avenues for further studies and 
improvement and these are: 
1. The study used Altman (1983, 2002) Z-score to identify its sample of financially 
distressed and financially non-distressed firms. Since there is no well accepted 
definition of financial distress and that researchers select their sample of 
distressed and non-distressed firms based on their study purpose, different criteria 
could be used to select these samples to observe if similar outcomes could be 
achieved. 
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2. The study adopted a matched pair sample approach that led to some non-distressed 
firms identified by the criteria being left out and this reduced the sample size. 
Different sample approach such as the random sample, which could prevent 
misclassification biases associated with the matched pair approach, could be 
adopted in a further study to determine if sample size could be increased. Related 
to the sample size, is the study’s use of four consecutive years to identify a firm 
as distressed or non-distressed, as well as a firm having full eight years accounts 
to be included in the Z-score computation. A different approach could be used to 
relax some of the sample selection criteria to avoid cases where many of the firms 
were dropped from the sample due to the non-availability of financial data for the 
entire period under consideration in a further study to realise if the sample size 
could be improved to enhance the reliability of the outcome.  
3. The study used data from the AMADEUS database for the control variables, the 
moderating factors as well to compute the Z-score values. This database has 
inputed the data from firms’ annual reports onto its website and since any major 
error that occurred in the process could affect the data which invariably could 
affect the results, different data sources such as obtaining the data manually from 
the firms’ annual reports could be adopted to determine if similar results could be 
achieved.  
4.  The sample for the study was obtained from the London Stock Exchange. 
Corporate governance arrangements are different across different countries. In 
addition, different Stock Exchanges have different reporting requirements and 
economic and fiscal conditions in different economies could affect the 
performance of firms that operate in those countries. It would be significant for 
further studies to replicate this study using different Stock Exchanges and 
countries to ascertain if similar evidence could be obtained.  
5. Also, further studies can be carried out to include other corporate governance 
mechanisms such as directors’ and CEOs characteristics including age, length of 
service, number of board meeting attended by each director, and directorship in 
other companies to explore their relationships with financial distress.  
6. Similarly, different financial variables and firm characteristics such as investment 
and market ratios, and location of firms can also be explored in further studies to 
measure their influence on firms’ financial distress. 
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